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This thesis examines the methodology prevalent in the analysis of democratic 
transitions, focusing upon the case study of Spain. Although current literature 
provides a detailed description of actions taken by elite actors during transition 
periods and the resultant outcomes, it fails to adequately connect these two factors. 
This thesis seeks to address the gap in the current literature and to underline the 
necessity for an explanatory methodology to take into account an amalgamation of 
approaches. 
The case of Spain is drawn upon to highlight the importance of the connection 
between the role of elite actors and the constraints set in place by the system in which 
they operate. I argue that an awareness of the existing parameters, both institutional 
and societal, is critical for an assessment of possible action to be undertaken. The 
methodology of comparative politics provides the ability to ascertain where there 
exists a failing in current theoretical approaches and to address this problem through 
increased analysis. An increasingly comprehensive appreciation of the actions of 
individuals and the underlying forces that drive these actions deepens our 
understanding of transition processes as a whole. I would argue that this thesis has 
implications for future research and indeed, relevance in the actual practice of politics. 
An awareness of the connection between the individual and the overriding political 
system is paramount for our understanding of democratic transitions and for future 
investigation of such processes. In this way, the thesis underlines that the connection 
between the micro and macro interpretations of transitions is fundamental; not only to 
guiding systematic analysis, but also to ensuring that research does not remain in the 
confines of the theoretical but is relevant in the real world. 
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Introduction 
When all the dust has been swept away... 
"What is Spain? Spain is a swirl of dust on the path of history after a great nation has 
galloped past. "' 
"When all the dust has been swept away, therein will you see the shape of things2" 
The driving force behind this thesis has been the desire to explain better the role and 
relative power of individuals within democratic transitions. There exists a wealth of 
literature detailing the events and trajectory of the Spanish transition to democracy and 
yet no real attempt has been made to analyse the role of elite actors within the process 
itself. 
The role and influence of individuals is a topic of great interest to the field of 
political science and merits further investigation. 3 The necessity to understand on a 
more fundamental level, the capabilities and constraints associated with individual 
involvement in democratic transitions is intricately connected to a comprehensive 
awareness of the form of transitions as a process. Focusing my thesis on the Spanish 
transition provided the ideal forum in which to debate and deconstruct the actions taken 
and the decisions made by those involved in creating political change. The initial 
impetus of this thesis was solely aimed at highlighting the importance of individuals 
over the more traditionally accepted structural understanding of transitions. This 
methodology led to a historically-linear interpretation of the Spanish transition and did 
little to further the field of political science. What became apparent was the need to 
incorporate various theoretical approaches in order to construct an intrinsically coherent 
structure within which to examine the period in question. It was not sufficient simply to 
elucidate Spain's transition to democracy from a micro-individualistic perception, but 
t (Jose Ortega y Gasset) 2 Quote given by author 3 
"There is also widespread agreement that political elites play a central role in democratization. In 
particular, whether there is a transition from dictatorship to democracy seems to depend heavily on the 
interests, values, and actions of political leaders, whether seconded, downwardly mobile, or at least 
potentially, upwardly mobile. " (I3unce 2000,707). 
2 
rather attempt to situate decisions made, and actions taken by individuals, within the 
wider constraints of the structural framework that encompasses political activity. To 
this end, various approaches were considered and some discarded in the search for 
greater clarity, those that remained granted the greatest degree of understanding for the 
data available. 
Case Study: Spain 
The choice of Spain was a relatively obvious one, in addition to my own 
personal interest in the country, the example set by the Spanish case is one that has been 
studied extensively and emulated by countries around the world. During the first half of 
the twentieth century Spain experienced political upheaval, civil war, WW2 and 
dictatorship at the hands of Francisco Franco. One could argue therefore that Spain was 
not only familiar with periods of change, but had also suffered sufficiently to demand a 
more positive political situation. 4 What makes the Spanish case remarkable is the speed 
and apparent case with which a successful transition was executed. This is not to say 
that the entire process was completed without difficulty and free from violence; far from 
it, but the timeframe outlined demonstrates the phenomenal ability displayed by those 
involved to engineering change, and to certain extent speaks to the nature of the 
parameters under which decisions were made and action was possible. 5 
While this thesis deals with Spain as a case study, and does so for the reasons 
outlined above, the intrinsic nature of the analysis allows it to be applied to democratic 
4 "For many Spaniards, democratization meant awakening from a nightmare of overwrought worldviews 
and dogmatic enthusiasm, and the collective memory of this debacle made the country receptive to a 
political strategy that, while not hostile to civic engagement, was often indifferent to it. " (McDonough et. 
al. 1998,2). S 
"All evaluations, however, see Spanish leaders as consciously striving to direct events so as to minimize 
the potential for conflict, to craft a transition that would not stir up the demons in historical memory. " (McDonough et. al. 1998,10). 
3 
transitions as a general political process and not simply constrained to the example in 
question. This thesis does not purport to have created nor established a paradigm with 
which to fully comprehend democratic transitions, but an attempt has been made to 
produce a theoretical approach capable of addressing questions previously unanswered. 
Chief among the questions that informed this thesis arc: What was the actual role of 
individuals within Spain's democratic transition? What drove them to act in the manner 
in which they did? How aware were they of the external factors that controlled and 
shaped their decisions? Were they aware of their ability to manipulate the system as 
well as be manipulated in turn? Can individuals truly affect change in the face of 
overwhelming structural and traditional formulated shackles? These are all questions 
that lay at the very heart of our understanding of democratic transitions and they are all 
questions that have yet to be answered satisfactorily. 
The manner in which this thesis was designed and has been presented was in 
order to facilitate greater understanding of both the case study itself and of the 
mechanism employed for analysis of said data. In any attempt to deal with a subject as 
vast and detailed as a democratic transition, one must naturally be selective in the 
material one investigates and subsequently presents to the reader. Not all areas can be 
covered, not all data can be included and not all theoretical approaches applied. With 
this in mind, I set about constructing the thesis based upon parameters that would best 
allow me to address the questions posed above. In order for the thesis to be grounded 
within the appropriate context, I included a chapter detailing the historical aspects of the 
period in question. This was required as it provides the necessary background to grasp 
fully the implications of the data discussed in subsequent chapters. I have included a 
chapter outlining the methodology employed in an attempt to prevent repetition of 
definition as the thesis progressed. For the actual analysis undertaken, I have chosen 
4 
four events throughout the transition period to examine. The selected events mark the 
significant beginning and the end of the transition period. While alternative events are 
of potentially equal merit for inclusion and consideration in a work of this nature, the 
four in question were selected due to their undeniable importance to the process and the 
character of their respective structures. The four events are varied in nature, thus 
requiring varied sets of analytical tools. No single tool accurately explains all four 
events; no single theoretical approach provides a comprehensive deconstruction of the 
underlying motivations present. 
Theoretical Approaches 
The task of constructing an applicable methodology consumed a great deal of 
time to formulate. I examined existing literature and prevalent theoretical approaches 
that had been applied to both the Spanish case and to other democratic transitions. 
Through a process of trial and error, I was able to eliminate those approaches that failed 
to make a substantive contribution to this thesis and I was subsequently left with a core 
of approaches that best suited the material for consideration. The approaches which I 
settled on arc outlined below, and the relative merits of those chosen arc detailed and 
discussed. The purpose of the theoretical chapter is intended to provide the reader with 
a general overview of the methods employed in this thesis, not to detail minutely the 
approaches from inception to modern-day. 
While there is a certain amount of detail provided regarding each approach that 
has been chosen and the reasons for their selection, I restrict myself to that level of 
information that proves useful, as opposed to an in depth analysis of the theoretical 
approaches themselves. The approaches chosen were selected for their relevant 
5 
connection to the data and the part they play in the wider context of the thesis is 
highlighted accordingly. The main focus, when selecting applicable theoretical 
approaches, was that of ensuring the data could be handled adequately and 
comprehensively. With the obvious concentration, outlined above, upon the actions of 
individuals and how they relate to the structures that guide and constrain them, it was 
evident that the theoretical approaches that would prove most applicable would be those 
that dealt with a complete analysis of the motivations of single actors. 
Rational Choice will form the basis of my thesis from a micro perspective as it 
enables one to determine, not only why actions were taken, but also what actions would 
be taken in a given set of circumstances. This provides us with a degree of predictive 
ability and allows the thesis in question to be of use when applied to alternative case 
studies. Accurate examination of the reasons behind the actions of individuals is at the 
very heart of this thesis as an attempt is made to outline why certain decisions were 
taken and others disregarded. Rationality plays a vital role in the process of 
understanding political processes but also, paradoxically, serves to prevent complete 
understanding of the underlying reasons behind the decisions, if this is the only 
methodology employed. The issue of rational behaviour is one that this thesis will 
focus on throughout but not without sufficient consideration to those factors which are 
perhaps not as easily mapped or analysed, namely institutional and structural 
constraints. In order to situate the actions of individuals within the wider context of 
political structure, I will utilise elements of the Institutional approach. This will enable 
me better to explain the actions in line with traditional understanding of transition 
processes. The Institutional approach will provide the wider context within which can 
be placed a more fundamental analysis of the actions of individuals. The merit of this 
thesis will be determined by how successfully various theoretical approaches arc 
6 
connected and to what extent the exercise furthers the understanding of democratic 
transitions. 
Spain's Path to Democracy 
The historical chapter of this thesis is designed to provide the reader with 
sufficient background information to understand the actual analysis presented in the 
main body. Rather than organize the chapters as amalgamations of historical and 
analytical data, it was deemed necessary to separate these two factors and in so doing, 
greatly simplify the process and increase the case with which the thesis could be read. 
Despite the relative speed with which the transition in Spain was exacted there is still a 
great deal of information that is relevant and critically so, for a fundamental 
understanding of the process at large. For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen the 
nomination of Juan Carlos in 1975 as the starting date and have ended my thesis with an 
analysis of the attempted coup d'etat by the military against the State in 1981. 
Although these two events arc markers for a period of tremendous activity and change, 
there arc of course factors preceding the nomination of Juan Carlos that played their 
respective roles in creating parameters and establishing traditions and accepted forms of 
action. The historical chapter provides the reader with the wider context of Spanish 
history and delves into detail not provided in the chapters that focus on the individual 
events chosen. There exists a plethora of information regarding the historical and 
factual side of the transition and as a result, I do not intend to make a substantive 
contribution in this respect, save to provide the reader with the information required to 
6 (1lcywood 1995), (Powell, 2001), (Preston, 2004). These three works, among many others, give an in 
depth and detailed account of the events that transpired in Spain prior to, during and after the transition to 
democracy and much of the information contained within the Historical Chapter of this thesis is derived 
from these sources among others. 
7 
understand the subsequent analysis. The aim of this thesis is not to rewrite Spanish 
history, nor even to provide additional information from an historical perspective but 
rather to deconstruct well documented decisions and actions in an effort to deepen our 
understanding of the process as a whole. 
The information contained within the historical account will attempt to illustrate 
the complexity of Spain as well as the underpinning pillars of traditional society that 
helped to shape and structure the political arena in which the transition took place. 
Were this thesis simply concerned with explaining the transition from a linear 
perspective, there would perhaps be no need to include information relating to past 
events but as the aim is to increase understanding from both a micro and a macro 
perspective, previous events and existing structures arc crucial for any understanding of 
events that follow. The necessity to ground the decisions taken during the six year 
period in question rests upon the intimate connection between the past and the present. 7 
Shared heritage and cultural awareness play a decisive role in the decision making 
process of any particular country; lessons learned from previous regimes and experience 
gained through trial and bloodshed produce certain responses in given situations. It is 
imperative to take into account the historical and institutional structure of a country 
when attempting to explain the reasons behind change as momentous as a democratic 
transition. The importance of the past cannot be overlooked or underestimated in any 
analysis of political events as to do so is to ignore that which originally gave birth to the 
structural constraints! 
7 
"Taking it a step further, I can confirm that the man of today is living through past history, in the 
manner in which he lives now, like a prison from which he must escape. " (Aranguren 1974,20). 
(Translated from original by author). 
1 
"We need a historically based analysis to tell us what they (actors) are trying to maximise and why they 
emphasize certain goals over others. " (Thelen and Steinmo 1992,9). 
8 
First Event Chapter: The Nomination of Juan Carlos 
The first of the four event chapters presented in this thesis details the 
nomination of Juan Carlos by Franco in 1975 and is to mark the start of the period I 
have selected for analysis. The decision by Franco did of course not take place in a 
vacuum and to a certain extent, this will be dealt with in the chapter itself, but much of 
the information building to this decision is detailed in the historical chapter. Given the 
importance this thesis will place upon the role of individuals, it seemed only fitting to 
begin the process with an examination of a decision taken that centred on the interaction 
of two single actors: Franco constituting the existing power base, and Juan Carlos 
representing the future one. The chapter will examine the selection method used by 
Franco and demonstrate the true distribution of power that existed at the time. This 
distribution was to set the parameters within which decisions could be made and actions 
taken. The role of Juan Carlos will be examined in an attempt to illustrate the manner 
in which those actors, subordinate within the game are able to act. The relationship 
between Franco and Juan Carlos was highly important and the expectations placed upon 
Juan Carlos by the Caudillo even more so. 
The nomination of Juan Carlos has been chosen as it represents, in many ways, 
the true essence of the Spanish transition to democracy. Franco's choice of Juan Carlos 
marked the end of the old regime and ushered in the beginning of the new. Events in 
Spain changed dramatically from this point on but from the outset, the event itself did 
not guarantee this. The chapter will look at the manner in which Juan Carlos conducted 
himself during the process and ask questions as to the underlying motivations of Franco. 
The way in which individuals react to each other, alternatively collaborating and 
competing will also be highlighted in this chapter. 
9 
Second Event Chapter: The Nomination of Adolfo Sufirez 
The second event chapter will deal with the first aggressive decision taken by 
Juan Carlos in the transition process, namely the removal of Arias Navarro and his 
subsequent replacement with Adolfo Suarcz. This event is a decisive one within the 
transition as it represents concrete proof that action was being taken by Juan Carlos and 
those close to him, such as Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, to orchestrate change. This 
chapter will examine the manner in which the change was made, the discussions that 
took place and the actions taken. I have selected this event for inclusion in the thesis as 
I believe it to demonstrate the true beginning of the democratic reform process. The 
nomination of Juan Carlos by Franco was an event, as will be demonstrated in the 
chapter dealing with it, very much out of the sphere of control of those later intimately 
involved in the process. The successful nomination of Adolfo Suarez was a pro-active 
decision and one that served to provide the impetus for any subsequent change that took 
place. The key actors, that played decisive roles in this event, will be examined in the 
chapter and the interaction and dialogue that existed between them will be illustrated. 
Evidence will show that actions were not taken unilaterally, and indeed, all angles were 
considered in an attempt to produce a course of action that would be successfully 
completed. 
Third Event Chapter: The Reform of the Cortes 
The third event chapter deals with what was perhaps the greatest victory on the 
part of the reformists, namely the reform of the Cortes. The events outlined in the 
previous two cvcnts chapters dcal, to a large cxtcnt, with actions taken by individuals 
10 
against other individuals; the reform of the Cortes was a mammoth undertaking by 
comparison. The Cortes, or Parliament, constituted the existing political authority and 
had been established and consolidated during Franco's regime. The traditional role of 
the Codes had been to `rubber-stamp' decisions made by Franco and to provide 
political, and to a certain extent legal, justification for these decisions. As a result, the 
majority of the members of the Cones were stalwart supporters of Franco and 
Francoism and continued to represent a very real obstacle to any notions of reform that 
may have existed well after the death of the Caudillo. 
lt is possible to view the role of the Cortes as similar to the role of Arias 
Navarro; both represented the old regime, both were well established in their respective 
positions and both saw the emergence of Juan Carlos as nothing more than a nuisance. 
The Codes was to constitute a somewhat greater challenge than Arias Navarro however. 
The Cortcs had the ability to hinder reform via their legally established and 
institutionally protected role. The strategy used by actors such as Juan Carlos, Adolfo 
Suarez and Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda is one that merits closer analysis and for this 
reason I have included this event chapter in the thesis. The task at hand was to 
transform the existing parliamentary system in such a way as to provide Spain with both 
a working and accountable political authority and a peaceful transition to democracy. 
The result of the reform of the Cones hardly credits belief. The task of reforming an 
established political system from within without repercussions was achieved in a timely 
manner and with no apparent difficulties. The reform of the Cortes, and more 
importantly, a fundamental understanding of the manner in which it was achieved is 
crucial for any interpretation of the Spanish transition to democracy. The chapter 
dealing with this event will attempt to outline the methods used by the actors and the 
parameters within which the decisions were made possible. 
Fourth Event Chapter: Attempted Military Coup 
The fourth and final event chapter deals with the attempted coup d'etat that took 
place on the 23 February 1981 (23-F). This event was selected for inclusion in this 
thesis as it not only represents the first real defence of democracy by the reformists but 
also the dc facto end to the transition process. The aftermath of the attempted coup, the 
manner in which the conspirators were dealt with and the subsequent national elections 
in Spain were steps on the road to democratic consolidation and are consequently, less 
connected to the actual process of transition. The attempted coup is an event shrouded 
in mystery for the most part. Little is known of the real involvement of the 
conspirators, indeed, not all of the conspirators arc even actually known, and yet it is an 
event that must be included in any analysis of the Spanish transition. 
The previous two events chapters deal with decisions of a pro-active nature by 
the elite actors involved in orchestrating change; what marks this chapter as different in 
this respect is that the event in question was the action of others and the elite actors in 
question were forced to react to events as opposed to initiating them. This provides an 
ideal opportunity to examine the role of individuals from a different perspective and 
allows for a greater understanding of the capabilities and constraints, which exist within 
transition processes, to be achieved. It is not until we have examined the manner in 
which individuals act, not only when they are in control but also when that control is 
wrested from them, that we can obtain an accurate picture of the way in which existing 
parameters and rational analysis will form the basis for decision making. 
It is not necessary that the attempted coup be explained in minute detail, it is 
sufficient that the event itself is used as the backdrop against which the actors were 
placed. The chapter will outline the actions taken by those involved, that we know of, 
12 
to demonstrate the manner in which communication played an integral role in the 
construction of the game, and examine the nature of decision making on the part of the 
elite actors. 23-F, as it is commonly known, is the culmination of the Spanish transition 
process and represents the ideal opportunity to analyse the lessons learnt and experience 
gained by the actors in the build up to this event. The chapter will outline the 
parameters under which those involved in the coup felt compelled to act and highlight 
the nature of the opposition and defence mounted by the reformists in turn. 
Overview 
The fundamental aim of this thesis is to deepen our understanding of the position 
taken by individuals, and the role they play within democratic transitions9. The choice 
of Spain as a case study will naturally provide insights into the actions taken during the 
period between 1975 and 1981, and enable an even greater appreciation of the 
phenomenal task undertaken during this period. This thesis does not set out to create an 
all-encompassing paradigm that will provide all answers to all questions, rather it 
attempts to take the field of political science one step closer to comprehending the 
intrinsic values, beliefs, constraints, actions and motivations placed upon and adopted 
by individual actors faced with the enormity of addressing issues such as dictatorship, 
democracy and the best way to achieve this with an absence of bloodshed. 
In Spain it was a question of reformist elements associated with the incumbent dictatorship, initiating 
processes of political change from within the established regime. " (I luntingdon 1991/2,591). 
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Chapter 1 
Twentieth Century Development: 
Spain's Path to Democracy 
The history of Spain is one that has been exhaustively documented and 
therefore, I do not intend to repeat that which has been so eloquently written before me. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual backing to the analytical framework 
and thus provide the reader with the necessary overview to fully appreciate the 
methodology used. The specific period under analysis in this thesis dates from 1975 to 
1981 and attempts to highlight those events that the author sees as key. There will be 
four events examined in total and it is therefore obvious that additional events could 
have been included and used to elaborate further on the structure and direction of this 
thesis but for the sake of space have been omitted. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explain and outline the exact reason why the four events detailed in subsequent chapters 
were chosen, and as a result, why others were not. 
While it is in fact possible to examine one of countless existing books for an 
accurate historical account of the period in question, in order to provide the reader with 
an in-depth understanding of the transition process in Spain, it is necessary for me to 
elaborate and provide the relevant contextual detail to support the choice of my 
examples. To such an end, this chapter will not simply provide a linear account of the 
transition period but will seek to explain the motivation behind decisions made and the 
justification for the events chosen. 
Francisco Franco assumed control of Spain in the aftermath of the Spanish civil 
war and held power from 1939 until his death in 1975.10 This period marks the longest 
reigning European dictatorship to date and as such, his system of government was well 
entrenched by the time of his death. Spain had lived through a civil war, the Second 
10 
-Despite the gradual institutionalization of the franquist regime, Franco's personal power remained 
virtually unlimited up until his death. In addition to his title as generalissimo of the armed forces and 
leader of the only legitimate political party, between 1938 and 1973 Franco was both head of state and 
head of government. Even in 1973, when Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco assumed the presidency (head of 
government), Franco continued to exercise supreme political power. " (Share 1986,19). 
15 
World War, through economic hardship and an atmosphere of distrust and fear. " To 
say that the county was ripe for change is perhaps somewhat misleading. Granted, there 
existed elements within the country anxious for progress but there remained a 
substantial body of support for the existing Francoist structure. 
Spain had undergone periods of economic turbulence, from high levels of 
unemployment to substantial periods of growth. The reality of living in a global 
community began to have an effect upon the progress of Spain too. The United Nations 
(UN) sponsored blockade was lined in 1950 and with this began a period of economic 
development that while not entirely successful did produce results. 12 The emergence of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), also in 1950, created new possibilities and 
the prospect of membership became an attractive concept and one that would bring with 
it increased economic prosperity. It would take Spain until 1986 to become a member 
but the existence of the EEC crystallised the vision of a new and democratic Europe. '3 
The decade 1960 to 1970 saw unprecedented rates of economic growth in Spain, 
coupled as it was with the emergence of a successfully burgeoning tourist market. The 
Gross National Product (GNP) in 1971 was 85.4% greater than it had been in 1963. 
Real per Capita income grew at an average rate of 6.4% compared with 2.8% between 
1940-1960. In the 1965, the per capita income reached $650 and this sparked a social 
revolution. Between 1964 and 1972, the hourly wage increased 287.9% while the 
11 `"Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Spanish politics was characterized by elite 
disunity, deep social and political conflicts and endemic regime instability. Moreover, rather than 
evolving through incremental reforms that become embedded in institutions and in the political culture, 
political changes often took the form of drastic swing of the pendulum from one extreme to the other. " 
(Gunther 1992,43). 
11 
"In the early 1950s an attempt was made to ease trade restrictions and stimulate private enterprise, but 
although it eventually succeeded in boosting industry it opened up a trade gap that rapidly absorbed the 
country's foreign reserves. " (I looper, J. 1995,15). 
13 "During the period 1975-94 the political economy of Spain became more closely integrated into the 
world economy. In particular, membership of the EC altered the pattern of external relations and 
redefined the position of Spain in the world from a protected national economy to an economy embedded 
in one of the world's core trading regions and within the corporate space of multinational companies. " 
(Salmon, 1995.67) 
16 
overall cost of living increased by 69.9%. 14 It may well seem from the above figures 
that Spain was stable from an economical standpoint. This was not the case however 
and there were negative aspects to counter the progress that was being experienced. 
The rapid economic growth served to increase inequality between regions within Spain 
and this was to further add to the underlying sense of a divided country. The 1970s saw 
a rise in mass opposition and unrest and this was to have an effect upon the overall 
productivity of the country. In 1966,1.5 million hours were lost due to strike action; 
this number had risen to 8.7 million in 1970 and to a tremendous 14.5 million hours by 
1975.15 The economic revolution was not being felt by all and this consequently created 
a sense of dissatisfaction with the existing regime and fermented a desire for change. 
Economic development had been halted during the Francoist regime due to the 
implementation of various outdated models. 16 This was to prove a legacy that would 
hinder progress well into the post-Franco cra. 17 
One would assume that given the level of unrest and inequality within Spain, the 
percentage of the population prepared to take an active role in the process of change 
would be relatively high; indeed there exists a theoretical basis for this assumption. 
14 These figures are taken from (Gunther, R. 24), (Lieberman. S. 1982,212-214), (Share, D. 1986,29). 
15 These figures are taken from (Share, D. 1986,36), (Maravall, J. M. 1984,271). 
16 
"Spain, after all, did grow extremely rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s and did become democratic 
after the death of Franco in the mid-1970s. Could this have happened without the industrialization, 
urbanization, and development of the middle class that were central to Spanish economic growth? Quite 
probably not. Lopez Rodo was at least partially right when he had earlier predicted that Spain would 
become democratic when its per capita income reached $2000 per head. " (IIuntington 1984/5,200). 
17 
"Spain's spectacular economic growth began only alter the franquist regime abandoned its autarchic 
policies in the late 1950s. Despite the fact that the international ostracism of Spain had come to an end by 
1953, Franco stubbornly pursued autarchic policies until 1959, when he was forced to abandon this 
political economic model. In part restrictions had strangled economic activity; agrarian production 
lagged behind demand, fuelling inflation; and Spain's balance of payments was running a serious deficit". 
(Share, D. 1986,29). 
17 
One of the most well-substantiated hypotheses in the social sciences is that 
socioeconomic change creates protoparticipatory orientation within populations; as 
societies modernize, their populations tend to become more politically active, or at least, 
to expect and demand more active roles in the political system. (Gunther et al. 1988, 
28). 
This was not entirely the case however as a survey taken in 1969 shows that only 4% of 
the youth polled were very interested in politics, 48% were partially interested and the 
remaining 48% were not at all interested. 18 This level of apathy cannot simply be 
attributed to a general lack of interest on the part of the youth, and as such, does not 
contradict the above assertion by Gunther, but can in fact be related to the preceding 
political situation in Spain under Franco. Many Spaniards had been conditioned to 
remaining outside the active political arena and this attitude was to persist. 19 
The state of political repression under Franco was to have both a positive and 
negative effect upon the transition period. As has been mentioned above, the lack of 
political freedom had created a certain status quo amongst sections of the population 
that was to prevent full participation from taking place; however, the alternative side of 
this was a backlash against the old regime and a drive towards developing the society 
from within. The Church was one such sector of society involved in this manner. It 
must be stressed at this juncture that the Church did not represent a single entity at this 
point in Spain's history as there was very much a partition within the Church between 
the younger members and the established clerical aristocracy. 20 
Survey outlined in (Alba 1978,231). 
19 
"The armed police in the cities and the Civil Guard in the smaller towns and the countryside were well- 
armed, well resourced and virtually unrestrained. Moreover, they had to deal with a population which 
had learnt the hard way that public political protest was an unaffordable luxury that day-to-day survival 
lay in political apathy. " (Preston 1995,165). 
20 
"The church experienced a still deeper division among its ranks. The young clergy, which was 
concerned with social issues, helped the workers' commissions, and in Catalonia and in the Basque 
Country, participated in the nationalist demonstrations. Even the hierarchy began to oppose the regime 
and enforce the Vatican 11 decisions. " (Alba, 1978,227). 
18 
While it is perhaps not possible to claim a single attitude from within the 
Church, it is evident that the Church had begun to distance itself from Franco towards 
the end of his regime. 2' Whether this was motivated by an internal shift from Francoist 
policy making, or as a result of a survival tactic in preparation for the life after the 
dictator, the Church played a role to a certain extent in the transition. 1971 saw the 
emergence of a progressive clement within the Spanish Church with the election of 
Cardinal Enrique y Tarancdn as President of the Spanish Episcopal Conference. 
September 1971 was a landmark date as it constituted the first ever assembly of Spanish 
Priests and Bishops but the conclusion of the event was to have a greater impact than 
the event itself. The one hundred democratically elected members voted in favour of 
civil rights and opposed church participation in the Francoist regime. This was to mark 
an open defiance of Franco by the Church and a revolutionary act at that. The Church 
had steadfastly stood as one of the foundations of a strong society under Franco, along 
with the Armed Forces and the institution of the family. This act was not the only 
manner in which the clergy participated in the transition however. When meetings of 
clandestine trade unions were banned by the regime, progressive clergymen offered 
their churches for this very purpose. 22 
By the time of Franco's death in 1975, Spain was a country in need of direction 
and guidance and yet it was not immediately clear from whence this would come. 23 The 
21 
"Meanwhile, the Church, which had initially been a mainstay of the Franco regime. began gradually 
withdrawing its support in a process of post-Conciliate aggiornamento. Eventually, both reactionary and 
opposition factions (and even some more extremist viewpoints) coexisted with the Church. This led to 
the disappearance of the former anti-clerical cleavage and made it possible to include in the Constitution a 
declaration that Spain is a lay state while still maintaining special cooperative relationships with all 
religions, but particularly with the Catholic Church. " (Lieben and Cotta 1990,123). 
22 (Gunther et al. 1998,28), (Preston. 1995,169). 23 
"The importance of certain nonclite factors must not go unnoticed. The higher level of socioeconomic 
modernization that Spain had reached by the 1970s, with substantial literacy and affluence and reduced 
class tensions certainly differed from the situation of the 1930s. In the 1970s, a widespread desire to 'join 
Europe' reinforced democratizing tendencies, made neighbouring democracies models to emulate, and, in 
some instances, led to infrastructural support for newly emerging political parties and trade unions. 
Moreover, Vatican Council li had transformed the behaviour and popular image of the Catholic church 
which, in combination with the marked secularization of Spanish society, made the religious cleavage 
19 
economy of the country was far from secure, despite having enjoyed a substantial period 
of growth, the population at large was divided between those anxious for change, and 
those apathetic to the political reality of the world, the founding strata of Franco's 
society were at odds to their previously unshakeable stability, and the man chosen by 
Franco as his successor was a relative unknown. There exists a degree of belief that 
Spain was taking its place in a wave of democratic development sweeping Europe at 
this time24 and that the transition was to become a reality due to an inexorable sway in 
this direction2S and yet this must have been somewhat problematic to credit at the time. 
The situation facing Juan Carlos upon his nomination was not an enviable one. 26 
1975 was a year of tremendous change in Spain; it saw the death of Francisco 
Franco, the decline of the old regime and the emergence of the new in the person of 
Juan Carlos. Spain passed from a dictatorship to a Constitutional Monarchy and began 
the process of reform and internal change that was to constitute the transition period. 
Juan Carlos' succession of Franco was far from a foregone conclusion and was a 
decision that had caused much debate within Spain and much friction amongst the key 
players in the process. 
I have chosen the nomination of Juan Carlos as the first of the four events under 
analysis in this thesis as it is one that comprehensively marks the beginning of the 
process of transition. While there were many factors that led to this decision being 
taken, without the power shift in Spain the final result would have been substantially 
somewhat less divisive than four decades earlier. Finally, the passage of time and the gradual 
disappearance of generations directly responsible for the civil war and the early, repressive years of the 
Franquist regime helped Spaniards forgive, or at least coexist with former enemies. " (Gunther 1992,43). 
24 This notion of democratic development was coined by Samuel Huntington in his seminal work: The 
Third If'ave: Democratization In the late Twentieth Century (1991) 
25 
"It has also been argued that the Spanish transition to democracy was part of a Southern European 
wave of democratization, initiated by the Greek and Portuguese events of 1974. Moreover, it is common 
to encounter assertions that authoritarian rule in democratic Western Europe was an anomaly whose end 
was bound to come. " (Share 1986,47). 
26 
"The Prince was formally committed to take over a form of backward-looking centralist, authoritarian 
state which was already on a collision course with Spain's modern society and economy. " (Preston 1986, 
2). 
20 
different. Juan Carlos came to represent different things for different people27; Franco 
saw in him the continuation of the regime he had worked so hard to create, many 
francoist ministers saw him as the embodiment of the legitimacy the regime needed28, 
the external community saw the potential for change should he assume power and there 
were those who saw him as an empty vessel who would become a puppet for the 
entrenched francoist power base. 29 
The change in the leadership in Spain was to become a crucial issue in the 
development of the transition and at the same time contained elements that could 
potentially reflect negatively on Juan Carlos. The situation was a complex one as the 
tics that bound Juan Carlos to Franco and the old regime were of both a positive and 
negative nature. Juan Carlos needed the support of the existing Francoists and yet, too 
close an association with the Bunker would have created doubt and unrest amongst 
those who favoured democratic reform. The task that faced Juan Carlos upon his 
succession was a delicate one indeed fraught with potential pitfalls and this was to set 
the tone for the transition itself. It became necessary to maintain the support of those on 
the right while appeasing those on the leit. This would have been no easy task for a 
skilled political operative but for Juan Carlos, a relative unknown on the political stage 
at this time, the task must have seemed daunting in the extreme. 
27 
"The position of Juan Carlos 
- 
Franco's successor as head of state 
- 
was also an object of conflict. 
Several political parties, most importantly the two large parties of the left, the Socialist PSOE and the 
Communist PCE, were by tradition opposed to all forms of monarchy, and many of their leaders believed, 
as stated by a Socialist deputy in 1978, that 'in Spain, liberty and democracy have come to have only one 
name: Republic'. " (Gunther 1992,43). 
2' 
"By the early 1960s a number of prominent franqulrtas, including Carrero Blanco and Lopez Rodd, 
had conic to the conclusion that Franco's successor should be Juan Carlos. There was an array of 
possible candidates, including the Carlist family of Borbön-Parma, and the Borbdn-Dampierrc nephews 
of Don Juan. But strong arguments could be made against all of them: the Borbdn-Parma family was 
French, while Don Jaime, the elder brother of Don Juan and father of Alfonso and Gonzalo dc Borbdn- 
Dampierre, had long since renounced his rights. Lopez Rodd and his associates knew that monarchist 
support in Spain was not strong, and that it would be even weaker if the main Borbdn line was discarded 
in favour of some lesser branch. Thus, if Franco had excluded Don Juan, his son became the only 
plausible candidate. " (Gilmour 1985,135). 
'The people had not taken the prince seriously while Franco was still alive: he was used to inaugurate 
highways and open veterinarians' conventions. 
-Spaniards became aware of the impossible role that was his to play. " (Alba 1978,290). 
21 
Juan Carlos had not received a great deal of formal training from Franco. lie 
had been introduced to the life that would be his upon the death of the Caudillo but had 
not been given a true sense of the power and responsibility until it was ultimately thrust 
upon him and as a result he was, at least on paper, ill-prepared for the job. Juan Carlos 
had experienced brief spells of control only to see them taken away again by an insecure 
and controlling dictator. 30 The manner in which Juan Carlos reacted to this event spoke 
volumes about his character and was to be an indication of the patience and fortitude 
that would stand him in good stead in later years. While it is true that Juan Carlos had 
received his education under the auspices of Franco and in a sense, had been groomed 
for the life he would eventually lead, there is little evidence to show that Franco was 
entirely convinced of his decision until the very end. Actions such as the establishment 
of the Laws of Succession guaranteed that ultimate control lay with Franco and that the 
final decision was very much subject to the whims of the dictator. 31 
It had been agreed by Don Juan and Franco that the education and training of the 
young prince would be the purview of the Caudillo. 2 This was seen by Don Juan as the 
only manner to ensure that a Borbbn inherited the throne and it is not a great stretch to 
see the ulterior motives behind the decision of the father. Don Juan believed, in as far 
as we can use this term, that his son needed the connection to Franco in order to gain the 
throne. This accounts for the education of his son by the man who had exiled him and 
30 "Ile kept silent in 1974 when Franco became ill, handed power over to the prince, then recovered and 
took it back as chief of state. But the people also noticed his serenity and detachment as he lived through 
those difficult years. " (Alba 1978,290). 
" 
"The first Fundamental Law to be submitted to a referendum was the Law of Succession for the Head 
of State (1947). This law represented the first serious attempt to give a comprehensive definition to the 
franquist regime, making Spain a 'Catholic, social and representative' kingdom. In addition, Article 2 
made Francisco Franco regent for life and the law gave him the right to name his successor at an 
unspecified future date. A Council of the Realm was established to advise the caudillo and to draw up a 
list of three candidates from which Franco could select the future heads of government. " (Share 1986, 
21). 
32 
"Franco and Don Juan held two further interviews, in 1954 and 1960, in a private house in 
Extremadura. Although the two men disliked and distrusted each other, they needed to remain in touch. 
Franco wanted the Prince to be educated in Spain, and the two men agreed that he should attend the 
Zaragoza military academy as well as receive naval and air force training before studying at Madrid 
University. " (Gilmour 1985,135). 
22 
prevented him from ruling his country. Franco needed a successor, somebody he could 
groom in his own image and educate in the ways of the regime. Juan Carlos had the 
lineage and the ability to create what Franco had been unable to; afranquista monarchy. 
Juan Carlos was aware, even at this stage that the only way to gain access to the throne 
was through Franco. 33 There existed the assumption that should Juan Carlos be 
nominated by Franco, he would accept and then defer in favour of his father. This was 
not to be the case however as the animosity that existed between Franco and Don Juan 
was substantial34 and it became increasingly evident that Juan Carlos was the only one 
who would be selected to continue in the Caudillo's place. Juan Carlos was very much 
trapped between his desire to honour his father and the ultimate necessity to ensure his 
position as Franco's successor. 
Juan Carlos received the initial nomination in 1969 but was forced to wait until 
Franco finally succumbed to illness and died in 1975 before taking over power. While 
it is true that he was endowed with the title of King, this meant little 3S given the history 
of the monarchy in Spain and perhaps the most important legacy of Franco would be 
that of Commander in Chief. 16 Juan Carlos was not permitted a great deal of leeway 
while Franco was alive and it was evident that should he deviate from the designated 
path, he would be removed from the position of successor. This ensured that the actions 
33 
"This is out of my hands 
- 
the Prince told him during a conversation with his father before being aware 
of Franco's decision 
- 
it is out of my hands. And if, as I believe, he does invite me to accept, what would 
you do? Is there another possible solution other than that which Franco decides? Are you capable of 
bringing back the Monarchyl" (Cernuda et al. 1981,169). (Translated from original by author). 
3' in the Caudillo's eyes, Don Juan was a liberal anglophile, badly advised and under the influence of 
freemasons. Franco decided, perhaps as early as 1943, that he would not be succeeded by such a man. 
Ile did not tell Don Juan of his intentions, however, and continued to send advice to the exiled pretender. " 
(Gilmour 1985,134). 
35 
"When Spain began its democratic transition in 1975, the majority of observers, above all those doing 
so from abroad, did not believe the Monarchy had anything of real substance to contribute. " (Powell 
1991.21). (Translated from original by author). 
36 
"in order to understand the situation, one must remember that the institutions the king inherited were 
like a straightjacket tailored by Franco. These institutions were established by the 1966 reforms of the 
Fundamental Laws. The center of the system was occupied by the caudillo, chief of state, head of 
government, leader of the National Movement, and generalissimo of the combined air, land, and sea 
armed forces. Of all these titles, the king had only inherited that of chief of state. " (Alba 1978,254). 
23 
of the young prince were in accordance with the wishes of the dictator but it does not 
automatically follow that this corresponded to his own. 7 When we examine the events 
that came later, it is safe to say that Juan Carlos had plans for the future that did not 
feature in the grand scheme of the Caudillo. When Juan Carlos was nominated in 1969, 
it was at the hand of Franco, und when he assumed the throne in 1975, he owed his 
entire support base to this relationship. 8 
The nomination of Juan Carlos is a key event in the transition as it marks the end 
of the old regime and the start of the new. Franco nominated Juan Carlos as his 
successor in order to maintain the existing status quo; Juan Carlos accepted the 
nomination in order to obtain the throne and avail himself of the myriad of opportunities 
that would follow. Don Juan had pushed for the nomination in order to secure the 
throne for his bloodline; the Bunker believed Juan Carlos would become a puppet ripe 
for abuse while others still thought he embodied the future of Spain. 39 One such event, 
when viewed from all angles seems scarcely credible and yet it was to affect and 
ultimately shape the transition in Spain and sow the seeds of a consolidated and 
functioning democracy that would eventually join Europe. 
The legacy of Franco extended beyond the conditioning of a population; the very 
structure of the government had been established in order to perpetuate the regime after 
the death of the Caudillo. To this end, Juan Carlos inherited an intrinsically Francoist 
37 
"Juan Carlos, who had decided to be a francoist until the death... of Franco, but not one minute longer, 
possibly because it is not advisable to continuously waste time, and even less so when your destiny is 
telling you that the time that has finally arrived is yours. " (Castellano 2001,118). (Translated from 
original by author). 
38"At his death, the military, few of them who genuinely considered themselves monarchists, transferred 
their loyalty and obedience to Don Juan Carlos because they saw in him the person whom Franco had 
nominated as his successor to the title of King. " (Powell 1991,19). (Translated from original by author). 
39 
"On the morning of 22 November 1975, Prince Juan Carlos was sworn in as King of Spain. lie 
promised Franco's puppet Parliament to be loyal to the dead man and to up hold the principles and laws 
of his State. Then in a brief and prudent speech, he said that a new era in the history of Spain was about 
to begin, and expressed his determination to work for a future in which there would be 'an effective 
consensus concerning national concord'. In terms whose ambiguity was surely deliberate, he went on: 11 
hope to be capable of acting as moderator, as guardian of the constitutional system and promoter of 
justice. Let nobody fear that his cause will be forgotten, let nobody expect advantages or privileges. 
Together we will be able to achieve all if we give to all their legitimate opportunity. " (Gibson 1992,49). 
24 
Bunker, led by a staunch supporter of the regime, Carlos Arias Navarro 40 Arias 
Navarro was firmly in favour of a continuance of the existing regime and this was to 
represent a significant obstacle for the transition41 and yet, at the same time, it served to 
highlight both the fortitude and the resolve of the new regime. 
I have chosen the removal of Arias Navarro and his replacement with Adolfo 
Suarez as the second event for analysis as I believe it to mark a crucial point in the 
transition process. The nomination of Juan Carlos was clearly a hugely relevant event 
but without the installation of Suarez, the transition would have been of a very different 
nature. The removal of a man chosen by Franco demonstrated the power of the new 
monarch and illustrated his capability to act in the face of opposition. The choice of 
Sudrez himself was an interesting one and in hindsight, successful too. Juan Carlos' 
decision to remove Arias Navarro was not one simply based upon a conflict of 
personalities 42 or a perceived lack of respect, but rather out of a genuine desire to 
reform. We cannot deny that there was animosity between the two men and that this 
contributed greatly to the events that transpired but we must allow that other factors 
were also involved. It is arguable that had the decision for removal been based solely 
upon the whim of Juan Carlos, its chances of success would have been close to nil, 
representing as it would have, the fancies of a dictator. The fact that the decision was a 
rational one is a further example of the system being used against itself and marks the 
shape of the transition. 
40 'What I want is to continue Francoism. And as long as I am here or still in political life, I'll never be 
anything but a strict perpetuator of Francoism in all its aspects and I will fight against the enemies of 
Spain who have begun to dare to raise their heads. " (Areilza, J. M dc. 1977), 84. 
41 
,1 still firmly preserve in the objectives outlined in my 12 February speech. We are called, we come 
together, to continue and persist with the gigantic achievement of Francisco Franco. " Speech given by 
Arias Navarro at his first cabinet meeting. (Preston 2004,334), (Fernandez-Miranda 1995,121), (Osorio 
1980,54-5). 
42 "The relations between the two men were strained and were not helped by comments to the effect that 
'Juan Carlos was an inexperienced young man who should be kept safely away from the serious day-to- 
day business of government. ' This was a reported quote by Arias Navarro given to a senior US 
diplomat. " (Preston 2004,337), (Eaton 1981,38). 
25 
The removal of Arias Navarro marks a shift in the power balance within Spain 
and as such is an event that requires closer scrutiny. Arias Navarro was a man who 
believed himself untouchable. Franco had appointed him to the post of prime minister 
for a period of five years43 and for Juan Carlos to have him removed without due 
provocation would constitute a breach of the Constitution. This does not mean that 
Arias Navarro felt himself without competition though, and this was to be a significant 
factor in the actions taken by Juan Carlos and Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda. There 
existed a feeling of disrespect for Juan Carlos and his fellow reformers44 and a sense 
that he was very much subject to the existing order. Juan Carlos was relatively young 
and inexperienced at the time of Franco's death in 1975 and it was assumed by the 
Bunker that he would conform to the rules as laid out before him. The removal of Arias 
Navarro demonstrated Juan Carlos' ability for independent decision making and hinted 
at the shape of things to come. 45 It is difficult to assert that a master plan existed at this, 
or at any point in the transition process but this event, and the subsequent success it 
gave rise to, surely marks the start of a new era in Spanish politics. The change did not 
happen immediately and was to take careful strategic planning by Juan Carlos and his 
mentor Fernandez-Miranda, even at the cost of the appearance of progress. 
Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda wanted grand scale change to take place in 
Spain but this was a difficult task to achieve in one fell swoop. Much of what was 
happening within the government was taking place behind closed doors in the Cortes 
and was therefore hidden from public view. Juan Carlos took a close interest in the 
proceedings of the Cones but it became increasingly clear that he would need an `inside 
43 "Ilis view was that Franco had'appointed him and the King remained subject to the Caudillo's will. " 
(Preston 2004,331). "It's as if he believes that he is absolutely safe, that he is Prime Minister for five 
Tears and that all I can do is keep him on. " (Fernandez-Miranda 1995,176-80), (Preston 2004,346). 
This notion was fuelled by comments such as `lie's going to hear me now. This snot-nosed kid needs 
rutting in his place. " This quote by Arias Navarro is reported by Preston. (Preston 2004,316). 
s 
"Juan Carlos exercised his power and prerogatives to the full in moving Spain toward democracy, not 
least in the surprise selection of Suarez as prime minister. " (I Iuntington 1991/2,599). 
26 
man'46. This was to take precedence over replacing Arias Navarro and while it earned 
Juan Carlos criticism for being indecisive and weak, it was to benefit Spain in the long 
run. Despite the inherent difficulty is assuming the existence of a 'master plan' for the 
transition, it becomes increasingly evident through the examination of subsequent 
events, that there did indeed exist a design and a distinct methodological approach to the 
change that transpired. When the removal of Arias Navarro did come about, it was the 
culmination of a carefully played game by Juan Carlos. Several steps were taken along 
the way and this in itself demonstrates the political acumen of the young monarch. 
Arias Navarro announced his new cabinet on December 10 1975, and despite 
limited moderation, it remained largely comprised of hardliners. Rodolfo Martin Villa, 
a young and energetic Falangist had been appointed Minister for the Sindicatos at the 
behest of Juan Carlos as he had been impressed by Villa's contacts with the Catalan left 
and saw him as a useful ally. Perhaps much more significant than this appointment was 
that of three ministers who would prove invaluable to Juan Carlos: 47 Joso Maria dc 
Arcilza became Foreign Minister; Manuel Fraga became Minister of the Interior and 
Antonio Garrigues y Diaz Cafabate became Minister of Justice. These three men 
possessed sufficient force of will, backed by support gained through service, to make 
them effective in the political arena. While these three appointments did not constitute 
a force capable of overriding Arias Navarro, nor did they represent the end of the 
struggle for Juan Carlos, they did however provide the young monarch with a degree of 
support within the government and proved his ability to successfully initiate change. 
46 
"Ile quickly ensured that he would have a mole in the cabinet by skilfully persuading Arias to accept 
his new protEg6, Adolfo Suarez, in the key post of Secretary-General of the Afovimiento. Arias believed 
he was obliged by Franco's wishes to maintain Josh Solis in the post but Fernandez-Miranda sidestepped 
the problem by suggesting that he gave Solis the Ministry of Labour. " (Preston 2004,333), (Fernindez- 
Miranda 1995,119-21), (Morin 1987,15-20), (Eaton 1981,32-3). 
47 For further information on these appointments. (Preston 2004,332), (Powell 2001,146), (Osorio 1980, 
46-7). 
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Having made the decision to remove Arias Navarro, there was still a certain 
protocol to follow. Juan Carlos could not be seen to overrule the Constitution and to 
continue with a precedent set by Franco of nepotism. Juan Carlos had increased his 
support in the army, he had placed Fernandez-Miranda in charge of the Cortes and he 
had increased his level of support within parliament itself through the appointment of 
well placed ministers, so the decision to remove Arias Navarro was not one taken on the 
spur of the moment, nor was it entered into without the assurance of support. By the 
time that Juan Carlos removed Arias Navarro from office, it is safe to say that he was in 
control of the situation and acted from a position of certainty and strength. 
By this time, Juan Carlos's desire to remove Arias as his prime minister was 
clear, as were the contributing factors behind this realization. A candidate was required 
who would both enjoy support from within the system, would be accepted by the army, 
open to dialogue with the opposition and of a mind with the ideals or reform already 
held by both Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda. This was no easy task and in 
retrospect, verged on the impossible. There is evidence that Juan Carlos had already 
considered Adolfo Suarcz as a possible replacement for some time48 and that he had 
been grooming him for the role with appointments such as Secretary-General of the 
Atovimfento. This may be true or it may not but it is possible to sec why Suärcz was 
chosen. Ne had an excellent pedigree49, was liked by the armyS°, was only six years 
41 "Areilza believed that the choice of Suarez as Arias Navarro's replacement had been planned since 
Easter and perhaps even since Henry Kissinger's visit to Madrid in January. Indeed it may well have 
been earlier. " (Preston 2004,352), (Areilza: Diary entry for 14 and 15 July 1976 1983,23-6). 49 "Carrero had a very high opinion of Adolfo Sudrez, General Director of Radio and Television, and 
attempted to arrange it so that he would be nominated as either National Provincial Delegate or Vice 
Secretary General of the Movement when these positions became vacant. " (Lopez-Rod6 1977,408). 
translated from original by author). 
" During his period in television, he began to build a reputation as a man who enjoyed a special 
relationship with the Army. lie began by establishing a close friendship with Colonel Andres Casinello 
Perez, second-in-command of Carrero Blanco's intelligence service, the SIPG, and ingratiated himself 
with senior generals by making television time available to them and by sending flowers to their wives. " (Preston 2004,304). 
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older than Juan Carlos and was sufficiently respected by the Bunkers as to prevent 
undue criticism at the outset. 
Suarez did not rise to the position of prime minister simply on the coat tails of 
others, rather his involvement in several events during the period leading up to Arias 
Navarro's removal, demonstrated his capabilities and drive. One such occasion saw 
him defending the new law of political associations when it was presented to Cones on 
9 June 1976. Suarez defended the law with such style, stressing that political pluralism 
was a necessary reflection of the realities of Spanish society, that he greatly impressed 
Juan Carlos and after the speech, the Cortes passed the new law of political associations 
by 338 votes to 91 with 25 abstentions. Suarez had used the opportunity given to him to 
prove his eloquence and ability in the political arena. This situation would have served 
to convince politicians of his relevance to the events of the time but his public persona 
was greatly enhanced by his involvement in the Vitoria strikes of March 1976. Suarez 
counseled a more discreet solution 52 to the problem than had been proposed by the 
Captain-General of the Burgos Military Region and as a result, further bloodshed was 
avoided. Sudrez's involvement in Vitoria further strengthened Juan Carlos' opinion and 
belief in his potential" and served to demonstrate to the watching world that he was a 
serious candidate for prime minister. 
The removal of Arias Navarro had to been seen as legitimate and without the 
expertise and adroitness of Fernandez-Miranda, S4 would never have been achieved. ss In 
51 
"Suarez joined the Opus Del and made friends with important regime figures during the period of the 
early 1960s when I lerrero was Vice-Secretary of the Movimiento under Solis. " (Preston 2004,303). 
s= For additional reference: (Areilza 1977,104), (Osorio 1980,86), (Preston 2004,344), (Moran 1979, 
30-3). 
53 
"For his part, the King was visibly impressed with the attention to detail and talent demonstrated by 
Adolfo Suarez, eventual Government Minister, and would repeat this opinion in private audiences 
thereafter. " (Moran 1979,32). (Translated from original by author). 
s' "Later. Torcuato came to see me and said: 'Majesty, tell me the name of the man who should replace 
Arias Navarro and I promise they will vote for him. " (Vilallonga 1993,118). (Translated from original 
by author). 
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the end, it was resolved via a very simple method; Juan Carlos met with Arias Navarro 
and the prime minister's resignation was submitted. There are contrasting reports on 
whether Arias Navarro willingly tendered his resignation or whether Juan Carlos 
formally requested it, but the path was left open to Juan Carlos to select a new prime 
minister as of I July. Arias Navarro had effectively been backed into a corner. Opinion 
against him had been mounting; he was falling from favour with the army and, coupled 
with his lack of respect for Juan Carlos, it was becoming apparent that his monarch was 
less than content with his position in political life. The time had come for action to be 
taken, Juan Carlos had waited long enough, all the pieces were in place and failure to 
act would have created further tension and unrest within Spain. It should not be seen 
that Juan Carlos was solely acting in reaction to external events; the decision to remove 
Arias Navarro had been taken for some time prior to 1 July but to rush events in a 
period of potential turmoil, would have harmed rather than aided the transition process. 
When it came time for Juan Carlos to act, he was ready and at peace with his decision 56 
Given the youth of Juan Carlos, and his relative inexperience at this time, it was a 
prudent decision to delay action until he was certain of its success. 
The manner in which Juan Carlos would choose a successor to Arias Navarro 
was represented by a list called the terna. This list would consist of three candidates, 
compiled by the Cortcs from which Juan Carlos would make his final selection. The list 
consisted of Gregorio Lopez Bravo, a Franco technocrat, Federico Silva Munoz, a 
conservative Christian democrat, and Adolfo Sudrez. The Press heavily favoured the 
ss 
"From this post (that of President of the Cortes), the monarch's old tutor dedicated himself to preparing 
the Cones for reform and the Consejo del Reino for the nomination of a new head of government. " 
Powell 2001,146). (Translated from original by author). 
"On the morning of 1 July, Areilza met the King whom he found relaxed and refreshed, 'as if a weight 
had been lifted from his shoulders'. Juan Carlos said, 'This can't go on without a risk of losing 
everything. The job of King is sometimes uncomfortable. I had to take a difficult decision but I've taken 
it. I will put it into effect suddenly and surprise everyone. You've been warned, so keep quiet and wait. 
It will be before anyone thinks. There's no choice. "' (Preston 2004,351), (Areilza diary entries for 1-3 
July '76.1977,214-7), (Fraga 1987,52-3), (Osorio 1980,126-7), (Tuscll 2002,138), (Sverlo 2000,144). 
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first two candidates and Suarez was seen as a waste of a nomination. The balance of the 
first two men, a Francoist and a Christian Democrat was an intelligent move; it 
appeased both sides and lent hope to them that their candidate would be selected. This 
was not to be the case however as Fernandez-Miranda had used political acumen and 
shrewd tactics, to ensure the final piece of the puzzle was slotted into place. A 
combination of timing, expertise and the additional pressure of outside factors enabled 
Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda to politically ambush Arias Navarro and remove 
him from office both effectively, and more importantly, legally. 
The nomination of Suarez was not universally accepted, nor was it even fully 
comprehended at the outset. Despite his connections within the Bunker, Suarez was a 
relative unknown figure in political life at this point. S7 The inclusion of Suarez on the 
terna had been surprise enough, when he received the nomination itself, it came as a 
shock to many. 58 The actions and commitment of Suarez would silence many of his 
critics as time went by but the initial response to his nomination was that of indignation 
and disbelief. There were those who believed he would construct a government of hard- 
line Francoists 59 and in so doing, drag Spain back into the era of Franco. It is a measure 
of the control and influence of Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda that the removal of 
Arias Navarro and the installation of Suarez were possible. Juan Carlos and Ferndndez- 
Miranda had seemingly managed the impossible; they had manipulated the system 
57 
"Adolfo Suarez, a young and relatively unknown product of the Movimiento national (uncharitably 
described by the second-ranking Socialist leader, Alfonso Guerra, as 'a creature who crawled from the 
sewers of fascism'), who had previously served under Franco as director general of the state-run 
television network and, in the first post-Franco government, as minister of the Movimicnto. " (Gunther 
1992,48). 
""The news of the King's nomination of Adolfo Suarez as President of the Government was an authentic 
surprise for all political observers, without exception... nobody, literally nobody had suspected that the 
name of a minister such as Suarez would be present in the list. And when it was known, nobody, 
absolutely nobody thought that he was there for any other reason than a less than deserving companion to 
the other two political figures that had been proposed to the King to take charge of the Government of 
Spain. " (Prego 2000,27-8). (Translated from original by author). 
59 "The general opinion is that Adolfo Suarez would either form a Government of neo-fascists from his 
ilk or not be able to form one at all. " (Osorio 1980,130). (Translated from original by author). 
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against itself, used the arrogance of an out-of-touch Francoist prime minister to engineer 
his downfall and begun the process of reforming the Cones from within in an incredibly 
short period of time. 
The acceptance of Franco's nomination and the removal of Arias Navarro were 
decisions that greatly benefited the transition process and as such, they were a 
demonstration of the capabilities of the leading actors in forcing change. This approach 
would not be possible in the reform of the Cortes. It could not be seen to have been 
forced from above, there could be no element of impropriety involved and this in turn, 
made the situation much more complex. Juan Carlos was successfully installed as King 
of Spain, Adolfo Suarez had been awarded the position of prime minister and it would 
appear that the situation in Spain was a favourable one for an attempted transition to 
democracy. Despite the relative power and authority possessed by the primary actors, 
they did not enjoy an uncontested position60 and were forced to tread carefully at 
times61. This reality would influence the way in which decisions were approached, and 
ultimately dealt with. There were many constraints that faced the primary actors at this 
time and many of them bore remnants of Francoism. While it is true that Juan Carlos 
inherited power from Franco, the laws and regulations that had been put in place during 
the Caudillo's reign would also shackle him; chief among these was the Leyes 
Fundamentales. Franco had put these in place in order to provide a safeguard for his 
regime and to tie Juan Carlos to the principles of Francoism, after he had died. 62 
It fell to the otcn-overlooked figure of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda to convince 
Juan Carlos that refonn of the political system would not constitute a betrayal of his 
60 "Juan Carlos did not inherit the supreme juridical field that Franco had enjoyed, or his political power, 
fruit of a 'charismatic legitimacy' that a large section of the political class refused him. " (Fernandez. 
Miranda, P. 1995,20). (Translated from original by author). 01 "The political stage at the time of Franco's death and symbolized by the Presidency of Arias forced the 
King to act with caution, and not to attempt to exercise power he did not have, or to seek it. " (Ferndndez- 
Miranda, P. 1995,21). (Translated from original by author). 62 For an in-depth analysis of the Leyes Fundamentales see Preston (2004), Powell (2001), 1lern5ndez Gil (1982). 
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oath to Franco and to Spain. 63 Given the position of Juan Carlos, it was imperative that 
his actions were beyond reproach. The climate of the time called for a legitimacy to be 
awarded to the newly democratic regimeTM and every effort was made to make this a 
reality. 65 In light of the fact that Juan Carlos had recently removed Arias Navarro as 
prime minister and replaced him with Adolfo Suarez, further unilateral action of this 
sort would run counter to the democratic aims of the regime. 66 The constraints placed 
upon him coupled with the inherent complexity of constitutional law would have 
prevented him from taking action other than a unilateral one, if he acted alone. Despite 
Juan Carlos' drive and personal ambition, he was not alone in this process. As has been 
alluded to above, Fernandez-Miranda was instrumental in advising the young King and 
when we analyse the situation more closely, it becomes apparent that it was Fernändez- 
Miranda who ultimately convinced Juan Carlos as to the validity of this course of 
action. 
In a conversation that took place between Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda 
on 18 July 1969, before Juan Carlos would accept the nomination from Franco, we are 
able to see the entire dilemma played out. Juan Carlos was worried about his 
responsibilities to his oath67 and Fernandez-Miranda went to great lengths to assure him 
that reform of the Leyes Fundamentales would not constitute a breach of ethics; on the 
63 
"If he accepted the charge, it was because he followed the teachings of his professor Torcuato 
Fernandez-Miranda that the Fundamental Laws, all of the Fundamental Laws including the basic 
principles, were open to reform providing respect was shown to the manner in which they had been 
established. " (Fernandez-Miranda, P. 1995,17). (Translated from original by author). 64 '? he Monarchy had to present from the start a new image. Things could not continue as before. " (Quote by Juan Carlos found in the manuscripts of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda and taken from 
(Fernandez-Miranda, P. 1995,92). (Translated from original by author). 
65 "A television programme was recorded in the Prado del Rey with six journalists. We attempted to 
remove pomposity, triumphalism and stress that had been the main ministerial ingredients of the past. " 
14/1/76 (Areilza 1977,52). (Translated from original by author). 
66 "Beneath his guarded and disciplined appearance, Don Juan Carlos had an energy and tenacity to 
achieve his objectives that permitted both advisors and collaborators to be involved but would not tolerate 
Patronage or guardianship. " (FernQndez"Miranda, P. 1995,97). (Translated from original by author). 
"Juan Carlos was preoccupied with the manner in which he could make more flexible, to the point 
where democracy could be introduced, that which he had sworn to uphold in July 1969; namely the Leyes 
Fundamentales. " (Tusell 1995,546). 
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contrary, it represented a constitutionally protected avenue of action. Once Juan Carlos 
became convinced that true reform would be possible within Spain and that it would be 
possible to use the system against itself in order to achieve this, new avenues opened for 
the transition process. It would also become apparent that Juan Carlos and Fernandez- 
Miranda were not alone in their understanding of the situation and what was needed to 
induce change. The table below outlines public opinion in Spain in 1975 surrounding 
the issue of political reform. 
"The Government of Arias never constituted the 'King's Government', it was 
Franco's Government with a few individuals aligned to the Crown and to the desire to 
democratize. The new Government needed to be clearly the King's, created to function 
accordingly. " (Fernändez"Miranda, P. 1995,192). (Translated from original by 
author). True reform could not exist without a dramatic overhaul of the existing system. 
In 1975, Juan Carlos did not enjoy a position of complete power, nor had the removal of 
Arias really tested the waters in this respect. Given the climate in Spain at the time, the 
presence of the Army and the grudging recognition that was awarded to the King, it 
would have been a dangerous move indeed to attempt what could only be interpreted as 
a coup d'etat and forcibly remove an appointed body from office. 
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Attitudes on the Desirability of Democracy in the Aftermath of Franco's Death. May 
and December 1975 (percent) 
Attitude 
December 1975 (national survey) 
Would like the king to: 
Perccnt 
Grant more freedom of speech 72 
Grant universal suffrage 70 
Grant more regional autonomy 61 
Grant amnesty 61 
Grant more political freedom 58 
Follow more democratic policies than previously existed 58 
May 1975 (sample of seven large cities) 
The system should evolve toward a democracy of 
the Western kind 74 
This evolution is not possible without reforming the 
Fundamental Laws 60 
Sources: Data for December come from a survey carried out by Consulta and published 
by Cambio 16 (1 December 1975); those for May come from a survey by Mctra 6 and 
were published by Informaciones (31 May 1975). Table reproduced from Rafael 
Löpcz-Pintor, "Transition toward Democracy in Spain: Opinion Mood and Elite 
Behavior", IVorking Papers, no. 80 (Washington, D. C.: The Wilson Center, 1981). 
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The pressure to change is a difficult variable to quantify and yet it must have 
played a role in the process. The clashes between the police and the youth of Spain 
were becoming more frequent with increasingly worse results. On 15 August 1976, the 
Guardia Civil killed a 19-year-old named Jaime Verdejo in Cadiz for spraying graffiti 
on a wall. The graffiti read, "Pan, Trabajo, Libertad. " (Bread, Work, Freedom) 68 The 
increase in civil unrest and the pressure from the international69 arena played a role in 
the actions of the primary actors in Spain and would go a long way to influencing the 
ultimate course of action. The option involving a reform of the Cortes from within did 
not herald such a potentially volatile outcome. The process may have seemed a lengthy 
and difficult one70 from the outset but it was legal, constitutionally recognised and 
represented a safe avenue to explore at this juncture. 7' 
Human agency was the significant factor in engineering change of this nature, as 
opposed to institutional developments. Although it is indeed true that the institutions 
themselves were manipulated in order to manifest the change, this was a result of 
human interaction and ingenuity. Juan Carlos' esteem for his former tutor, Fernändez- 
Miranda, has already been mentioned above, but this esteem would turn to dependence 
as the process for reform began in earnest. Fernandez-Miranda had turned down the 
role of prime minister and finally, this decision would begin to pay dividends. 
6° This account is told in (Velazquez, J. L. & Memba, J. 1995), (Preston 2004), (Powell 2001). 
69 "After his first conversation with the North American Ambassador, the minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Areilza, concluded that the United States 'desires the democratization of our system but, true to their 
pragmatism, without too much hard work, too many demands, and too many worries. " (Powell 2001, 
150). (Translated from original by author). 
70 
"All Franco's powers were theoretically subject to limitation by the Cortes and the Consejo del Relno 
but, in practice, both bodies acted as rubber stamps. They could not be expected to behave like that if 
faced with a reforming King. The task thus facing Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda 
- 
that of winning 
over the Procuradores to their project and of asserting the authority of the Cortes over the government 
- 
was awesome in its enormity. " (Preston 2004,329), (Fernandez-Miranda, P. 1995,125-8), (Prego 1995, 
365-9). 
71 
"The Monarchy is the only means of political and social transition that would grant us an 
institutionalized democracy in public life in the shortest time, with the least risk and the least amount of 
violence. " (Areilza 1977,112). (Translated from original by author). 
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Fernandez-Miranda was able to use his legal acumen and political position to generate 
the required reform. 72 
The planning and preparation put into place during the period leading up to the 
introduction of the reform bill was just as important as the debate over the bill itself. 
The issue of legality was crucial and there was a very definite procedure that needed to 
be adhered to. 73 Fernandez-Miranda had been responsible for ensuring that the Cortes 
and the Consejo del Reino were in a position to greater benefit the transition when the 
time came. Noted amongst the actions taken at this time were the opening of the legal 
avenues for the constitution of parliamentary groups and the modification of the 
Reglamento de las Cortes (Ruling of the Cortes) that enabled the introduction of the 
Procedimiento de Urgencia (Urgency Procedure). This procedure had a dual objective; 
to destroy the power of the commissions, in particular, the orthodox Comisidn de Leyes 
Fundamentales (Commission of Fundamental Laws) and secondly, make possible full 
control by the Presidency for the time when the reform bill would be introduced. 74 
Fernandez-Miranda was not the sole actor in this process despite the tremendous 
degree of responsibility he assumed to guarantee its successful outcome. Juan Carlos 
played a less public role in the procedure and therefore the practical aspect of ensuring 
success fell to the two men who, between them, held the crucially important positions of 
political power, namely Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda and Adolfo Suarcz. The task 7s 
n'The key to all of Juan Carlos's plans lay in the appointment of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda as 
President of the Cortes and of the Consejo del Reino. His intelligence, his knowledge of Francoist 
constitutional law and his acquaintance with the entire Francoist political elite made him the perfect guide 
to the labyrinth through which Juan Carlos had to advance. " (Preston 2004,333). 
73 
"In Spain, for instance, the monarchy was re-established and Suarez adhered to the provisions of the 
Franco constitution in abolishing that constitution: no Francoist could claim that there were procedural 
irregularities. " (Iluntingdon 1991/2,599). 
7' For a full account of this see (Fernandez-Miranda 1995,22), (IlernSndez-Gil 1982), (Maravall 1984). 75 
"In an impressive display of political skill (and in close collaboration with he king and Torcuato 
Fennindez-Miranda, president of the Cortes and of the Council of the Realm), Suarez persuaded the 
corporatist Cortes to commit institutional suicide by approving the Law for Political Reform in October 
1976, which established procedures for future political reforms to be undertaken by a new, democratically 
elected Cortes. " (Gunther 1992,48). 
37 
before these two men was immense in scope. Having chosen to follow this option, they 
were presented with the unenviable task of convincing the Cortes to self-destruct. 76 
Given the inherent difficulties involved in this process, it was imperative that all pieces 
were correctly set up. Despite Fernandez-Miranda's influential role in the creation of 
the Ley para la Refornia Politica (Reform Bill) it stood a greater chance if his 
subsequent involvement were not so open. 77 Fernandez-Miranda had played a visible 
role in the removal of Arias Navarro and it was deemed prudent that his involvement in 
the process of reform be much less overt. 
Adolfo Suarez may have been more suited for the task than was Fcrndndez- 
Miranda but this did not mean that the task was an easy one. External factors also 
played an important role at this time. Not only had the Caudillo bequeathed a Francoist 
government to Juan Carlos but also the Army was still a force to be reckoned with. It is 
indeed true that Juan Carlos had become Chief of State upon his succession to the 
throne but this did not guarantee the support of the armed forces in all matters, 
especially those that could be interpreted as an attack on the sovereignty of the state. 
The primary actors, namely Ferri ndez-Miranda and Suarez in this case, foresaw the 
dangers of acting without consideration and felt it prudent to ensure that their path to 
reform was as clear and unobstructed as possible. Suarez, with the approval of the 
King78, met with twenty-nine high-ranking military officers on 8 September 1976 to 
discuss the matter. The main purpose of the meeting was for Sudrez to convince the 
army that the reform bill would only be passed if voted for by the required two-thirds 
76 
"Many were persuaded by arguments to the effect that the process did not stray from Francoist legality, 
permitted a decorous end to the dictatorship and was the King's will. " (Preston 2004,372). 7 Fernandez-Miranda approached, amongst others, the sourly suspicious Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, 
and told him that, 'The King has made the decision and we are proceeding to a full-scale party system'. " (Preston 2004,372). 
71 
"Adolfo Suarez consulted with his close collaborator and vice-president, General Manuel GutiFrrez- 
Mellado, concerning the phrasing of key constitutional articles, with the intention of avoiding language 
that might provoke an otherwise avoidable negative reaction by the military. " (Gunther 1992,61). 
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majority of the Cortes, the bulk of whom were staunch Francoists. 79 This was 
absolutely essential to the survival of the reform process and represents an astute 
awareness and management of political affairs on the part of the primary actors. 80 An 
additional factor that is worth highlighting is the action that took place following the 
meeting between Suärcz and the military representatives. Two days afterwards, Suarez 
appeared on television announcing the imminence of political reform. Having assured 
the army that matters would not move forward without the backing of the Cones, a 
television address ensured that public opinion would be on the side of reform and would 
therefore cause additional pressure to be placed upon the voting members of Cortes. 81 
Having manipulated the situation to the best of their abilities, through control 
and preparation of the significant institutions, the only task that remained before the 
primary actors, was that of convincing an institutionalised government to commit what 
amounted to political suicide. 92 Adolfo Suarez was in possession of various tactics in 
his task to ensure that the reform bill would pass when presented to Cortcs. Some of 
these weapons occupied a somewhat ethically grey area but were effective nonetheless. 
In many ways, Suarez manipulated the members of the Cortes to best suit the needs of 
the reform process. It does not take too much imagination to comprehend the enormity 
of the task facing him and the knowledge that he was forced to resort to varying tactics 
to achieve the objective comes as no surprise. The nature of the reform bill was less the 
79 
"Every member of the cabinet had been given the task of sounding out a particular group of 
Procuradores. SuSrez spoke to the most hard-line members of the Movimicnto. " (Preston 2004,372). 
s0"Sudrez's strategy unfolded within the institutions and in accord with the rules of the authoritarian 
regime, and he went to great efforts to secure support for the monarchy from traditional republican 
political groups from the earliest stages of the transition. " (Gunther 1992,75). 
"During the public presentation of the project in a televised speech, that would make him famous, 
Suarez adopted the position of an impartial statesman acting in the name of the King and whose primary 
objective was to guarantee the smooth transition from a system of legitimate delegation of authority to 
one of open participation and responsibility. " (Powell 2001,166). (Transla(ed from original by author). 22 
"According to the President, 'many of them truly see themselves as representatives of their respective 
provinces', in light of which they were enthusiastic about presenting themselves for consideration in 
future elections, this in turn led more than one of them to think that they would need the future support of 
the government. Suarez recognised that while he was not engaging in 'buying votes', he was certainly 
relying heavily upon his knowledge of people. " (Powell 2001,168). (Translated from original by author). 
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issue than what it meant for the members of the Cortcs as a piece of legislation. The 
objections were focused on the ramifications of the bill, not the bill itself. 
The entire process was fraught with obstacles and challenges throughout and at 
times, would have seemed insurmountable. 83 Suircz and Fernandez-Miranda spent 
much time behind the scenes to increase the likelihood of success and established a 
close working relationship that would enable the pooling of their respective skills. The 
bill was submitted before the Comisidn Atixta Gobierno-Consejo Nacional (National 
Government-Advisory Mixed Commission) for their consideration. Minor adjustments 
were made to the text by such men as Miguel Herrero B4, acting secretary general of the 
Ministry of Justice, but the bulk of the text remained untouched and true to the spirit in 
which it was conceived. This is further evidence of using the system against itself; it is 
much easier to convince someone of an idea, if they believe they have played a role in 
its conception. 
The approval, grudging or otherwise, of the bill was not sufficient to ensure it 
was passed by the required two thirds majority and so other tactics were also employed, 
including the manner in which it was presented and phrased. 8S We have evidence of 
Suarez using a carrot and stick approach. Positions were offered in the future 
government86 and this was combined with the possibility of withholding stipends that 
" 
"nhe project for the Reform Law was not received with enthusiasm by the opposition either, despite it 
being recognised that the government 'had exerted the greatest effort of which it was objectively capable, 
within the authoritarian institutions of the regime. " (Powell 1991,195). (Translated from original by 
author). 
14 
"After discarding the attractive temptation to resign- writes Ilerrero-, I dedicated myself to improving 
the plan to reform, including the changing of its name and preparing for its negotiation and 
consequences. " (Ilerrero y Rodriguez de Miiion 1993,86). (Translated from original by author). 
15 'he project was an honest reflection of the reformist philosophy of Fernlndcz-Miranda... in other 
words; it dealt with a law to permit reform, not a reform law. " (Powell 2001,165). (Translated from 
original by author). 
s6 
"Reformers in government negotiated with the primary opposition groups and arrived at explicit or tacit 
agreements with them. In Spain, for example, the Communist party recognized that it was too weak to 
follow a 'radical rupturista policy' and instead went along with a 'ruptura pactada' even though the pact 
was 'purely tacit. ' In October 1977 Suarez won the agreement of the Communist and Socialist parties to 
the Paclos de la Moncloa comprising a mixture of fairly severe economic austerity measures and some 
social reforms. Secret negotiations with Santiago Carrillo, the primary Communist leader, 'played on the 
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were paid to ministers from the banks. The combination of reward and punishment 
provided a powerful cocktail and achieved the desired result. Decisions of this 
magnitude could not be left to chance, the angles had to be researched and covered in 
advance of the attack to ensure success. When gentle persuasion, bribery or blackmail 
failed to achieve the desired result, somewhat more drastic options were employed. 87 
When it became evident that there were elements within the parliament who would 
remain loyal to their Francoist tendencies and would vote against the bill, they were 
simply removed from the equation. This may well seem somewhat unconventional at 
best and downright unethical at worst, but there is a feeling of justification about it in 
the literature, a sense that the reform would be achieved by any means necessary. 88 
Spain was on a path to democracy and the foundations had been meticulously planned 
and executed by the primary actors. The removal of dissident elements should be 
viewed as an additional political manoeuvre and not a betrayal of the democratic 
principals that the transition was attempting to instill. The crucial factor remains that 
control was never relinquished by the primary actors. 
The introduction of the bill was a closely monitored affair, from inception, to its 
presentation to the Cortes, to its successful conclusion. Fernandez-Miranda's role was 
much less public than he deserved but the necessity to award ownership of the bill to 
SuSrcz, the face of democracy in Spain, overrode personal considerations. All efforts 
were made to guarantee the successful passage of the bill through Cortcs on 16 
November, including the eliciting of support from individuals closely associated with 
PCE (Partido Comunista de Esparta) leader's anxiety to be near the levers of power and secured his 
backing for an austerity package. " (I luntington 1991/2,600). 17 
"Powell also claims that 'negotiations' of a very different kind also took place': "Some procuradores 
were threatened with scandals of an economic and sexual nature in order to guarantee their support for the 
ýovemmcnt. " (Powell 1991,200). 
r "With the exception of sleeping with them, we did everything we could. " Testimony from Suarez to 
<Seminario sobre la transicibn politica espaftola>, Pundacidn lose Ortega y Gasset, Toledo, mayo de 
1984. Victoria Prego, Asl se hizo !a Transicldn, p. 556. Testimony by Martin Villa to the author. 
(Translated from original by author). 
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the old regime, chief of which was Miguel Primo de Rivcra89. While the involvement 
of Miguel Primo dc Rivera did not placate all involved, it did go some way to ensuring 
the bill was at least considered in kind. The conclusion of the process was naturally the 
vote before the Cones and the required ratification of the bill 90 In essence, the issue of 
the reform bill was the pivotal one of the transition as without its acceptance by the 
Cones, all the preparation and subsequent plans for future democratic development 
would have been destroyed. 
The voting style was changed in order to create the appearance of a free and 
democratic practice. This may well have been the stated justification but it also had an 
additional consequence, it would become immediately obvious who had voted both in 
favour of, and against the reform bill. This may not seem all that relevant but in light of 
the violence and civil unrest in the country at the time and coupled with the 
assassination of Carrcro Blanco, an event that had shattered the illusion of Francoist 
invulncrability91, it was an important factor indecd. 92 Coercion of individuals had fallen 
short of a successful outcome but the pressure of external factors and the potential 
repercussions from an unsatisfactory decision were to play a decisive role. 
The vote itself took place on 18 November 1976 after 19 hours and 37 minutes 
of dcbate. 93 While there appears to be some discrepancy between the actual recorded 
19 
"Miguel Primo dc Rivera, a close friend of the King, was nominated by Fernandez-Miranda due to the 
weight his name carried and for his will to reform, defended the necessity to move from 'a personal 
regime to one of participation, without ruptures or violence', which involved 'creating a new constitution 
based upon the legality of the prevailing constitution'. " (Powell 2001,168), (Preston 2004), (Moran 
1979). (Translated from original by author). 90 
"The object of the Law, although not exclusively, was to create a new procedure for constitutional 
reform that would be immediately applicable. " (l lern5ndcz-Gil 1982,128). (Translated from original by 
author). 
91 Information on the assassination of Carrcro Blanco and the repercussions for Spain can be found in (Preston 2004), (Preston 1986), (Moran 1979), (Vilallonga 1993), (Powell 2001). 
92 
"The assassination of the prime minister, Luis Carrero Blanco, in the final years of the Franquist 
regime, made it clear that demands for restructuring the Spanish state would have to be addressed. " 
(Gunther 1992,47). 
93 Figures courtesy of (Soto 1998), (Moran 1979). 
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result with it varying from 438 in favour, 2 against and 57 abstention? 4 to 425 in 
favour, 59 against and 13 abstentions" a clear two thirds majority was not only reached 
but surpassed with resounding consequences 96 The truly interesting clement of this 
process is, not so much that Suarcz and Fernandez-Miranda were able to initiate reform 
but that the vote was finally passed. 97 There was no precedent for this and yet it was a 
resounding success in the face of overwhelming odds. The decision did not go 
uncontested however and the government was to experience a substantial backlash to 





you have reversed forty years of Spanish history, 
you have destroyed the calm in Spain, you have provoked the Army, you have created 
an uncertain future for our children. "98 The reaction was to take the somewhat 
predictable format associated with countries of traditionally authoritarian rule, namely 
that of military action. 
The transition up to this point had experienced some turbulence, increased levels 
of violence with Spain, coupled with an economic downturn and stagnation of the 
Centre Democratic Union (UCD) had led to an undercurrent of unrest within the 
country and a shift in the power structure. The UCD, under the leadership of Adolfo 
a (Prego 2000,46) 
°S (Powell 2001,171 and Morin 1979,314) 06 
"In rapid succession other crucial reforms were enacted: Hundreds of political prisoners were granted 
pardons in July 1976 and March 1977; the Movimiento was disbanded and political parties were 
legalized; the vertical labour syndicates were abolished and replaced by independent trade unions; an 
electoral law that set the rules for electoral competition was passed that was regarded as acceptable by 
both left-wing and right-wing political parties; despite fierce opposition from certain sectors of the 
military, the PCI; was admitted as a legitimate contender in the new political arena; and democratic 
elections were scheduled for June 1977. " (Gunther 1992,48). 97 
"Successful democratic consolidation in Spain was primarily the product of a profound transformation 
of Spain's political elites from disunity into consensual unity. For the most part, this transformation 
involved the processes of an elite settlement. All significant nationwide political parties were induced to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the regime's institutions and respect for its behavioural norms through 
extensive rounds of negotiation from the second half of 1976 through the end of 1978, culminating in the 
overwhelming endorsement of the new constitution in the December 1978 referendum. " (Gunther 1992, 
40). 
91 (Calvo Sotelo, L. 1990,19). This is taken from a conversation between Fraga and Leopoldo Calvo 
Sotelo on April 9'" 1977 and was Fraga's response to the legalization of the PCI: by the Spanish 
Government. (Translated from original by author). 
43 
Suarez, had guided Spain through a difficult and sensitive period in the transition but it 
was becoming increasingly apparent that the burden of leadership was taking its toll on 
the prime minister and cracks were beginning to show. These cracks will be examined 
below in more detail and it will become evident that a vacuum of sorts was created in 
the power structure and that this provided the opportunity for various groups to assert 
their influence. 
Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez had managed to effect change largely due to a 
sense of control and dominance that they were able to exert on various factions of 
Spanish political life. Political wrangling and strength of personal character had 
enabled the election of Suarez, while institutional reform from within had played a vital 
role in rendering the Cortcs an instrument of democratic reform rather than an 
antiquated Francoist dinosaur. Control was maintained and change made possible as 
long as those involved believed in the supremacy and authority of the government, and 
by extension, Suarez. As soon as the weaknesses were exposed and the curtain pulled 
back, the aura of invincibility was exposed 99 From the perspective of Juan Carlos and 
those involved in the democratic reform process, it was imperative that the semblance of 
authority was maintained in order to successfully govern during what was becoming an 
increasingly more turbulent time for Spain. The country was newly democratised, 
lacked a comprehensive democratic political sphere, faced threats from regions 
demanding autonomy and was under siege by the ever-increasing spread of terrorism. 100 
°9 
"The impression prevalent during the autumn of 1980 to the winter of 1981 was that democracy would 
collapse and that a substantial part of it would disintegrate due to the inability of those publicly 
responsible 
- 
paid and subsidised by contributions- to sustain the institutions of the system and ensure 
they functioned correctly. " (Vilar 1986,89). (Translated from original by author). 
100 For a more comprehensive list of problems facing Spain at this time see Preston (2004,444). 
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There was no single contributing factor1°' that led to the coup taking place in 1981, 
rather a collection of events and circumstances that came to a head on 23 February. 
The reduction in Suirez's authority resulted from the inability to adapt to the 
changes of the system he had helped to create. In essence, he had become too distanced 
from the process itself, too representative of it while failing to remain as connected as in 
the past. This in turn led to a general weakening of the system as Adolfo Suarez had 
become the recognizable face of democratic transition and any weakness he exhibited, 
was naturally associated to the government and the process of reform itself. Given the 
fragility of the system, this was an unacceptable reality for Juan Carlos to accept. 
Evidence suggests that notions of a military conspiracy existed from 1980 and that the 
establishment were aware of this threat. 102 If this is indeed true then in it is logical to 
assume that the establishment was taking the necessary steps to avoid such an 
eventuality. 
The summer of 1979 saw increased levels of terrorism in Spain and a more 
profound feeling of unrest than had been experienced thus far. Public opinion was 
changing, as was the nature of democratic governance itself. The honeymoon period of 
transition was over and the real process of consolidation had begun, and with it surfaced 
all the problems and weaknesses that had been overlooked, or simply not dealt with, in 
the desire to establish democracy in Spain. 103 The face of political debate was changing 
as a result of popular sway. The UCD began to lose some of the control it had achieved 
when it won 167 seats in the election of 1 March 1979. On the final day of 
101" Thcre was no one cause, no one force, no single dynamic that unleashed irrationality... of that there can 
be no doubt. " (Vilar 1986,90). (Translated from original by author). 102 "Whatever the intelligence services may have been doing in the shadows, talk of the 'Turkish 
temptation' and the 'Ankara syndrome' became commonplace in the media and the corridors of 
parliament. Coming on top of the rumours about General Armada's Operacidn De Gaulle, both Manuel 
Fraga and Felipe Gonzalez were sufficiently worried to tell the King of their readiness to join in a 
caretaker coalition government if the situation became sufficiently serious. " (Preston 2004,450). 
103 "Most commentators are agreed that after the 1979 election the period of consensus politics ended and 
a more confrontational phase began. " (Gilmour 1999,181). 
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campaigning, Suarez had declared that the UCD offered the Christian humanist 
alternative to Marxist socialist materialism. In so doing, the UCD began to move 
towards the right and provided the necessary room to manoeuvre for the Socialist Party. 
Between 1979 and 1982, the Socialists (PSOE) and their leader, Felipe Gonzalez, 
gained support after eliminating their outdated Marxist association. An alternative to 
the UCD was beginning to demonstrate its potential and relevance to the political 
process. 104 
The inability of Suarez to respond to the challenge presented by political parties 
such as PSOE and his failure to safeguard his position of authority led to his downfall. 
Suärez's period in office had been plagued by terrorism, street crime, inflation and 
unemployment and in addition, attacks from the Socialists led to the disintegration of 
the UCD coalition. `Internal divisions, the impression of incapacity and inactivity, 
together with a number of tactical errors contributed to a series of damaging reverses for 
UCD in regional elections in Andalusia, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. By 
the spring of 1980, the prime minister faced a major credibility problem. "°5 While 
problems such as terrorism and street crime face many prime ministers, the manner in 
which Suarez saw fit to respond did nothing to support his claim to power. 106 The 
major problem that faced Suarez and as a result, Juan Carlos, was a popular feeling of 
desgobierno, a complete lack of guidance and governance. Suarez was criticised for his 
notable absence from cabinet meetings and his reluctance to face parliament and yet his 
actions when he was present came under equal criticism as can be seen by his response 
104 
"The UCD was truly the party of the transition. Once the Constitution of 1978 had come into force 
and the first Cortes had been elected in 1979, the centripetal force that had kept the pieces of the UCD 
toýether had dissolved. " (Ramon Arango 1985,167). 10 (Preston 2004,440), (Martin Villa 1984,90), (EI Pals, 18 February, 2,3,22 March 1980). 106 
"In part he seemed to be trying to defuse the situation by treating ETA as if it were no more than a 
minor irritant and by ignoring the fact that the extreme right was virtually on a military footing. To most 
observers, however, it appeared as if his government had lost its sense of direction. " (Preston 2004,441). 
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to the spate of killings by ETA between 23 October and 3 November 1980. '07 It 
appeared that neither his presence nor his absence elicited a positive response. 
The growing discontentment with Suarez, the increased levels of violence and 
the inner turmoil of the political spectrum created an atmosphere of potential danger for 
the establishment. The rise of the left was to create additional problems for the 
establishment. Given the nature of the previous regime and the continued existence and 
influence of the Francoist Bunker, the left wing had been suppressed and denied 
legitimacy from the outset of the transition process. 108 There had been little dialogue 
between the Communist Party (PCE) and the monarch and yet this would change109, and 
with this change would come resentment and repercussions. The legalization of the 
PCE and the ever-increasing popularity of the socialist leader, Felipe Gonzalez, may 
well have been interpreted by the Bunker as a direct affront to their Francoist 
understanding of societal structure. Bearing this in mind, the establishment needed to 
devote time and energy to both suppressing the military threat and to once more giving 
direction and authority to the government. 
The manner in which the establishment sought to control the game was a two- 
pronged effort. Juan Carlos used his influence with the military; a factor that was to be 
incredibly relevant and will be examined in greater detail below, and the issue of the 
prime minister was to come to the front. On 6 January 1981 the King delivered his New 
Year message to the Armed Forces at the Pascua Atilitar reception in the Palacio de 
107 
"On 23 October 1980... 48 children and three adults were killed in an accidental propane gas explosion 
at the village school of Ortuella in Vizcaya. On the same day, UA-M assassinated three Basque 
members of UCD. Whatever his real feelings, Suarez responded with what seemed like callous indifference. Ile made no parliamentary statement about either the disaster or the terrorist attacks. Nor 
did he visit the stricken village and he stayed away from the funerals of his party colleagues. " (Preston 
2004,448). (E! Pais, 24,25,26 October 1980), (Cambio 16,3 November 1980). 
1`" 
"Officially at least, the position of the government in relation to the PCC was identical to that of its 
predecessor, in that it was considered as a party incapable of becoming legalized. " (Powell 2001,163). (Translated from original by author). 109 
"Don Juan Carlos was fully aware that the consolidation of the Monarchy required acceptance by the left, and especially by the party that had become internationally associated as the legitimate representative 
of Spanish socialism. " (Powell 1991,153). (Translated from original by author). 
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Oriente. Juan Carlos made it very clear that he would approve no `conspiratorial 
activity'. A clear message was given to the military that their involvement in the 
political forum would not be supported nor condoned by the King. 
"Happiness is total commitment to duty, with enthusiasm and dedication and no 
inclination to get involved in political activities other than that elevated endeavour 
which interest us all, the grand endeavour of the greatness of Spain and the permanent 
vigilance of its security.... If you stay united, committed to your profession, respectful 
of the constitutional nouns on which our rule of law is based, with faith and confidence 
in your superiors and your Commander-in-Chief, and inspired always by hope and 
optimism, together we will overcome the difficulties inherent in any period of 
transition. "' 10 
The language used in the speech quoted above gives the impression of authority and 
common purpose and was designed to harness the support of the armed forces. Juan 
Carlos had made similar speeches previously and therefore, his thoughts on this matter 
were well documented. 
Juan Carlos met with Suarez on 4 January and while the exact nature of their 
discussion is not known, Preston (2004) believes they would have discussed the 
rumours surrounding a planned military coup and the ways in which it could be pre- 
empted by forming a coalition government. The notion of a coalition government was 
not a new one and it was to form the basis for the strategy of the opposition to the 
establishment and will be examined in greater detail below. Speculation at the time 
assumed Juan Carlos had spoken to Sudrez about the benefits that could be reaped from 
the resignation of the prime minister. While this has not been confirmed, it stands to 
reason that a logical analysis of the time would dictate this as a prudent course of action. 
Later incidents lead us to believe that the subsequent resignation of Suarez was a 
110 Extract taken from Royal Message delivered on January 04 1981. (Preston 2004,453), (Vilar 1986, 
98-9), (Urbano 1982,52-5), (Morales & Celada 1981,125-6), (EI Pals, 7 January 1981). 
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voluntary act and not one that resulted from external pressure. ' The official 
announcement of the resignation of Suarez was to come in a television broadcast on 29 
January and was to send waves of speculation through Spanish society. The ultra-right 
took his resignation as a victory believing the King and the Army generals had forced 
him into the decision 112 while other opinion viewed his resignation as a response to the 
threat of military intervention. This latter opinion was given credence by a single line 
in Sudrez's resignation broadcast. "I do not want to be responsible for the democratic 
regime of coexistence being once more a parenthesis in the history of Spain. " Whatever 
the true reason behind the resignation Suarez, it had been an clement of inevitability for 
some time and was to mark the start of a new period in the Spanish transition. 
At the UCD party conference in Malaga on 29 January Sudrez announced his 
resignation to his party and "urged them to remain a centrist party as to do otherwise 
would betray the voters' confidence in the party. ""' After some debate, the 
conservative-centrist candidate Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo was nominated to succeed 
Suärcz as prime minister, Juan Carlos approved his nomination and a vote was 
scheduled for 10 February in order for his nomination to be ratified by the Codes. The 
establishment had played their hand well, a clear message had been sent to the military, 
Suarez had resigned and opened the path for a new prime minister and there was an air 
of expectancy about the situation. Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo remarked, in relation to 
Adolfo Suarez, in his nomination acceptance speech that "with his retirement, the 
111 
"Whatever the truth of the matter, on the following day (Jan 27'h) Suarez lunched with the King at La 
Zarzuela. Before entering Juan Carlos's office, he informed General Sabino Fernandez Campo of his 
decision. He wanted there to be no suspicion that any suggestion of his resignation had emanated from 
the King, saying, "No matter what happens, I want you always to be my witness and be able to say no one 
sacked me. " (Preston 2004,456-7), (Attard 1983,190-1), (Fem6ndez-LGpcz 1998,160). 112 For further information: (El Pais, 30 January 1981), (El Alch_ar, 30 January 1981), (Diarlo 16,30 
January 1981), (Oneto 1981,113,119,152), (Melia 1981,74-5), (Calvo Sotelo 1990,24-32), (Prego 2000, 
105-10), (Navarro 1995,366-9). 
113 This is told in greater detail in (Ramon Arango 1985,169-71). 
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transition ended. s114 Further problems were to ensue when the vote that took place on 
20 February was not a success and Calvo Sotelo did not receive sufficient votes to be 
sworn in as prime minister'15 and a second vote was scheduled for 23 February. This 
was a blow for both Juan Carlos and the continuity of the system itself. The first vote 
had demonstrated a lack of confidence in Calvo Sotelo as the candidate for prime 
minister and was to provide the military and illegal opposition with the ideal 
opportunity to exploit the situation to their advantage. 
The faction within Spanish society at this time that desired change were well 
represented by high-ranking officials and influential men. While the depth and breadth 
of the conspiracy is still not known to this day, it is viable to claim that the power base 
enjoyed by the opposition was sufficient to mobilise the necessary forces needed for 
change to be exacted. As has been mentioned above, the main focus of the opposition 
was the leadership of the Cortes and by extension, the very nature of government itself. 
The opposition also followed a two-pronged strategy in order to ensure success. The 
main objectives were gaining control of the government and eliciting the support of 
Juan Carlos. The latter was fundamental to their success and can be seen as a remnant 
of the Francoist command structure so indoctrinated in Spanish military life. Among 
the conspirators were high-ranking military leaders 116 and so the possibility of using 
Marshall Law was a reality. 
The two-pronged strategy can be seen as a viable option as it incorporated both 
political negotiation and the demonstration of military force. The opposition needed 
(Calvo Sotelo 1990,36). (Translated from original by author). 
"After presenting his agenda for the government before the Congreso de los Diputados on 20 
February, the candidate received only 169 votes in favour and 158 votes against, leaving him seven votes 
shy of an absolute majority, forcing the convening of another session, scheduled for three days later, to 
ensure his investiture by a simple majority. " (Powell 2001,292), (Alonso-Castrillo 1996,433-4). (Translated from original by author). 16 Captain-General Milans del Bosch, Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero, Lieutenant-Colonel Pedro Mas Oliver, 
General Carlos Iniesta Cano, General Manuel Cabeza Calahorra and General Luis Torres Rojas were 
among the more prominent members. 
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legitimacy for their actions and expected this to come from the person of Juan Carlos. 
The logical analysis of possible outcomes provides the opportunity for the establishment 
of an authoritarian monarchy to be set up with a military representative at the head of 
the government. The situation in Spain was conducive to change of some description; 
the increasing levels of violence that had gone unanswered and the decline of the 
economy were used as validation for the actions of the opposition. There is still 
speculation as to the true cause and origin of the conspiracy that led to the attempted 
coup but the fact that it existed and was able to go as far as it did, speaks volumes about 
the nature of the transition process in Spain. General Alfonso Armada headed the 
political side of the conspiracy' 17. 
Armada enjoyed a close friendship with Juan Carlos, as demonstrated by his 
appointment as head of military intelligence on 3 February at the King's request. This 
appointment was designed to create an ally for Juan Carlos to have at his side in the 
light of the potential military threat but was ultimately used by Armada to the advantage 
of himself and the conspirators. Armada met with Juan Carlos several times in the build 
up to the attempted coup (23-F) and was able to put forward the case and position of the 
conspirators without actually declaring it thus to the extent that in the `summer of 1980 
Armada had presented Juan Carlos with a report drawn up by an unnamed constitutional 
lawyer, examining legal ways of resolving the situation with a coalition possibly headed 
by a soldier. 't 18 The notion of a coalition government was not solely held by Armada at 
this point but was increasingly becoming a viable option to guarantee the continued 
117 
"At the beginning of 1980, Armada had moved from the Escuela Superior del Ejcrcizo to become 
Military Governor of Ikrida. Increasingly, he had concluded that the solution to what he, and other 
generals, regarded as an intolerable situation was a non-violent substitution of UCD by a government of 
national salvation under his own premiership. On 22 October, at a lunch in the home of the Socialist 
Mayor of Lerida, Antonio Ciurana, Armada went so far as to broach his ideas with two Socialists... thcy 
immediately informed Felipe Gonzalez and he duly passed on the information to Suarez. As a result of 
the conversations that day, however, Armada seems to have convinced himself that he could count on the 
support of the Socialists for his scheme. " (Preston 2004,446-7). (Armada 1983,216,223-7), (Morales & Celada 1982,122-5), (Urbano 1982,232-5) 
11  (Preston 2004). 
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existence of a functioning government. The manner in which Armada went about his 
negotiations with Juan Carlos can be interpreted as a legitimate response to the troubles 
of the times and in an advisory capacity. At this stage, the conspirators were presenting 
an alternative to the existing establishment with no threat of violence. The fact that 
there was a current underlying threat of a military coup can only have lent weight to the 
urgency of their argument. 
Armada did not rely solely on his own influence on Juan Carlos but employed 
various other aspects of persuasion. After the resignation of Suarez and the opening of 
the political forum, it became increasingly possible that a coalition would be formed in 
order to preserve the authority of the government. Two days after Sudrez's resignation 
broadcast, an article, written by the influential right-wing columnist Emilio Romero, 
was published in ABC discussing the options open to Juan Carlos to resolve the 
succession to Suärez. Romero suggested that rather than choosing another politician, 
the King should consider 'the idea of a politically blessed outsider' and proceeded to 
suggest the name of General Armada. 119 Given the nature of the friendship between 
Romero and Armada, the article can well be viewed as a further tool of persuasion. It 
has been demonstrated that Armada used a combination of personal negotiation and 
external populist pressure to gain the support of Juan Carlos, to this he would now add 
strength. 
On 17 November Armada met with the Captain-General of the Valencia Military 
Region, Jaime Milans del Bosch. Both men were monarchists and had been friends 
since serving together on the Russian front. Armada was able to use this friendship to 
manipulate Milans to join efforts with him. Preston states that Armada told Milans that 
`The King is worried about the situation in Spain. Things arc going badly. Terrorism is 
119 Story told in greater detail in (Preston 2004,458), ('Las tertulias de Madrid', ABC, 31 January 1981). 
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shedding the blood of the Armed Forces and the autonomous regions are destroying our 
national unity'. 120 He also alluded that there was plenty Milans could be doing to help 
as Juan Carlos had confided his worries and spoken of the need to solve the problem of 
violence. '2' This was merely an elaboration and to a certain extent, fabrication, of 
conversations that had taken place between Armada and Juan Carlos and when we 
contrast this to earlier speeches by the King 122, it is difficult to see how Milans would 
have been fooled. This is even more of a stretch when we take into account that Juan 
Carlos can be seen to have actively avoided Milans during this time, and certainly did 
not ask for his help. 
The inability of Milans to see the reality of the situation is not the issue here 
however; the strategy now had a military element to it. Milans was in favour of a 
violent coup and Armada's assurances that they had the King's approval to 'redirect' an 
event of this nature to their benefit, coupled with his recent promotion were sufficient to 
convince Milans of the merit of his strategy. The plan was to storm the Cones and seize 
control of the political structure and wait for the appropriate authority to arrive and take 
charge. This initiative would be supported by the activation of the military factions in 
Spain and the implementation of Marshall Law until such time as full control was 
obtained. Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero123 was responsible for the storming of the Cones 
and even as this took place, Armada was still negotiating with Juan Carlos for political 
legitimacy. 
tm (Preston 2004,451). 
121 Also see: (Segura & Merino 1983,53-6), (Pardo Zancada 1998,174-5). tu 
"In no circumstances should they rely on me to cover the slightest act against a constitutional 
government like ours. Such actions, if they took place, I told them, would be considered by the King as a 
direct attack on the crown. "' Speech given by Juan Carlos to a number of senior generals in the aftermath 
of the assassinations of October 31". (Preston 2004,448), (Vilallonga 1993,166-7), (Scmprün 1993, 
194). 
12' 
"°Tejero had also been told by Armada that they were involved in an 'operation backed by the His 
Majesty the King to strengthen the monarchy' and ordered him to stress when he entered the Cones that 
he was doing so in the name of the King, the crown and democracy. " (Preston 2004,466) 
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At 6: 25 p. m. on Monday 23 February 1981, a contingent of Civil Guards 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero stormed into Parliament while Ml's were 
voting the investiture of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo. The ceremony was being broadcast 
live on television and therefore word spread immediately. Armada, denied the 
opportunity to be present at La Zarzuela by Juan Carlos, lobbied for the opportunity to 
go to Cones to negotiate with Tejero. One last attempt was being made to secure the 
position of prime minister. The final nail in the coffin came when Armada was finally 
allowed to speak to Tejero under the understanding that he was the only man with 
whom Tejero would negotiate. What should have culminated in the proposal for a new 
government by Armada to the Cortes, was thwarted by Tejcro's realisation that the new 
cabinet would contain both Socialists and Communists and that Armada would reap the 
benefits of the coup while he would become the scapegoat. The opposition's failure lay 
in the lack of cohesion amongst its members. It became evident as the night progressed 
that Armada had been acting without the direct approval of the King and that his agenda 
did not necessarily correspond to that of the initial concept behind the coup. 23-F failed 
largely due to the inability of the opposition to mount a unified challenge to the existing 
structure. Despite the obvious weaknesses of the system prior to the coup and the 
potential for upheaval that were rife at this time, the democratic system withstood the 
attack. 
The establishment was able to contain matters, thanks in large part to the 
involvement of Juan Carlos during the night of 23-F. The following extract is taken 
from the speech delivered by Juan Carlos at 1: 13 a. m. on the morning of 24 February 
and was to prove instrumental in re-establishing order and calm: 
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"In addressing myself to all the people of Spain, with brevity and concision, in the 
unusual circumstances through which we are living at this moment, I ask from all of 
you the utmost serenity and confidence and inform you that I have issued the following 
orders to the Captains-General of the Military Regions, Maritime Zones and Aerial 
Regions: `Given the situation created by what has been happening in the Parliament, 
and in order to avoid any confusion whatsoever, I confirm that I have ordered the Civil 
Authorities and the Junta of Chiefs of Staff to take whatever steps arc necessary to 
guarantee constitutional order within the legal framework currently in force. Whatever 
military measures may have to be taken in due course must have the approval of the 
Junta of the Chiefs of Staff. The Crown, symbol of the permanence and unity of the 
Fatherland, cannot possibly tolerate actions or attitudes by persons hoping to interrupt by force the democratic process determined by the Constitution which, in its day, the 
nation endorsed by referendum. ', 124 
Juan Carlos was able to gain control of the situation quickly and effectively, rally his 
supporters, reassure the population at large and prevent a military coup almost by force 
of will alone. The ultimate irony of the attempted coup lays in the fact that Juan Carlos' 
power and authority came, not from his democratic stance, but rather from the powers 
invested to him by Franco. The Armed Forces followed his lead due to loyalty to the 
position of Commander-in-Chief rather than to the man himself. The opposition and 
most certainly the military components of it were ultimately defeated in their attempts 
by the very system that they adhered to. 125 23-F can be seen less as a political coup than 
as an internal power struggle among chiefs with victory going to the most powerful. 
Juan Carlos was able to avert the coup because of military control and position rather 
than in the name of democracy itself. 
i24 (Gibson 1992,63). 
25 
"One important study (Agüero 1991) concludes that consolidation of the Spanish constitutional 
monarchy was secured at that time, as virtually the entire military hierarchy joined the procedural 
consensus in support of the system. Agüero argues that one of the most important factors in securing the 
supremacy of civilian political elites over the military in democratic transitions is the absence of 
semiloyal or antisystem political party elites who call upon the military for support in the course of 
partisan conflicts. Instead, the attempted coup of 1981 met with solid opposition from all political parties. 
This was most clearly symbolized in the course of the coup when the leader of the right-wing Alianza 
popular and former Franquist minister Manuel Fraga Iribarnc melodramatically stood up in the Cortes and 
dared his captors to begin by shooting him if they were serious about over throwing Spanish democracy. 
The complete loyalty to the new regime of Alianza Popular denied the conspirators of the kind of civilian 
allies often necessary for the overthrow of democratic regimes. " (Gunther 1992,39). 
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This poses many questions about the nature of democracy within an actual 
transition process and posits that a strong influence must be maintained until all 
semblance of a threat is removed. The result of the attempted coup was the opposite of 
its aim126. Democracy appeared to have triumphed due to the end result but the actual 
process that led to this triumph was far from democratic in nature. The Spanish case, 
and in particular, the events leading up to and including 23-F, demonstrate that the 
action and decisions taken during a transition period represent the foundation for the 
nature of democracy to come and that ultimately, the process of a democratic transition 
can be far from democratic in essence until the process has moved from that of 
transition to consolidation and for this very reason, bear closer scrutiny and analysis. 
The aftermath of the attempted coup served to stabilise the country to a certain 
extent and created a desire to reform that had hitherto not become fully crystalliscd. 127 
The violence inherent in the night of 23-F harkened back to memories of the bloody 
second republic and the Civil War. In this sense, a direct attack upon the fragile 
democracy in Spain had failed in its objectives and demonstrated the capability for 
survival and development of the new government. Inevitably, the aftermath of the 
attempted coup also brought with it feelings of revenge and rumours of a `cover-up' 
regarding the conspirators themselves. There were far from many suspects in custody 
and the level of comfort in which they were detained prior to the trial led people to 
believe that no punishment would be doled out to the golplstas. '28 In addition to this 
unrest, the government was pressing for rapid entry into NATO and attempting to curry 
126 
"The attempted coup merely served to strengthen the new democratic system rather than undermine it. 
It brought the politicians closer together than before, turned right-wingers like Fraga into staunch 
defenders of the new Constitution and created an even greater gulf between him and the extreme right. " jGilmour 1999,192). 
27 
"In a way that went far beyond the cabinet, the survival of democracy on the night of 23 February 
marked a new beginning. The mass demonstrations of 27 February marked the end of the desencanto (disenchantment). The contempt for democracy shown by Tejcro, Milans and Armada had the 
inadvertent effect of obliging the population as a whole to reassess the value of their democratic 
institutions. " (Preston 2004,489). 
121 ABC, 12 April; Cambio 16,20 April 1981; (Morales and Cclada 1982.166-8). 
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the favour of the military in the event that the increased level of terrorism escalated 
once more. For some time after the attempted coup, there still existed rumours of 
potential military involvement in the democratic process. The issue of the military was 
to remain at the forefront of both the government's and Juan Carlos's thoughts but 
progress of sorts had been made. 129 
In October 1981, Juan Carlos and his wife Sofia made an official visit to the 
United States. In many ways, this was a prudent decision at this time, in addition to 
cementing external relations between Spain and America; it gave Juan Carlos the ideal 
opportunity to lobby for Spain's admission to NATO. This in itself would serve more 
than one purpose; inclusion in NATO would pave the way for eventual membership into 
the EEC and it would deflect the attention of the military away from domestic affairs. 
Over the ensuing months, there would continue to be a threat of sorts from the military 
with the attempt to implicate Juan Carlos in the attempted coup. Whilc these were 
eventually dealt with and the military issue reined in, the political climate was far from 
controlled. 
The UCD party began to lose its foothold in the political arena and to fall apart 
from within. There are those who argue that this process began with the resignation of 
Adolfo Suarez and became an inevitable turn of events given the platform of the party 
and the situation in which it was operating. 130 Calvo Sotclo did not possess the force of 
will to hold together the government and the natural decline of UCD, coupled with the 
rapid rise of the PSOE only served to weaken the position of the government further and 
ultimately resulted in the announcement that he would not be UCD's presidential 
tp 
"In the aftermath of the coup's failure there was a significant expansion in the scope of elite 
consensual unity, as those military officers previously ambiguous in their commitment to the new 
democratic regime abandoned all expectations that an alternative form of government was possible or 
desirable. " (Gunther 1992,39). 
10 
"UCD was never a real party, it did not manage to institutionalize itself as such, and its successes 
depended upon the external leadership of Adolfo Suarez during a particular period, but once this had 
failed, it collapsed rapidly and with great ease. " (Soto 1998,92). (Translated from original by author). 
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candidate for the 1982 elcctions. 13' A definite shift in Spanish politics had begun as the 
PSOE focused their platform on the stimulation of employment, the reform of Spain's 
cumbersome civil service and the development of a more positive and independent 
foreign policy. Much attention was focused on the promise to create 800,000 new jobs 
and an aura of expectancy was evident. 132 
The elections were held on 28 October 1982 and resulted in a 79.78% turnout of 
votcrs,, marking the highest thus far in an election in Spain and as such represent an 
integral part of any historical narrative of the transition. 133 The massive turnout served 
not only to cement the desire of the population to be involved in the democratic process 
but also `made it impossible for officers to claim that the military subversives 
Interpreted the national will. 9134 The Socialists received 47.26% of the votes and 202 
seats. Alianza Popular came second with 25.89% and 107 deputies and UCD was 
reduced to 6.17% of the vote and only 11 deputies. 1" This vote provided Spain with its 
first Socialist government and began the process of democratic consolidation. While 
there existed a myriad of tasks facing the PSOE leader, Felipe Gonzalez, the manner in 
which his party had won the election meant that they were able to govern alone without 
the necessity of forming a coalition within parliament. This was to be an important 
factor in the development of a strong and consolidated democratic state and as such, 
marked the true start of the consolidation process and with it, the definitive end to the 
struggle for control between the traditional establishment and the reformist contingent. 
151 El Pals, 31 July; Cambio 16,26 July, 2 August 1982. 
32 (Preston 2004,500). 
31 There are those who believe the transition ended with the ratification of the constitution. But it would 
appear more prudent to prolong this until the PSOE's victory on the 28 October 1982, as during those 
years events took place congruent with a period of transition, such as the failed coup d'etat of 23F, the 
collapse of die UCD, the construction of the democratic State and the success of the autonomy process. " (Soto 1998,92). (Translated from original by author). 3' (Preston 2004). ý" Election figures taken from: (Mwioz Alonso, 1984), (Preston 2004,502), (Soto 1998,112.3), El1'ais, 
29,30 October; Cambio 16,1 November 1982. 
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The Spanish transition can be seen to have started at many points during the 
history presented above, and equally can be seen to have ended at various junctures. 
What has been provided above is an attempt to outline the timcframc in which my 
subsequent analysis takes place. Not all events have been covered and those that have, 
in no great detail. Sufficient literature exists to negate the need for any greater detail to 
be provided, but this chapter demonstrates the necessity for the illustration of those 
factors that contributed to the transition to be included in any attempt at a 
comprehensive analysis of Spain's democratic transition. 
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Chapter 2 
Constructing the Theoretical 
Framework: 
Analysis of suitable approaches 
"The one great thing we have going for us is the premise that individuals act rationally 
in trying to satisfy their preferences. That is an incredibly powerful tool, because you 
can model it. "136 
This chapter provides the theoretical underpinning to the contextual clement of the 
thesis. Four key events from the Spanish transition have been chosen for detailed 
analysis, and given the varied nature of these events in respect to each other, a pool of 
equally varied theoretical tools is required. The theoretical approaches were selected as 
they provide a more comprehensive understanding of the period as a whole, through the 
analysis of individual events. The aim of this chapter is to not only eliminate the need 
for constant redefinition and elaboration of my working terminology throughout the 
body of the text, but also to provide the reader with a working basis with which to 
ground the theoretical applications that will follow. 
There exists an extensive collection of applicable theoretical approaches for 
dealing with democratic transitions and therefore the challenge was to reduce this list to 
a manageable and useful selection, in order to create, not only an original piece of work, 
but also a coherent one. Approaches that were of limited use have been excluded from 
the analytical framework presented in this thesis in an attempt to further codify the 
explanatory power available in regards to democratic transitions. The greater the 
simplicity of the model employed, the greater the possibility of increased development 
in the field of political science. 
The approaches elected, and the reasons for this selection, are as follows. The 
nature of this thesis requires that an attempt be made to explain not only 'how', but also 
'why' certain actions were chosen and consequently, why others were disregarded. 
136 The above quote is taken from Charles Schultze, the former President of the American Economic 
Association. (Kuttncr 1985,75). 
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While it must also be made clear that no infallible predictive power exists in this field, it 
is possible to, through investigation based on analysis of available data, with a fairly 
high degree of accuracy as to the expected outcome of events and in turn, explain the 
sequence of events via a process of reverse-engineering. The approaches selected for 
this thesis enable the questions raised above to be tackled and deconstructed in a manner 
that provides additional understanding into the Spanish transition to democracy. The 
approaches are outlined below: 
Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has provided much of the basis for analysis in this 
thesis. The underpinnings of RCT are fundamentally straight forward, and for this 
reason, intrinsically valuable to the questions addressed in this work. 137 The clear-cut 
and, to a certain extent, simplistic nature of RCT is evident in the name itself. RCT 
provides an all-encompassing term to explain the motivations behind human action and 
decision making. A fundamental interpretation of RCT sees human action primarily in 
economic terms138 and subsequent analysis of actions is therefore analysed accordingly. 
If we view RCT in this light, it becomes increasingly clear that decisions are made 
based upon a system of maximising returns that will produce the most desired outcome 
ttr'The theory of rational choice is, before it is anything else, a normative theory. It tells us what we 
ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible. It does not tell us what our aims ought to be. " (Elster 1986,1). 
139 
"The fundamental core of RC'T is that social interaction is basically an economic transaction that is 
guided in its course by the actor's rational choices among alternative outcomes. An action is taken only 
after its benefits and costs have been weighed. Essentially, an actor will choose an action rationally, 
based on a hierarchy of preferences (values, utilities), that promises to maximise benefits and minimise 
costs, or more precisely, that promises a net gain of benefits minus costs, or still more precisely, that 
promises the highest net benefit to the actor and the highest probability of its occurrence. " (Zey 1998,2). 
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for those involved in the decision process. 1' The implicit reality of the previous 
statement creates an inherent structure to RCT that in turn generates a predictive and 
explanatory capacity vital for the understanding of certain political processes. 
RCT can be seen to rest upon very simple assumptions about the nature of choice 
and decision making in general. 140 Choice represents that which we do, desire 
represents that which we prefer and logic is the tool that connects these two together. 
This aspect of RCT dates back to the time of Aristotle141 and has largely remained 
unchanged as a result of its intimate connection to the fundamental core of human 
behaviour and decision making. The true applicability for this analytical tool becomes 
apparent when we are able to analyse and examine real life situations using the above 
formula and therefore create greater understanding of events. The ability to interpret 
and situate decisions, which on the surface may appear firmly grounded in human 
nature, within a rationally orientated framework increases our ability to understand 
decision making and the contributing motivational factors that exist. 
The central problem with RCT as a theoretical approach is paradoxically, that which 
also makes it applicable as a theoretical approach. RCT is based upon the assumption 
that actors will act in a rational manner best suited to their personal needs. Rational can 
be understood to be an action chosen with the highest utility outcome. 112 This is correct 
in and of itself but fails to address the context in which rational decisions are made. 
Why is it that actors behave as they do? What is it that drives them to believe they are 
acting in their own best interest? Can actions simply be attributed to an internal thought 
process resulting from a moral and ego-centric evaluation of variables, or is there in fact 
119 "Rational-choice approaches begin with a set of individuals, assumed to have a well-defined set of 
Preferences " (Weingast 2002,661). 
"0 
"To use //onto econor» lcus, one assumes that actors have complete and well-ordered preferences and 
complete information, and that they maximize the net value of expected returns to themselves. " (Ostrom 
1999,44). 
"' Much of the information regarding Aristotle is taken from his Nlchomoc/, can Ethics. 
"_ 
"Choosing rationally becomes equivalent to maximising utility: that Is, to seeking the greatest 
fulfilment of pre-existing passions. " (Allingham 1999,1). 
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an exterior set of constraints that shape the decision making process and generate the 
rational actions themselves? If external parameters do exist, as they surely must, the 
recognition of them as contributing factors in any analysis of decision making must be 
apparent. The parameters that exist provide the `choice-field' within which decisions 
arc taken, and in so doing create the `rational' aspect of choice subsequently seen as 
available by the actors involved. The existence of institutions and institutional 
constraints provide us with the wider context and the reality of parameter setting. 143 
RCT alone does not comprehensively address the exact nature of decision making as it 
fails to take into account the connection between the individual and the arena in which 
they operate. 
Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Rational Choicc Institutionalism (RCI) takcs the political scicntist one stop closcr 
towards a more comprehensive understanding of the decision making process in 
politics. Rationality, according to this theoretical approach, stems from the existence of 
available alternatives and the stability and order of the active and established regime. '44 
RCI can be better understood once we are able to deconstruct the structure and 
demonstrate the elements that constitute the rule base of the approach. These rules in 
turn, naturally provide the underpinnings for the final applicability of the approach and 
can be summarised thus: 
"' 
"Institutions arise in part to help create the conditions for self-enforcing cooperation in an environment 
v%here there are gains from cooperation but also incentive problems that hinder a community's ability to 
maintain cooperation. " (Weingast 2002,674). 
'N 
"An important concept throughout this study is credible commitments, self-enforcing incentives 
provided by institutions for relevant actors to behave in a certain manner. " (Weingast 2002,675). 
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a) A set of actions from which an individual chooses 
b) A set of outcomes 
c) A rule associating an outcome with each action in cach environment 
Bearing in mind the basic elements listed above, it becomes clear that the environment 
in which the actors find themselves affects the manner in which they make decisions 
and that it is perhaps this, and not an inbuilt wisdom that guides the decisions of human 
beings. 145 The existing parameters that govcm the daily running of political life act as 
both guide lines and constraints for those operating within the system. This enables the 
actions of individuals to be explained in connection with the wider perspective. For a 
full understanding of RCI, it is necessary to observe it under real world conditions 
rather than as a purely abstract notion, as it is the environment that plays a vital role in 
the decision making process. 
Actions and decisions are naturally shaped and directed by factors resulting from 
the surrounding climate. As such, we can say that actions in fact take place under 
invisible constraints. These constraints can perhaps be outlined accordingly: 146 
1) Scarcity of resources 
2) Opportunity costs (rnaximisc bcncfits) 
3) Institutional nouns (laws ctc) 
4) Information 
tos 
"Tbcrc is likely no unique method used by minds to make decisions. It is well known that individuals 
are generally not very logical, and that their decision behaviour can be modified by the surrounding 
culture or by the acquisition of some special skill. " (Raymand 1986,17). 
146 For further reference to these outlines please see M. Zey's "Rational Choice Theory and 
Organizational Theory: A Critique" (1998). 
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It is important to bear these factors in mind when it comes to the task of analysing data 
and attempting to make subsequent predictions. RCT sees human action primarily in 
economic terms and is therefore not overly concerned with the ethics or values that lead 
to rational decisions. 147 Bearing this in mind, it would appear that there is an clement of 
RCT which needs a certain amount of revision before it can fully be integrated into the 
explanatory tool box required to more fully explain transitions. As Kuttncr writes, "the 
central fallacy of RCT is that it postulates a single motivation, self-interest, as an 
explanation for all human behaviour, economic and otherwise. "148 This exposes a 
weakness of RCT, which I need to address in order to best incorporate this theoretical 
approach into my analysis. 149 No decisions, political or otherwise, arc made in a 
vacuum and not only does the existing climate of a country play a vital role in the 
decision making process but the past also plays its part. RCI proved to be a most 
applicable theoretical tool for dealing with Spain during the transitional proccss. 150 
Providing it is possible to ground RCT in the real world and move away from the purely 
abstract and theoretical that fails to take into account human response to dccision- 
making and to situations that shape day-to-day living, it should prove to be useful 
indeed. The use of RCI creates the ability to connect the actions of individuals to the 
system in which they operate and to do so in a manner, that continues to recognize the 
importance of rationality in explaining human behaviour. 
147 
"For many problems, it is useful to accept the classical political economy view that an individual's 
choice of strategy in any particular situation depends on how he or she perceives and weighs the benefits 
and costs of various strategies and their likely outcomes. " (Radnitzky 1987,32). 48 (Kuttncr 1985,41). 
49 ' he kind of deductive logical system that informs rational choice analysis has important strengths, 
parsimony first among them, but its characteristic weaknesses, such as those imposed by the highly 
restrictive assumptions that make this kind of analysis possible, are also well known. " (Helen, K. and 
Steinmo, S. 1992,12). 
170 
"Riots, revolts, and other mob activities are engaged in by separate, rational, individual actors who 
have preferences. Societies, organizations, and mobs do not have preference orders as do 
individuals... Rational choice is about the business of explaining collective actions and outcomes on the 
basis of individual behaviour. " (Zey 1998,17). 
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Garne Theory 
Game theory has proved an immensely useful tool in my analysis of the Spanish 
transition'51. Many of the core assumptions are inherently applicable and the rules at 
the core of the model provide for a greater degree of understanding than do other 
approaches. 152 Game theory attempts to address the rules of interaction in order to 
derive patterns and trends from a seemingly chaotic and often turbulent process. This is 
largely due to the direct applicability of the subject matter to the model itself. 1S, While 
Colomer's work on game theory' 54 succinctly outlines many of the ways in which the 
approach can be applied to the case study of Spain, there is still room for further 
analysis when incorporated into the larger theoretically applicable political paradigm 
this thesis attempts to construct. The manner in which decisions were made, actions 
taken, and to an extent the collective memory of Spain; provides the ideal case study for 
the basic tenets of game theory to dissect and explain. Iss 
Although game theory, as the name suggests, deals with the interpretation of 
data through the 'playing' of games, the fundamental underpinnings of the approach arc 
151 
"Strategic situations are a subgroup of social situations. Social situations involve the interaction of individuals; to study and understand social situations, we need a theory that explains how individuals' decisions are interrelated and how those decisions result in outcomes. Game theory is one such theory. It 
is a theory of interdependent decisions 
- 
when the decisions of two or more individuals jointly determine 
the outcome of a situation. The 'individuals' can be persons or collective entities that make consistent 
choices. " (Morrow 1994,1). 
152 
"Game theory provides tools that are particularly useful for studying situations in which the rules of 
die interactions are more imprecise or not defined at all, as happens with many characteristic situations in 
a process of political change. A regime change is precisely a change of the rules of the game and logically, the game for changing rules cannot entirely be shaped by the incentives structured by the rules being changed. Some interactions among actors in a process of political change are therefore less 
constrained than those of actors in a stable political situation, whether this is a dictatorship or a 
constitutional, consolidated democracy. " (Colomcr 1995.6). 
ts) 
"The 'Spanish model' has usually been identified with negotiations and pacts among political elites 
and a consensus among the citizenry which avoid acts of revenge, violent confrontation and civil war. " JColomer 1995,1). 
"Colomer, J. M. Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Alodel (1995). tss 
"Partly, it was the experience of failure and the political process itself which shaped the preferences 
and choices of actors. It was this dread which induced a predisposition toward negotiation and 
compromise on the part of the main political actors. " (Colomer 1995,3). 
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rooted in RCT. '56 Game theory, like RCT, has at its core, the assumption that actions 
taken are grounded in the process of rational analysis by the actors, but this has been 
taken one step further, in this thesis, and refined to a certain extent. IS7 If we assume that 
individuals act `rationally', and we assign this rationality to self-interest, we have the 
basis for our analysis. This analysis, however, must be placed within a wider 
framework in order to fully explain the interaction between actors and the motivations 
that lay at the core of transitional politics. RCT provides us with the foundation, Game 
theory supplies the initial support for analysis by creating organised and ordered 
`games' which enable interpretation and a greater understanding of data, 158 but more is 
needed in order to fully integrate historical linear accounts into a model of political 
interest that will provide us with some semblance of predictive ability. RCT by itself 
cannot fully explain information of this complexity due to the fundamental design of the 
model itself. For this purpose, additional tools are needed. 
I have highlighted some of the problems with RCT and put forward an argument 
for the incorporation of game theory but this is still not sufficient to provide us with an 
explanatory framework equipped to handle transitions. 
156 
"The major premise... is that people are rational actors whose decisions are guided by rational 
calculations. A rational person is assumed to be driven by the pursuit of goals.. AW'hat gives the 
rationality premise some explanatory power is the corollary assumption that only goals that are private in 
nature have any intrinsic value to an individual. Only private goals, in other words, are pursued for their 
own sake. " (Chong 1991,2). 1" «Game theory is based on utility theory, a simple mathematical theory for representing decisions. In 
utility theory, we assume that actors are faced with choices from a set of available actions. Each action 
provides a probability of producing each possible outcome. Utility is a measure of an actor's preferences 
over the outcomes that reflects his or her willingness to take risks to achieve desired outcomes and avoid 
undesirable outcomes. The probabilities of obtaining each outcome after taking an action represent 
uncertainty about the exact consequences of that action. " (Morrow 1994,16). Im 
"Game-theoretical analysis does enable each player to discover the solution of the game and, therefore, 
to predict the strategies of the other players, provided that the latter will act in a rational manner. But the 
Point is that, prior to such a game-theoretical analysis; he will be unable to make such predictions. " (Ilaranyi 1986,89). 
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It turns out that rational individuals often will have difficulty producing public goods 
that depend upon collective contributions. Since these goods, if supplied, can be 
enjoyed equally by everyone, including those who have not contributed their share of 
the cost, there will be a strong temptation for everyone to let other people pay for 
them.. 
. 
From the standpoint of any individual, therefore, it is not what he does that 
counts; it is what the other members of the group do that will determine the outcome of 
the process. 159 
If we interpret `goods' to be an end product of some kind, and for our purposes, 
democracy fits this definition, then we are able to see that having `rational' individuals 
who act 'rationally' is not always sufficient to produce the desired end result. "Game 
theory is a theory of possibly conflicting (but not necessarily selfish) individual 
interests, ethics can be regarded as a theory of the common interests (or the general 
welfare) of society as a whole. i160 This notion presents us with a new avenue to tackle. 
RCT deals with the actions of individuals, their motivations and the influences 
that have led them to act in a certain manner under certain circumstances. Viewed in 
this manner, RCT constitutes the basis for my framework, despite its failings that have 
been outlined above, namely that, "rational choice theorists do not question whether 
their assumptions fit reality in different historical, cultural, or institutional 
circumstances. "161 If this is the case, then how effective can RCT be as a framework for 
cross-case study comparison? The answer must surely lay in the manner in which we 
apply the tools to the subject matter at hand. Simply because RCT has flaws, does not 
make it useless in the explanation of transitions. What is required of us is to transplant 






"One superficial way to look at irrationality is to say that rationality informs the agent as to what to do; if the actor behaves otherwise, then he or she is irrational. " (Zey 1998,19). 
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doubts and failings that may show themselves to be present in an analysis based solely 
upon a single theoretical approach. 
Game theory provides the political scientist the mechanism to avoid precisely 
the pitfall highlighted above. "" By placing the assumption of rationality, that exists at 
the foundation of human action, and then plotting these actions through 'games', it 
becomes possible to examine the manner in which actors behave in situations where the 
level of information available to them is either limited or alternatively, in some cases, 
perfect. These 'games' provide an explanatory tool that allows the purely theoretical to 
be grounded in the realms of the actual and consequently provides for some degree of 
predictive power to exist. Where the amalgamation of RCT and game theory still falls 
short is in the connection between the theoretical and the physical, and more 
importantly, in how we are able to understand this connection. As a result, additional 
theoretical approaches are required to address this shortcoming and attempt to provide a 
substantive explanation as to the connection between the actions of individuals and the 
overriding constraints of the system within which they manoeuvre. 
Historical Institutionalism 
In order to address the gaps in the existing theoretical framework, I have 
incorporatcd historical institutionalism into the analysis of this thcsis-164 Information 
from approachcs uch as path dcpcndcncy has also been a contributing factor but the 
161 
"Strategic decisions are the topic of game theory 
... 
There is a set of agents and, for each of them. a set 
of possible choices or strategies. When the agents choose one element from their respective strategy acts, 
they bring about a certain state of the world. " (Elster 1986,7). 164 
"In general, institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that 
shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups. Thus, clearly included in the definition are such features of the institutional context as the rules of 
electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, 
and the structure and organization of economic actors like trade unions. " (Thelon, K. Steinmo, S. 1992.2) 
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bulk of the model has its roots in institutionalism. 165 It became increasingly apparent 
that the analytical tools provided by RCT and game theory were open to criticism as 
they were without a strong attachment to the `linear' understanding of transitions. 
While this is perhaps an ambitious task to connect very specific, micro-level approaches 
to one that takes into account the wider context of events that have taken place, unless a 
successful collaboration of these elements is achieved, our understanding of transitions 
will remain blinkered and therefore lacking in true meaning and applicability. 
Historical institutionalism provides us with, what many may sec as a linear 
account of political situations and therefore can be viewed as falling short of possessing 
any real semblance of political design. This is true to a certain cxtcnt, but once again, 
the manner in which the information is put to use will ultimately determine the 
usefulness of the approach. 166 In essence, this bears many similarities to the basic 
premise of RCT; in that customs are created based upon an examination of the past with 
a view to applying it to the future. The fundamental difference lays with the manner in 
which RCT views the role of individuals as paramount but historical institutionalism 
sees the role of society, or institutions as relevant when it comes to explaining the 
relationship between decision making and the actual development of ideas into policy. 
The two approaches are both possessed of merit when viewed individually, but it is 
when we are able to combine the two that they arc at their most cfTectivc. 
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'historical institutionalists tend to conceptualise the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms-they emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the 
operation and development of institutions.. 
. 
they tend to have a view of institutional development that 
emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences.. 
. 
they are especially concerned to integrate 
institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political 
outcomes. " (Ifall, P. A. and Taylor, R. C. T. 1996,936). 166 
"Scholars working in different disciplines and writing on subjects as diverse as the political economy 
of advanced capitalism and policy-making during China's Great Leap Forward have all focused on the 
significance of institutional variables for explaining out-comes in their respective fields. " (Thelon, K. and Steinmo, S., 1992,1). 
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The aim behind the nature of the analysis presented in this thesis is to situate the 
initial focus of the actions of individuals within a wider context. 167 Institutionalists see 
factors that shape the actions of actors as being other than mere self-interest. 168 Here we 
have an indication of interpretation of the data from a more macro-orientated 
perspective. This is relevant, in that human behaviour and decision making is far more 
complex than an analysis focusing upon a single element or perspective would indicate. 
The assignation of a value, namely self-interest, which can account for any given end 
result, is a valid technique, but this value must take account those factors that shape it. 
In other words, while we are aware that no action takes place in a vacuum, it is still 
necessary to examine the nature of the metaphorical vacuum in order to better 
understand the initial action itself 169 
It can be argued that political actors are not aware of the true relevance and 
impact of institutions and that the structure of institutions can cause actors to fight the 
same battles over and over again. 170 For this very reason, institutions do matter. It is a 
fair assumption to make that an actor will be aware of RCT, in as much as he is 
motivated to act in his own best interest, but it is possible that he will not be fully 
cognizant of the vast scope of institutions and the effect that these have in shaping the 
outcomes of various situations. 171 Ellen Immergut writes that, "self-conscious political 
107 
"For historical institutionalists the idea that institutions provide the context in which political actors 
define their strategies and pursue their interests is unproblematic. " (Thelon, K. and Steinmo. S. 1992,7). 168 
"Rational choice institutionalists in effect 'bracket' the issue of preference formation theoretically, 
though of course in the context of specific analyses they operationalize self-interest, and generally they do 
so by deducing the preferences of the actors from the structure of the situation itself. This is quite different from historical institutionalists, who argue that not just the strategics but also the goals actors 
pursue are shaped by the institutional context. " (Thelcn, IC. and Stcinmo, S. 1992,8). 
`ý if there is no single political choice or outcome that maximizes the individual's self-interest, then 
clearly game-theoretic tools need to be supplemented with other methods to understand which solutions 
will be or were chosen. " (Ibid. 9). 170 For a more detailed explanation into the nature of historical institutionalism and its relation to the 
actions of individuals, please refer to Steinmo, S. et al. (cd). Structuring Politics: Ilistorical 
Institutionalism in comparative analysis (1992). 171 
"Institutions create their own environments by the way they interpret and act in a confusing world. It is not simply that the world is incompletely or inaccurately perceived, but also that actions taken as a 
result of beliefs about an environment can, in fact, construct the environment. In politics, a standard 
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actors, reflecting on their pasts and futures, can divert the supposedly ineluctable march 
of progress onto unexpected paths. Such contingent developments stand beyond logic 
and can only be grasped through historical analysis. "172 This is important to factor into 
our analysis of transitions because, were actors aware of the impact of institutions 173, 
the end result would be much more susceptible to manipulation and cxploitation. 174 
Here we have found our wider context. 175 Bo Rothstein (1992) sums up this notion 
when he writes, that by focusing on these intermediate institutional features of political 
life, institutionalism provides the theoretical `bridge between men who make history 
and the circumstances under which they arc able to do so. ' 
Historical institutionalism has proved useful in highlighting cross-national 
differences and outlining patterns or preferences over time within individual countries. 
This is done through explanation of different policy outcomes in different countries 
with reference to their respective institutional configurations. The obvious problem 
with analysis of this kind is that it lends itself towards a degree of institutional 
determinism. 176 This is naturally something that I wish to avoid, as it deliberately takes 
away from the notion of free decision making on the part of the individual. Given the 
central focus individuals and their capabilities constitute in this thesis, the notion that 
free will is completely subordinate to external pressures runs contrary to the wider 
context intended. While it is certainly true that the nature of institutions will play a vital 
example is the way in which a reputation for power is transformed into the reality of power. " (March and Olsen 1989,47), (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), (Weick, 1979). 172 (Inunergut 1998,19). 
173 
"Instead of making completely independent or autonomous decisions, individuals may be embedded in 
communities where initial norms of fairness and conservation may change the structure of the situation 
dramatically... Further, they may change their strategies over time as they learn about the results of past 
action. " (Ostrom 1999,47). 
174 
"It should be noted that the values and preferences of political actors are not exogenous to political 
institutions but develop within those institutions. " (March and Olsen 1989,40). 
"s 
"Institutional analysis also allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects 
and as agents of history. " (Thelcn, K. and Stcinmo, S. 1992,10). 16 This information is paraphrased from Kathleen Thclcn and Sven Steinmo's chapter in Stcinmo. S. et 
al. (ed). Structuring Politics: historical institutionalism in comparatlºT analysis (1992). 
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role in the shaping and ordering of preferences'77, there has to exist a mechanism for 
analysing the other factors that weigh on the decision making process. We have seen 
then that the micro involvement of actors within the macro system is just as relevant for 
our analysis, but what has not been made clear is how it will be possible to truly connect 
the two? 178 Peter Hall argues that a better understanding of institutions can be achieved 
by creating a broader matrix of competing interests and ideas. 
Within this matrix, institutions interact with interests and ideas in a variety of ways. By 
providing routines linked to processes of socialization and incentives for ccrtain kinds 
of behaviour, they contribute to the very terms in which the interests of critical political 
actors are constructed. By making organized activity and the expression of political 
views more or less viable for certain groups, they affect the power with which the interests of key social groups are pressed. In many instances the routines that have been 
institutionalised into the policy process filter new information, affecting the force with 
which new ideas can be expressed. In other cases they alter behaviour in such a way as 
to produce wholly unintended consequences of considerable moment for a nation. 179 
t" March and Olsen argue that it is possible to outline a basic set of propositions that reflect the dynamics 
of balancing within organizations, the lives of each participant. (1) Individuals will cone to trust others 
whom they see as producing relevant events that they like and preventing relevant events that they dislike. (2) Individuals will come to believe that people they trust cause events they like and that people they 
distrust cause events they dislike. (3) Individuals will come to believe that events are relevant if they 
agree about them with people they trust and disagree about them with people they distrust. (4) 
Individuals will be active to the extent to which their seeing, liking, and trusting are unambiguous. (5) 
Individuals will 
- 
to the extent to which the political system and their activity levels permit - seek contact 
with people they trust and avoid contact with people they distrust. (6) Individuals will feel integrated into 
a political system to the extent to which they like the relevant events that they sce. Taken together, these 
propositions suggest a view of reality forming that emphasizes the impact of interpersonal connections 
within a political system and the affective connection between the system and the participant and liking. 
IMarch and Olsen 1989,45). 
""Analysis 
of individual preferences cannot fully explain collective decisions, for in addition we need 
to understand the mechanisms by which individual decisions arc aggregated and combined into collective decisions. " (Dahl 1961,770). 
179 (Ilall 1992,91). 
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The matrix, mentioned in the above quote, and its `links to processes of 
socialization' will be of paramount importance for my thesis. Within this matrix the 
role of the individual '80 is seen as a relevant factor, providing a substantial underpinning 
to the wider contextual framework of analysis. It is apparent that actors react, at least in 
part, according to the climate in which they find themselves but this will not 
automatically guarantee a specific outcome under a specific set of circumstances. 181 
While it is possible to predict, to a given value of accuracy, how an actor will behave 
according to RCT, it is not as straightforward when we employ historical 
institutionalism. 182 I am not denying the connection between the past and the future and 
have no desire to refute out of hand the notion of causation, but it must be made clear 
that there is an existing cleavage between the two factors I am attempting to unite and 
by bringing the two together, I hope to eliminate some of the weaknesses by pooling the 
foundations, assumptions and relative successes, thereby creating a virtual subset within 
a theoretical framework. 
Historical institutionalism provides me with tools that have proved most useful 
in answering some of the questions that have arisen from my research. We have 
established that individuals act based upon utility maximisation, we have seen that these 
actions can be better understood by placing them within a `game-theoretical' situation, 
'so 
"The individual is seen as an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols. 
scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of 
which a course of action is constructed. Not only do institutions provide strategically-useful information, 
they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors. " (I lall, P. A. and Taylor, C. R. 1996,939). 
tgt'The institutionalist approach views the summation of preferences - or for that matter, the aggregation 
of individual behaviours into collective phenomena 
- 
as exceedingly problematic... I luman interests are 
50 complex, that to speak of summing or aggregating them is merely applying a metaphor to a 
192.1 
complicated process" (Immergut 1998,7). 
istorical institutionalists have been strong proponents of an image of social causation that is 'path 
dependent' in the sense that it rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate 
the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the 
contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past. " (I fall, P. A. and Taylor. C. IL 1996, 941). 
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we have seen how institutions must be regarded as relevant when it comes to the 
explanation of behaviour183 and we have seen how the notion of social causation is one 
that must be examined very closely, and even then, its applicability is not possible 
without major problems. What we have also seen is the realisation that, despite the 
connection we are able to draw between events in different countries, based on 
assumptions inherent in RCT; it is not possible to create a blanket framework based on 
these assumptions alone. 184 There naturally exists a vast array of options available to 
actors in any given situation and it is the job of the `matrix' to provide us with the most 
coherent explanation for this behaviour. 
An additional factor worth considering is that despite not necessarily being fully 
aware of the impact of institutions, and not being in possession of complete information, 
actors are aware of certain elements of the process, which may well affect their 
actions. 185 They are privy to information and rules that have helped to shape and still 
constrain the actual system itself. 186 If actors are aware of the system in which they 
operate, they arc also able to manipulate it. This tics back to the notion that self-interest 
is at the very heart of actions taken. The course of action adopted may not always be 
that which is most desired, but simply that which is possible to achieve. It is not 
" 
"A complete view of society would also be a complete view of all the individuals, and vice versa; there 
would be no difference between them... through both the hereditary and the social factors in his life a man 
is bound into the whole of which he is a member, and to consider him apart from it is quite as artificial as 
to consider society apart from individuals. " (Cooley, C. I I, 1967,134). 184"There 
may be a number of reasons why, under one particular act of circumstances, someone may 
make a political choice that deviates from the choice the same individual, with the same prcferenccs, 
would make under other circumstances... Institutional ists aim to analyze why these actors choose one 
particular definition of their interests and not some other equally plausible alternative. Definitions of 
interests are viewed as political results taken at face value. Thus, institutionalist theory aims to expose 
and analyze the discrepancy between 'potential' interests and those that cone to be expressed in political 
behaviour. " (Immergut 1998,7). 
"""We 
often fancy that institutions, social custom, collective habit, have been formed by the 
consolidation of individual habits. In the main this supposition is false to fact. To a considerable extent 
customs, or wide-spread uniformities of habit, exist because individuals face the same situation and react 
in like fashion. But to a larger extent customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under 
conditions set by prior customs. " (Dewey 1967,149). I" "Because political actors are aware of the effects of these rules, they will attempt to cast their votes or 
to manipulate the rules in such a way as to achieve their most-preferred outcome. " (Inunergut 1998,13). 
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necessary to reach the ultimate goal with every decision taken and every political move 
engineered, what is required is constant forward movement. 
The design I have arrived at for my framework involves varying levels of 
analysis all directed towards a single objective. This project was born from a desire to 
address the gaps that I felt existed in current literature. In an attempt to better explain 
transitions to democracy, I feel it necessary to incorporate the ideas of various 
approaches and attempt to develop the field of political science accordingly. A micro- 
level initial analysis or RCT based design, outlining the reasons and motivations behind 
the decisions and actions of individuals will be at the core of my design; this will be 
situated within a game-theoretical framework. Historical institutionalism will provide 
that mechanism with which to connect these two fundamental approaches to the wider 
context of political and social understanding. 187 The manner in which these approaches 
have been employed allows for a comprehensive understanding and provides the ability 
to better answer some of the questions surrounding the Spanish transition to democracy. 





that can be utilized to analyze, predict, and explain behaviour within 
institutional arrangements. "188 Once this `action arena"89 has been established, the 
process of analysis can begin. It is of paramount importance to define the parameters 
within which analysis will take place but also to realise that this step is but one in the 
"'historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are inherently of interest to broad 
publics as well as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or 
puzzles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations 
and processes of varying scale and temporality. Historical institutionalists likewise analyze macro 
contexts and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time. " (Pierson and Skocpol 2002,695-6). 
" (Ostrom 1999,41). in For further explanation of an action arena, please refer to C. Ostrom's chapter titled "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework" found in P. A. Sabatier's book, Theories of the Policy Process. (1999). 
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process of constructing a framework for increased political understanding. 190 
Significant analysis can only really begin once the terms and parameters of the problem 
have been outlined. Without this having taken place, the complex and intricate varieties 
that will result, become far too great to chart. Although the setting of parameters could 
well be seen as limiting, especially in light of the relatively minor area of data 
employed, the introduction of a more multi-layered and encompassing paradigm, allows 
for compartmentalisation of this kind. The problem with this system of analysis, it 
seems to me, is that prediction of an outcome depends upon the elements within for the 
degree of accuracy that can ultimately be obtained. To clarify, the final conclusion can 
only be as good as the initial data used to test the model. Bearing this in mind, it 
becomes imperative that the initial data arc not only carefully chosen, but also dealt 
with in the correct manner. 191 It is required that the data be correctly chosen and 
investigated in order to provide the analyst with the ability not only to connect the 
physical to the theoretical, but also to ensure that the structure of the investigation is 
harmonious with the mechanisms engaged in the original process itself. 
It is no longer sufficient to simply regard the data from a macro perspective and 
attempt to interpret information in what would be a posteriori rather than a priori terms, 
rather we need an analytical framework that provides us with the necessary tools'92 for 
interpretation on a micro level, the ability to discount the irrelevant and draw on both 
reason and logic to arrive at a satisfactory level of explanation. It is, of course, 
important to be aware of a macro perception of events as this will enable the setting of 
congruent parameters to take place, but the refusal to analyse and thus to situate the 
190 
"A major proportion of theoretical work stops at this level and takes the variables specifying the 
situation and the motivational and cognitive structure of an actor as given. Analysis proceeds toward the 
prediction of the likely behaviour of individuals in such a structure. " (Ostrom 1999,42). 
"' 
"Formal tools such as these simply serve to reduce the huge amount of intervening factors in the real 
world to those which allow the author and the reader to have a clear and parsimonious explanation of the 
real outcomes. " (Colomer 1995,4). 19= 
'Game theory is not knowing what theorems to apply but which tools to use, it is the emergence, 
transformation, diffusion and stabilisation of forms of behaviour. ' (Gintis 2000,18). 
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rational actions of individuals within the wider contcxt, is to fundamcntally fail to 
achieve the possible degree of explanation available. 
The role of institutions is one that must be carefully taken into account in any 
analysis of the Spanish transition to democracy. The constraints that exist and serve to 
shape the decisions of actors arc provided by, not only the natural environment193 in 
which they live, but also the formal structure of society that generates and guides the 
available alternatives. Institutions dictate the structure of a society in that they provide 
the system of rules and operating procedures under which actors live. 194 This structure, 
whether recognised formally by the participants or not, is responsible for much of the 
parameter setting within which decisions arc made. RCT allows for the assumption that 
actors behave in a rational manner and are aware of the possible outcomes of their 
respective decisions, institutionalism provides the connection between the physical and 
the thcorctical. 195 Institutional constraints prevent anarchy and generate accepted and 
expected outcomes to political decision making. 
1°3 By 'natural environment' I am referring to the shared historical memory of the country and the social 
character, taught over generations. This is an incredibly problematic variable to accurately map and yet it is one that can be easily recognised as relevant despite an incomplete understanding of its shape or nature. 94 in fact, institutions create their own environments in part, and the resulting complications are 
significant. For example, much of the richness of ecological theories of politics stems from the way in 
which the actions of each participant are part of the environments of others. The environment of each 
Political actor is, therefore, partly self-determined as each reacts to the other. " (March & Olsen 1989,46). 
's in general, the predictions that can be made depend on the fine detail of the ways an institution 
organizes contact and experience. However, a few broad predictions can be made. Where meaning 
develops within such a system, there is a tendency to partition a population of individuals into groups or 
institutions that share interpretations and preferences within groups but not across groups. " (March & Olsen 1989,45). 
79 
`The institutional constraints imposed on actors reduce the scope of alternatives to be 
chosen and indirectly induce a bias in favour of a particular group of preferences. 
'Rational choices' arc, hence, analysed within an institutional framework and as a 
frequent source of `irrational' collective outcomes. The advantage of the formal, 
deductive reasoning characteristic of the rational choice approach, is that it permits the 
identification of those elements which can explain real outcomes in a more accurate and 
precise manner than the conventional method of inductive generalization from empirical 
observations. Once a set of alternatives, relevant actors and preferences has been put 
forth and the deductive implications of the analysis have been formulated, the contrast 
between formal results and real outcomes can either confirm the validity of the 
explanation or suggest a modification or enlargement of the assumptions in order to 
produce a fit between the model and reality. " 196 
Examination of the existing literature has led me to conclude that the existing 
models, despite their inherent strengths and applicability, can be cxposcd and their 
weaknesses highlighted by the gaps that exist within their very structures. The 
applicability of these approaches rests upon the nature of their construction and yet it is 
this exact facet of their structure that exposes their weaknesses. Theoretical approaches 
predominantly explain political processes from a specific point of view but lack the 
ability to incorporate varying interpretations of the data. By drawing on the strengths of 
various theoretical approaches, it is possible to create a more fundamentally coherent 
explanatory framework that is capable of analysing democratic transitions not just from 
a single viewpoint, but rather from a wider and thus intrinsically more valuable 
perspective. 
196 (Colomer 1995,5). 
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Chapter 3 
The nomination of Don Juan Carlos: 
An unexpected successor 
His Majesty, Juan Carlos I de Borbbn y Borbbn is the central figure of the 
Spanish transition to democracy and yet, his actions during the period have been largely 
under-researched. As has been detailed above, the opinion of Juan Carlos, both prior to 
his nomination, and to a certain extent after it, was less than complimentary. At best 
Juan Carlos was seen as a Francoist puppet, at worse a fool. Analysis of the events will 
show that the transition was moulded very much in the image of the young monarch and 
to ignore such reality is to do the period a disservice. I have chosen Franco's decision to 
nominate Juan Carlos as the first event to be analysed in this thesis for several reasons. 
It is plausible to argue that the Spanish transition to democracy began well in advance 
of this event and that the seeds had already been sown, albeit unwittingly, by Franco 
during his regime. Despite this, I believe the nomination to be a crucial Juncture that 
merits further analysis as it clearly demonstrates the interaction between actors and 
presents an interesting political dilemma. 
The basic tenet of this thesis is to examine the role of individuals within 
transitions and therefore, the point at which the leadership of Spain was passed from 
dictator to monarch represents a turning point in the history of Spain. The role of both 
Juan Carlos and Franco in the nomination process will be examined below in an attempt 
to analyse the parameters within which the decision was made and outline the 
contributing factors and the expected results. This chapter will investigate the 
motivations of both primary actors as well as peripheral ones such as Don Juan, Juan 
Carlos's father and the exiled King of Spain, in an attempt to outline the initial stage of 
Spain's transition to democracy. Efforts will be made to demonstrate the importance of 
interpersonal communication and coherent strategy building for the construction of 
applicable political decision making. 
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Francisco Franco's decision to nominate Juan Carlos as his successor in 1969 
was both prudent and self-serving, best suiting as it did the immediate needs and long- 
term goals of the dictator, and yet, the ramifications of the decision were not congruent 
with the motivation behind it. This in itself represents an interesting case study with 
which to apply Rational Choice Theory (RCT) as the decision was taken after careful 
consideration and logical analysis and yet produced an end result, completely contrary 
to that designed by the originator of the decision. The nomination of Juan Carlos would 
be included in any analysis of the Spanish Transition to democracy as it marks a 
definitive point in the process; but the actual nature of the event itself provides a 
remarkable demonstration of individual choice and planning in the face of structured 
and systematic constraints. At the time of the selection of Juan Carlos, the balance of 
power lay firmly with Franco. The reigning dictator was able to choose the option that 
best suited his plans for the continuation of his regime and therefore, any decision to 
accept the nomination, made by a potential successor was contingent upon a variable 
outside of their control, namely their actual nomination. 
While we arc not privy to the internal decision process Franco underwent in this 
matter, we are able to calculate and determine the likely reasons behind his choice, 
based on a cost-benefit assessment of the options available to him and the subsequent 
outcomes attached. Analysis of this event is made relatively straightforward due to the 
number of primary actors involved in the process. While the role of Don Juan will be 
examined, this will represent the secondary focus and concentrate on the manner in 
which he related to the interactions of the primary actors; the focal point of this chapter 
will rest firmly upon the persons of Francisco Franco and Don Juan Carlos. The 
decisions taken by these two men and the level of communication experienced between 
them will be investigated so as to produce a comprehensive awareness of the 
83 
motivations behind the action and the resultant consequences of it. There arc a number 
of varying approaches that can be adopted when examining this event and I will deal 
with these in turn in an attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
motivations and implications inherent in this event. 
In order to adequately analyse the nomination of Juan Carlos, it is necessary for 
certain assumptions to be made. These assumptions will be outlined below in greater 
detail but a necessary underpinning of approaches such as RCT and Game theory (GD 
is the belief that actors make decisions based on a rational analysis of the available 
options and subsequently act in their best interest. Due to the absence of specific and 
relevant personal insight, we are required to examine the decisions taken, in light of 
what appears rational to us based upon a careful and logical determining of the 
parameters available. There is little margin for error in this process in that we arc 
assuming human nature will be consistent and respond accordingly to set parameters. 
In order to counter the clement of uncertainty, it is necessary to construct, as accurately 
as possible, the conditions under which the two men were operating and determine the 
subsequent rational course of action thus. 
Franco had assumed and held power in Spain from the aftermath of the civil war 
(1936-39) until his death in 1975. During the time of his reign, he established himself 
as the untrammelled leader of Spain and consolidated the mechanism with which to 
perpetuate this system after his death. The choice of a successor lay with him alone and 
as such provides us with the first of the parameters necessary for analysis. While it is 
true that Franco must have received advice from Ministers and advisors, the ultimate 
decision was his to make. This denotes a controlling interest in the decision making 
process and forms the basis of a dominant strategy that will be examined in greater 
detail below. The issue of power distribution is one that must be factored into any 
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analysis of political decision making and is particularly relevant when dealing with only 
two individuals, one of whom, represented an institutionalised form of control. Without 
adequate attention paid to the capabilities of the actors in question, it would be 
impossible to construct a workable action-field. Actions taken arc contingent upon an 
analysis on the part of the actors, as to which actions they arc in fact able to make, and 
not those which they would necessarily most like to make. 
In addition to the agency of individuals, a further clement to consider, prevalent 
in literature, is the notion of an underlying historical deterministic trajectory that directs, 
and ultimately controls the actions of both individuals and institutions involved in 
political processes. This notion is one that is at the heart of approaches such as 
historical institutionalism197 and system approach'98. This 'grand scheme' imposes a 
series of latent constraints upon the actors and generates a final outcome independent of 
the decisions taken by individuals. While this approach does appear far too simplistic 
on the surface, and negates the need for any real analytical work to be done, it does 
possess some relevance to the Spanish case. Even a brief glimpse into Spanish history 
provides us with evidence to support the need for order and control. '" Collective 
psychology aside, the pattern that had become a part of Spanish life was one of a strong 
leader in charge of all facets of life. The fact that Franco's reign had come after a 
bloody civil war and on the heels of the fracas of the Second Republic, only lent further 
197 
"The I listorical Determinist view... that institutional legacies determine the future. Institutions have an 
autonomous logic and cannot be replaced at will. Rather they will change in an organic way independent 
of purposeful action. " (Nielsen et. al. 1995,6). 191 
"Systems Approach 
- 
sees all political activity as a manifestation of a grand but as yet unrevcalcd design, wherein human needs and desires set in motion social and political processes called systems and 
these in turn eventually bring about the creation of political laws and institutions"(Charlesworth 1967,7). t" 
"I listorical memories of the suffering caused by the civil war and rranquist authoritarianism were also 
clearly relevant to the Spanish elite settlement. Virtually all the constituent elites of 1978 were keenly 
aware of the origins of the civil war... major Spanish parties made innumerable references to that historic 
conflict and to their awareness of what Santiago Carrillo described as 'the dangers that menace our 
society*. " (Gunter 1992,77). 
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weight to the necessity for a figurehead leader. 200 The very structure of the system may 
indeed have predicated certain outcomes as "structures, including political structures or 
institutions of the former authoritarian regime, impose certain limits on the number and 
availability of political alternatives. "201 There arc constraints placed upon actors that 
perhaps they are not aware of. Having spent almost thirty years coming to terms with a 
particular type of government and leadership202, the idea of a successor selected by 
Franco would not have constituted a radical solution. 03 By the year 1969 when Juan 
Carlos accepted the nomination from Franco, the reality that a successor had been 
chosen and was being prepared would have been accepted and welcomed and thus 
Franco would have made the decision free from rebuke or opposition. This is an 
important factor to bear in mind; the decision to nominate Juan Carlos was made by the 
existing ruler, without opposition from functioning sectors of the government. The laws 
of probability dictate that there must have been those who disagreed with the result; the 
structure of power distribution made this a moot point. Juan Carlos was Franco's 
choice and this was to be a crucial factor as the transition progressed. 
Approaches such as historical institutionalism and systems approach provide us 
with the initial understanding of the paramctcrs of the event under analysis. Them 
existed a certain tradition in Spain, based upon past experiences and taught over almost 
forty years of political life. It was this tradition that created a virtual political vacuum in 
which Franco was able to operate. His decisions were not questioned and this provided 
200 it is clear for example, for all actors and witnesses of the Spanish transition of the 1970s that the very 
memory, the trauma of the civil war of the late 1930s, fed the fear of a repetition of a violent conflict in broad layers of society. " (Colomer 1995,3). (Colomcr 1995,3). 
''_ in thirty-eight years of absolute personal power the people have become accustomed to personalizing 
politics. This is dangerous for the king, because it will take the people a long time to get used to seeing him as a symbol rather than the supreme ruler. " (Alba 1978,292). 203 What is interesting to note is that this sense of continuation and inertia was all but over-ridden in 
subsequent events in the transition process, such as the nomination of Adolfo Su! rcz and the reform of 
the Codes, and therefore provides us with evidence that no one approach will satisfy all criteria. no one 
approach can explain all. Outcomes are not always guaranteed and are not always dependant upon past 
performance. 
86 
him the opportunity to fully prepare his decision in order to ensure that his objective 
would be realised: namely the continuation of his regime after his death. What is 
required at this juncture is a more in-depth analysis into the actual motivations behind 
the nomination of Juan Carlos and the potential implications associated with these 
motivations. Historical institutionalism alone will not provide us with the necessary 
analysis, as the supposition that actors arc not aware of the true relevance and impact of 
institutions and therefore operate in a continuing cycle of uniform response does not 
provide the answers to the questions at hand. To a certain extent, there is merit in this 
assumption and it will be analysed in greater detail in subsequent chapters but for the 
purpose of analysing the event at hand, greater explanatory tools are needed. 
As has been mentioned above, Franco's choice of Juan Carlos was free from 
external constraints and therefore was based upon the determination of suitability for the 
role. h ere lies one of the principal assumptions that we must make for the purpose of 
this chapter. There exists the possibility that Juan Carlos was the only feasible 
candidate due to a complete lack of faith, on the part of Franco, in anyone else. If this 
was indeed the case, then the young prince was, in essence, the default choice but can 
still be viewed as the desired choice nonethcless204 Once the decision to select Juan 
Carlos had been made, something that may well have taken place during the 1950s, 
when his education was being decided by Franco and Don Juan, 05 or perhaps even 
earlier when Franco fully realised his distrust and dislike for Don Juan, as both a man 
and a potential successor. 206 In either respect, the decision was made and Juan Carlos 
became regarded, in certain circles at least, as the `man who would be King'. There did 
204 0 Broadly speaking the Rational Choice approach... begins with the assumption that men have given 
wants, goals, values, or 'utility functions'. It then assumes that these goals cannot all be equally realized. 
Men live in a world of scarcity and therefore must select between alternative courses of action. They 
will, it is assumed, do so rationally, selecting the course of action which is the most ciTcctive means to 
their goal or selecting the course which leads to their most preferred goal. " (I leath 1976,3). 
="s Refer to footnote 33 for additional information on this. Na Refer to footnote 35 for additional information on this. 
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exist alternatives to Juan Carlos but it became apparent that Franco had the tacit support 
of the `Bunker' in his decision207 Franco needed a successor who he could trust to 
ensure his legacy continued. He needed someone whom the `Bunker' would support 
and who would engender the support of the Spanish people. 208 We have evidence of 
Franco's approval of Juan Carlos in an interview the Caudillo gave to General Vernon 
Walters, special envoy of President Nixon in 1971 where he claimed that "there was no 
alternative to the Prince, and Franco sincerely believed that the presence of Juan Carlos 
would guarantee order and security after his own death. 09" Juan Carlos was viewed as 
Franco's choice in the face of other available options and yet he was not accepted 
without reserve but rather with a sense of tempered optimism. 210 
The reasons for Don Juan's acquiescence of his son's education at the hands of 
his cncmy are very straightforward to understand. Failure to abide by Franco's rules 
would have removed all possibility of a Borbbn becoming King. It is not a great stretch 
of the imagination to assume that Don Juan believed his son would obtain the 
nomination to be King of er the death of Franco and then step aside in favour of his 
father. A rational analysis on the part of Don Juan would have created this future 
scenario and allowed for the events to transpire in the manner best suited to his personal 
interests. We must also assume that Franco foresaw this possibility too and when we 
207 By the early 1960s a number of prominent franqutstas, including Carrero Blanco and Lopez RodS, 
had come to the conclusion that Franco's successor should be Juan Carlos. There was an array of 
possible candidates, including the Carlist family of Borbdn-Parma, and the 13orbOn-Dampierre nephews 
of Don Juan. But strong arguments could be made against all of them: the 13orlxSn-I'anna family was 
French, while Don Jaime, the elder brother of Don Juan and father of Alfonso and Gonzalo de Borb6n- 
Dampierre, had long since renounced his rights. Lopez Rods and his associates knew that monarchist 
support in Spain was not strong, and that it would be even weaker if the main Borbdn line was discarded 
in favour of some lesser branch. Thus, if Franco had excluded Don Juan, his son became the only 
Plausible candidate. " (Gilmour 1985,135). 
`" "Franco's nomination of Juan Carlos in July 1969 appeared to be able to secure, within the normal 
development of events, a relatively unproblematic restoration of the Monarchy, by contrast, what would 
be much more difficult would be the possibility of moving onwards to democracy. " (Tuscll 1995.513). (Translated from original by author). (Powell 1991,57). (Translated from original by author). 210 The franquistas knew that the prince was a risk. but they hoped and believed that, after his Spanish 
education and a long spell in the armed forces, he would free himself of this father's influence and 
embrace the idea of afranquista monarchy. " (Gilmour 1985,133). 
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examine the manner in which Juan Carlos was treated by the caudillo and the skill with 
which son was played against father; we understand that Franco was very much in 
control of the situation up until the time of his death. The fact that this clement of 
control was inevitably removed from Franco upon his death does not negate its 
existence during his life. 211 This control structure was recognized by Juan Carlos and 
must have been understood as by such Franco. This enables us to construct an 
additional parameter to our analysis, the players of the game are aware of the rules and 
the ramifications of deviating from them. This permits us to situate the decisions made 
within a wider context of constraint and direction. Franco possessed the power in the 
game and Juan Carlos, and therefore by extension Don Juan, was subordinate to this. 
Juan Carlos was a relative unknown prior to the death of Franco, while he had 
been involved in political life to a certain extent; he had amassed no great power base of 
his own212 and was seen as Franco's puppet by many. This is presumably the 
impression that Franco wanted to instill, that Juan Carlos would adhere to the regime's 
structure and authority, even when he assumed the role of King with all the power that 
would entail. Franco appeared to have coordinated and controlled the rules of the game 
and subsequently chosen the ideal candidate for the task at hand. A key clement of this 
manipulation was the manner in which the young Juan Carlos was denied full access to 
the inner decision process of Franco. Juan Carlos was effectively kept guessing as to 
what his eventual role would be and when, if ever, he would be allowed to assume 
211 
"Every system needs to develop a set of formal or operating constraints that are generally accepted. 
through quiescent indifference or positive consensus, by rulers and ruled alike and that give at least broad 
indications of what are or are not permissible goals, practices, and structures in the system. Whether the 
limits are broad or narrow, relatively changing or constant, the same for all or specific to various social 
groups or individual members, they do set up expectations about who is to wield power. the limits within 
which it is to be used, who are expected to comply, and the conditions under which these obligations 
2a 
ise. " (Easton 1967,192). 
in 1973, Don Juan Carlos represented a hope, albeit possessing a vaguely known profile, not solely 
by Spanish society but also in intellectual circles and the opposition. In contrast, it could not remotely be 
said that he had behind him any semblance of a bureaucratic or administrative capability to develop any 
political action. " (Tusell 1995,551). (Translated from original by author). 
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power. 213 This enabled Franco to protect his investment and ensure that Juan Carlos did 
not deviate from his design for the future. Franco possessed constitutional legitimacy 
for his actions, in the shape of the Law of Succession that granted him unlimited power 
in the decision of who would succeed him, to the extent that the position could be 
granted and then taken away again as and when he saw rit 214 This in itself is a manner 
of game playing, and constitutes an additional parameter. Juan Carlos was subject to 
the effective whims of Franco and only strict obedience would ensure a favourable 
response for both actors. 215 
Franco's role in the process has been outlined above; he had the ability to dictate 
the rules, was able to place constraints upon the other players within the game and was 
in possession of perhaps the most valuable commodity of all, the information necessary 
for an accurate strategy to be mapped out. The role of Juan Carlos was naturally 
somewhat different in this respect; subordinate to the desires of the dictator, unsure as to 
his future position and not privy to the full extent of information needed to accurately 
construct a response strategy to the actions of the dictator. One area in which Juan 
Carlos did possess information was in the possible ramifications for deviation. From a 
rational perspective this represents an integral part of Franco's strategy. Thcre is little 
point aficr all, expecting a player to adhere to the rules of the game, should they have no 
knowledge or appreciation of the ramifications that would ensue should they fail to do 
so. Rationally then, Juan Carlos would follow the guidelines as set by Franco, 
2""Why did I always maintain my silence? Why did I never say anything? 13ccause it was a time in 
which nobody, not even I dared to talk. The self-censorship. or prudence if you prefer, was the norm. 
Personally, I did not know how things would turn out. I did not know if l was going to succeed Franco 
while he was still alive or if I would have to wait until his death to become King of Spain. " (De Vilallonga 1997,102). (Translated from original by author). 214 
"The people had not taken the prince seriously while Franco was still alive: he was used to inaugurate highways and open veterinarians' conventions.... Spaniards became aware of the impossible role that was his to play. Ile kept silent in 1974 when Franco became ill, handed power over to the prince, then 
recovered and took it back as chief of state. nut the people also noticed his serenity and detachment as he lived through those difficult years. " (Alba 1978,290). 215 
"Previously, during the 70's, he had had to go through the humiliating position of having nothing to do 
except wait for Franco to appoint him. " (Tusell 1995,519). (Translated from original by author). 
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regardless of what future plans he may have had for his monarchy and Spain. This is an 
interesting aspect of the Spanish transition as there exists a disparity of opinion. There 
are those who believe Juan Carlos was merely a pawn in the political game216 and that 
any decisions made after the death of Franco were reactive as opposed to pro-active in 
nature; and there are those who believe that Juan Carlos was in possession of a master 
plan for the future of democracy. 217 In either respect, one must rationally assume that 
the end goal of Juan Carlos' game was the throne and the subsequent power that would 
result from this eventuality. 
Mistakes were made by Juan Carlos but his response to them and the manner in 
which he conducted himself subsequently indicate that he was conscious of the 
parameters of the game and was attempting to prevent an unfavourable outcome by 
constructing an effective strategy. One such mistake took place in 1970 when Juan 
Carlos gave an interview to Richard Eden of the New York Times, in which he 
expressed his intention to be involved in a post-francoist transition 2 This mistake was 
corrected219 and from this point on, we do not sec a public display of conflict between 
the opinions of Juan Carlos and those of Franco. Juan Carlos was therefore presented 
with a structured choice pattern that would determine his actions in relation to Franco. 
216 
"Ile had little to wait before he understood that he was simply being used like a chess piece, held 
under whatever method would best assure that the dictator and his followers maintained power. " jCastcllano 2001,134). (Translated from original by author). 
" 
"Ile wanted political liberalization, but he knew that he could not achieve this while Franco 
lived. 
-This 'quiet and melancholy youth', confined to himself much more than was perceived by 
his 
discoloured public image. Those who became close to him found him 'better informed, more intelligent 
and above all, much more decisive than they had previously believed, despite this he was 'unsure of how 
to proceed, of where to go, and in whom to confide. " (Tuscll 1995,518). (Translated from original by 
author). 
=18 
"Many Spaniards active in public life 
- 
according to the report - did not take Into account the 
determination of the Prince to play an active role in the post-francoist evolution.. 
.1 Ic hopes he will be 
allowed to journey widely throughout and without Spain, to talk to the people, to demonstrate his interest 
for their problems, to begin to speak with his own voice and to convince Spaniards that he is more than an 
insurance policy taken out by Franco and kept in a drawer. " (New York Times February 4 1970). 
ITranslated from original by author). 
'° 
"Aware that he had been far too explicit, the Prince attended a few days later, perhaps at the 
recommendation of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, the General Council of Franco's Guard, at the Institute 
of Political Studies, where he presented an emblem with the yoke and arrows upon it. " (Tu' ell 1995, S 19.20). (Translated from original by author). 
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Decisions made during Franco's lifetime would be restricted and predicated upon the 
wishes of the dictator. Necessity demanded that Juan Carlos curtail his actions until a 
more suitable time when he was granted the autonomy to act accordingly. 220 
The decisions facing Juan Carlos were contingent upon the time and events as 
they progressed. Given the manner in which the two men interacted and the power 
lauded over Juan Carlos by Franco, and coupled with the mistakes made by Juan Carlos, 
listed above, it was crucial that the young prince reassess his actions in response to the 
situation at the particular time of analysis in order to form a strategy congruent with the 
demands of the time. Given the power distribution, there existed only one realistic 
alternative for Juan Carlos but the outward manifestation of his strategy had to comply 
with that which Franco expected it to be. In essence, Juan Carlos was demonstrating his 
willingness to follow an already dictated course of behaviour, while making it appear as 
if it was of his own volition. 
The actions of Juan Carlos were therefore dependent upon those of Franco and 
his decision process differs depending on the particular period under focus. What does 
not differ, however, is the manner in which we can illustrate the interaction between the 
two actors in this game. Using the tenets of GT, I have plotted various scenarios below 
in order to highlight the manner in which decisions were made. It is important to 
understand that the numbers used in the diagrams bear no physical relevance to actual 
reward and were selected at the author's discretion and are merely symbolic in their 
numerical value. The purpose of the diagrams is to reinforce the text above and 
demonstrate that in a two-person game, it is still possible for there to be varying pay- 
220 
"He made it clear that nothing was possible while Franco lived and that the final destination of the process, that by stages unknown at the present time, would be democracy. " (Tusell 1995 555). (Translated from original by author). 
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offs and outcomes. 221 What is relevant for any appreciation of GT is a fundamental 
understanding of the exact conditions under which the game is played. The lack of true 
communication between the actors predicates a non-cooperative game analysis. 222 
There is a marked difference between cooperative games and noncooperative 
games223 and between games with a dominant strategy and those with equilibrium. 
Given the inevitability of uncertainty, there arc various possible scenarios that depend 
largely upon the perspective with which we are analysing the event. The figure below 
demonstrates the power held by Franco in the process. We can see that Franco was in 
possession of a dominant strategy and that in turn greatly narrowed the freedom with 
which Juan Carlos could act, in light of the assumption that the uniform goal of the 
game was for Juan Carlos to succeed Franco. 
ut 
"The best move in a chess game, the best way to bid or the best card to lay down in a bridge game. depends on what one's opponents are likely to do. " (Schelling 1967,237). u: 
"Noncooperative games force us to consider how collaboration among players is implemented in the 
game and what incentives the players have to violate such agreements 
... 
7hrce of the key questions game 
theory should address is when, how, and why the players cooperate to their mutual benefit. The 
enforcement of agreements is a critical question, and cooperative game theory assumes away that critical 
question. " (Morrow 1994,76). 
_ 
"A traditional distinction between cooperative and noncooperative games is that the latter do not allow 
any communication between the players. Each player must determine its own strategy on its own. " (Morrow 1994,76). 
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DOMINANT STRATEGY FOR FRANCO: NON-ZERO-SUM GAME 
Si represents the choice for the nomination of Juan Carlos to be rejected in favour of an 
alternative candidate. 
S2 represents the choice that the nomination of Juan Carlos be accepted. 
The numbers in the left hand side of each box correspond to Franco and those in the 













In the above diagram we see evidence of a dominant strategy on the part of 
Franco. The dominant strategy, namely that of accepting Juan Carlos as the 
nomination, is represented by S2 and as we can sec, when Franco, Player 1, adopts his 
dominant strategy, it is in the best interest of Juan Carlos, Player 2, to adopt his strategy 
s2. Franco is very much in control in this example. Irrespective of the decision that 
Juan Carlos makes, Franco will win. For this to be accurate there must exist the 
possibility that there was an alternative to Juan Carlos. While this was not to be true, it 
does represent an accurate account of the information available to Juan Carlos in the 
years preceding his nomination and gives some indication as to why he so readily 
accepted the nomination. If we concede that power and control lay in the hands of 
Franco, a rational analysis on the part of Juan Carlos would have logically driven him to 
the structured response illustrated above. 
The conditions vary slightly when we examine the situation from the perspective 
of Juan Carlos. While it is not possible to conclude that Juan Carlos was ever able to 
act from a dominant position of strength, as was Franco, there arc conditions under 
which a greater sense of equilibrium was established. If we posit that Juan Carlos was 
one of several choices available to Franco, but that he constituted the most desirable, 
then we are presented with a less one-sided game. Franco still maintains the upper hand 
but it is in his own best interest to nominate Juan Carlos. We assume for the purpose of 
this analysis that Juan Carlos is aware of the ranking of preferences that place him at the 
top. With this awareness would also exist the knowledge of the risk involved in 
deviating from the set rules of the game. 224 This awareness would not stem from any 
real communication with Franco but rather from an analysis of the events of the past 
22' 
"Game Theory is based on utility theory 
... 
we assume that actors are faced with choices from a set of 
available actions. Each action provides a probability of producing each possible outcome. Utility is a 
measure of an actor's preferences over the outcomes that reflect his or her willingness to take risks to 
achieve desired outcomes and avoid undesirable outcomes. " (Morrow 1994,17). 
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and the lack of any obvious competition for his position. Fig. 3.2 below demonstrates 
the possible outcomes of the scenario outlined above. 
If we posit that Juan Carlos was the only possible choice for Franco and without 
him, the regime would fall with the death of the dictator, we are afforded a 
noncooperative equilibrium. 25 It remains in the best interest of both parties to ensure 
that the nomination is passed to Juan Carlos and that nothing occurs to jeopardise this in 
the years leading up to the death of Franco. We assume again for this game that the two 
players were aware of the overall consequences of the game and once again, this 
awareness stems from logical analysis rather than direct communication. Fig. 3.3 below 
demonstrates a game in which the balance of power is equal among the two players and 
provides us with a possible interpretation of the events that took place. 
225 
"A noncooperative equilibrium point in a two person game consists of a pair of strategics, one for each 
player which are stable with respect to each other in the sense that if either player knows the strategy 
chosen by the other, he will not be motivated to change his own strategy. " (Shubik 1967,252). 
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SAME PLOTTING: JUAN CARLOS ONE OF SEVERAL OPTIONS FOR FRANCO 
SI represents the option of playing the game according to the rules dictated by Franco. 
S2 represents the option of playing the game by deviating from the rules dictated by 
Franco. 
The numbers in the left hand side of the boxes correspond to Juan Carlos and the 
numbers in the right hand side of the boxes correspond to Franco. 
FRANCO 
Playcr 2 











According to the diagram above, it was in Juan Carlos' best interest to adhere to 
Franco's desires and 'rules' even if they contradicted with his own aims for the future. 
If we assume that Juan Carlos was not the only choice then this represents the best 
strategy for him to follow and once again, we sec Franco in the position of rower. 
(Rules refers to the agreement that once a strategy had been adopted, it would be 
adhered too. ) 
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SAME PLOTTING JUAN CARLOS AS THE ONLY CHOICE 
SI represents the option of playing the game according to the rules dictated by Franco. 
S2 represents the option of playing the game by deviating from the rules dictated by 
Franco. 
The numbers in the left hand side of the boxes correspond to Juan Carlos and the 













-1, -1 -1, -1 
Here we can sec a much more balanced `game'. In order for this outcome to be 
achieved, communication had to have existed between the two actors in order for 
preferences to be known and therefore, consequences of actions to be realise!. If Juan 
Carlos represented the only available choice, it was in the best interests of both parties 
to follow the rules and create a mutually beneficial outcome through structured and 
organised play. 
The diagrams above clearly demonstrate that Franco had the upper hand in all 
but one of the realities. The balance was only created when we assumed that Juan 
Carlos represented the single viable choice and that both men were aware of this. The 
two players stood to lose if either deviated from the 'unspoken' strategy seemingly 
employed by both men. The sublime structure of the event outlined in this chapter is 
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manifested by the reality that there was no real alternative available for either of the two 
actors, and yet the manner in which it was played out suggests that a less than subtle 
demonstration of power was being exacted. The dismissal of Don Juan as a viable 
successor left Franco with but one name on the list. Juan Carlos' education was 
supervised, structural constraints imposed and the threat of banishment from the 
political arena kept in the forefront, and yet, the reality illuminated through the lens of 
hindsight prevents us from seeing a realistic alternative. 
The construct of game manipulation was carried to the very end by Franco and 
this further demonstrates the fragility of the situation for Juan Carlos. Despite the 
potential recognition that he was the only real candidate, this was never fully realised, 
perhaps until the death of Franco itself, and certainly not during the period preceding 
this event. Juan Carlos was forced to succumb to the machinations of Franco, even at 
the expense of his familial duty. 226 This was an clement that Franco was to emphasise 
throughout the period of Juan Carlos' education and indoctrination into the 
institutionalisation of the regime. The manner in which Franco nominated Juan Carlos 
was to have an enormous impact upon the decision to acccpt. 22' At the beginning of 
July 1969, Juan Carlos was preparing to leave for Estoril to spend the festival of San 
Juan with his family. Franco enquired as to when he would be returning to Madrid and 
requested that he present himself upon his return in order to discuss a matter of some 
importance. When Juan Carlos presented himself to Franco it was announced to him 
that he would be named as Franco's successor and would be awarded the title of King. 
Naturally a decision of such magnitude required some thought, even if only in regard to 
22611e had to put up with being a kidnapped Prince, in order that one day perhaps, at the pleasure of the dictator's cohort, he would be the hostage king of the National Movement. I It had to sacri rice family tics 
in order to rescue the historic task and appear the subordinate in order to one day be in charge. " 
Castellano 2001,134). (Translated from original by author). 
_' For a full account of these events, refer to Dc Vilallonga, J. L. El Rey., Conrrrsaelones con D. Juan Carlos ! De Espana (1997). 
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the impact that it would have upon Don Juan but the Caudillo pressed Juan Carlos for 
an answer immediately. The quote below outlines some of the internal thought process 
experienced by Juan Carlos and demonstrates the need to successfully weigh the 
consequences of actions in connection to the other actors of the game, prior to 
constructing a strategy. 
"Now, the main question was not whether I or my father would be King of Spain. The 
important question was how to restore the Monarchy to Spain. 'What have you decided 
Your Highness?, General Franco asked me. If I had not responded there and then, I 
would have been removed from his project as he did not like to be contradicted and he 
did not lack pawns with which to continue the game were I to leave. In either case, it 
was definite that Franco would not turn to the Duke of Barcelona...! naturally wanted 
things to turn out differently, above all out of respect for my father. But that day, 
Franco placed me between a rock and a hard place. He waited for my answer. I 
responded, `Very well, my General, I accept. ' lie smiled imperceptibly and gave me his 
hand.. X228 
Franco masterfully constructed the parameters of the game. It becomes apparent that 
not only was Franco choosing a successor, he was pitting the son against the father. 
Franco was well aware of the power he held over Juan Carlos and to what extent his 
involvement had aided the young prince's development. By forcing Juan Carlos to 
choose immediately, without the counsel of his father and with the threat of loss of 
support and patronage, Franco had ensured that Juan Carlos would feel grateful and 
relieved that he had been nominated. It would appear to have been less yarned than 
actually bequeathed by Franco. While Franco had selected Juan Carlos carefully, he 
was still to retain control until the very end. I would argue that the manner in which 
Franco took this decision might well have altered the way in which Juan Carlos played 
the game from this point onwards. 
22t (Dc Vilallonga 1997,99). (Translatcd from original by author). 
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Juan Carlos was aware that he needed Franco's patronage in order to fully 
capitalise on the potential of his new position but the treatment he had endured at the 
hands of Franco and the way in which decisions were made, demonstrated that what 
was happening was indeed a game and could therefore be played and won providing he 
adhered to the Caudillo's rules. Having been forced to take a decision that placed him 
at odds with his father and essentially subservient to Franco's whims, Juan Carlos 
became more aware of the situation in which he was operating and this was to affect the 
manner in which he made decisions subsequently. It would appear from this evidence 
that Juan Carlos was a man of strong character and that the events shaped much of his 
future involvement in the transition process. He was able to survive the doubts of those 
around him, the lack of confidence in his abilities and the belief that he would not last 
long in his role as King. 229 It has been contested that there was more to the young 
prince than common perception dictated and here is additional testimony to that. 23° 
Franco may well have constructed a `same' of the process but the manner in which it 
was played out is testament to the awareness of Juan Carlos and his ability to adapt to 
the constraints placed before him and to manipulate the situation in turn to suit his 
nccds. 231 
u' 
"The Prince of Spain appeared to be aware that 'Spaniards - who doubted that any successor of Franco 
could last 
- 
called him Juan Carlos the Drier" (Tuscil 1995,518). (Translated from original by author). 310 
"The peculiar biographical trajectory of Don Juan Carlos could well have converted him into a 
haughty and cornered individual, but this was not the case. It could also have engendered a distrustful 
character but on the contrary, it accentuated the capacity to adapt and to accept things as they came in the 
firm belief that he was channelled to the single objective that was the politics of the Monarchy. None of 
that this would have been possible without a particular conscience that corresponded with a destiny to 
fulfil, characteristic of an Institution with which he would become personified. Don Juan Carlos always 
felt the weight of responsibility of the task before him. " (Tuscll 1995,674). (Tran slated from original by 
author). 
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"It was a most complicated task that consisted of educating himself, maintaining silence while 
allowing his position to be known, to wait with patience. to moderate possible inopportune statements by 
his father, to always tread carefully and to feed the flames of expectation based upon his looming 
accession without arousing suspicion. It is still possible to include more stipulations: he had to refine as 
much as possible his greatest asset as a politician in training, intuition, that sixth sense that allowed him to 
grasp both people and situations in order to fulfil the task he had been given. " (1'uscll 1995,675). (Translated from original by author). 
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The nomination of Juan Carlos as Franco's successor is a remarkably simple one 
on the surface. Franco had established a regime that needed a strong leader to continue 
his work after he was gone; the available candidates yielded one favourite who was 
educated, cajoled, and manoeuvred into position and the existing structure provided the 
security that the system would protect itself even after the caudillo was no longer alive. 
From the perspective of the relatively weak Juan Carlos, obedience to Franco was the 
only manner in which to secure the throne for his family once more, and therefore the 
constraints imposed by Franco can be seen to have existed as much for his protection as 
for that of the Caudillo. The design employed for the nomination process existed to 
ensure that both parties adhered to a theoretical structure, whether fully perceived or 
not, in order to realise the mutually beneficial end goal. Under the surface, analysis 
shows the power games between Franco and Don Juan and the use of Juan Carlos as a 
pawn in the political game. Given the parameters of the situation, there was little 
alternative available to the Borbdns and while the scheming and subterfuge of Franco 
may well have been distasteful, and certainly counter to the primary objective of Don 
Juan, the end result was ranked among the leading preferences of both father and son. 
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Chapter 4 
The nomination of Adolfo Suarez: 
A valuable asset in place 
The event outlined in the previous chapter, namely Franco's selection of Juan 
Carlos as his successor, constituted the final decision taken by the previous regime and 
as such marks not only the end of the previous period of rule but also comprehensive 
start of the transition period. As has been clearly demonstrated in the previous chapter 
Juan Carlos had little choice in the matter and was subject to the whims of Franco. The 
decision to accept the nomination was the only possible solution for the young prince, in 
spite of his father's natural objections, to rc-instate the monarchy in Spain and preserve 
his family title. While it is indeed possible to view the nomination of Juan Carlos as the 
start of the transition period, the event itself does not represent the beginning of the 
process of the democratic transition, rather a precursor necessary to set the wheels in 
motion. The motivations behind the decision to accept Franco's nomination can be 
more realistically grounded in family survival and personal honour than in a far- 
reaching democratic agenda designed to transform the face of Spanish politics. 
The previous chapter was intended to demonstrate the necessity for certain 
factors to be in place before subsequent action can be contemplated, let alone achieved 
with any modicum of success. The current chapter constitutes the first major pro-active 
decision in the democratic transition by the primary actors. There existed the very real 
possibility that despite the best of intentions, Juan Carlos would simply remain a puppet 
to the Francoist Bunker and the existing prime minister, Arias Navarro. The return of 
the monarchy to Spain did not guarantee the return of democracy. The relative power 
distribution at the time of Franco's death created the expectancy of inertia, Juan Carlos 
was simply not in a position to exact significant change. 
The replacement of Arias Navarro with Adolfo Suftrcz was a carefully planned 
and expertly executed political manoeuvre and represents the true starting point of the 
democratic transition. The shift in power was perhaps imperceptible at the time but 
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current analysis highlights the subtle structural changes that were taking place. The 
existing government of Arias Navarro was not only firmly routed in the past regime but 
was also to prove detrimental to the process of reform through its inability to adapt to 
the changing climate of political debate. The following chapter will analyse the method 
employed and explain the reasons behind this political decision. 
Carlos Arias Navarro was Franco's appointee232, he enjoyed the support of the 
Dunker and the military, was firmly rooted in Francoist tradition and saw his role as that 
of Franco's de facto successor. 233 Herein lies the parameter within which all decisions 
were made, by which all risk was measured and against which, future courses of action 
were constructed. Arias Navarro viewed himself, as did others, as representative of an 
institution, long since established and understood as a reality of political life. 234 
The position of Arias Navarro, while legitimate in its appointment, did not 
equate to a perpetual guarantee of authority, despite his belief to the contrary. 235 
Coupled with Arias Navarro's expressed conviction that he embodied the role of 
Franco's successor, came a measure of arrogance and, at times, blatant lack of respect 
towards Juan Carlos. 36 Juan Carlos had, under Franco, been largely seen as an 
insignificant character that would not play a role in the governing of Spain and this 
attitude was perpetuated by the premier in his dealings with the young monarch, in the 
272 There is some speculation as to the direct involvement of Franco in the nomination of Arias Navarro 
that is succinctly outlined in Preston (2004) p 285-6 but the decision for a hard line president in response 
to the assassination of Carrero Blanco on 20'' December 1973 is & justifiable one. 273 
"Arias was quoted in his first speech to his cabinet, as saying that he harboured "neither murky desires 
or revisionism nor suicidal aims of stirring up our institutional system because of an itch for novelty or 
out of crackpot irresponsibility. "(Preston 2004,334), (Fern. ndcz-Miranda 1995,121), (Osorio 1980,34.5) 
=N 
"What I want is to continue Francoism. And as long as I am here or still in political life, I'll never be 
anything but a strict perpetuator of Francoism in all its aspects and I will fight against the enemies of 
Spain who have begun to dare to raise their heads. " Extract taken from a speech made by Carlos Arias 
Navarro on I fs' February at the first meeting of the Comisi6n Mixta Gobiemo-Con. +ejo Nacional. jArcilza, ]. M dc. 1977), 84. 
35 
"1 [is view was that Franco had appointed him and the King remained subject to the Caudillo's will. " (Preston 2004,331). "It's as if he believes that he is absolutely safe, that he is Prime Minister for live 
cars and that all I can do is keep him on. " (Fernandez-Miranda 1995,176-80). (Preston 2004.346). ý6 
"1 think he sometimes believes he is stronger than I am and that deep down he does not recognize nie 
as King. " Taken from a conversation between Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda (Fernandez-Miranda. 
L. 1994,372). 
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immediate aftermath of Franco's death. 237 This animosity was to further enhance the 
parameter of interaction between the two men and as a result, dictate the mechanisms 
employed by both men. 
An analysis of relative power distribution between Juan Carlos and Arias 
Navarro at the time of Franco's death in 1975 quickly reveals Arias Navarro as by far 
the stronger of the two actors. This was to play an important role in defining 
preferences and determining appropriate courses of action. The ability to make rational 
and logical decisions, and then act upon, them must also be tempered by the plausibility 
of said actions to be enforced. There must exist an additional analysis of the success 
rate of possible outcomes as it is not simply enough to formulate decisions based upon a 
moral determination of the desired outcome, consideration must be given to the 
complexity of variables and the likelihood of success versus failure. 
It is useful at this juncture to hypothesis as to a basic ordering of preferences on 
the part of Juan Carlos in 1975. Arias Navarro did not constitute the ideal choice of 
premier for the democratic designs of the new monarch, he rcprcscntcd the `old guard' 
in both position and age, and his actions and authority proved to have a negative effect 
upon the transition process. 78 The logical preference would have been to remove him 
from office and replace him with a more suitable candidate239, eliminating the problem 
as swiftly as possible and creating cohesion where there had previously been dissent. 
The diagram below outlines the choice pattern apparent to Juan Carlos. 
237 
"'Juan Carlos was an inexperienced young man who should be kept safely away from the serious day 
today business of government. ' This was a reported quote by Arias Navarro given to a senior US diplomat. " (Preston 2004,337), (Eaton 1981,38). 
' 
"The Arias government's programme, presented to the Cores on 28 January, disappointed Juan Carlos 
and exasperated Fernandez-Miranda. The Premier claimed his aim was to 'shift Franco's responsibility 
on to the nation as a whole, onto its politicians, its institutions and its citizens'. " (Powell 1996,92). 
='9 
"The Monarch explained that when he occupied the position of Ilead of state he feit a physical 
necessity to surround himself with people of his own generation. " (Powell 2001.159). (Translated from 
original by author). 
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ORDERING OF PREFERENCES FOR JUAN CAR OS REGARDING ARIAS 
NAYARRO 
1975 
1) Remove Arias Navarro from power immediately 
2) Bide time and replace Arias Navarro at a later date 
3) Refrain from challenging Arias Navarro's position 
1) The dangers inherent in this decision were considerable, the potential 
repercussions and backlash from the Francoist Bunker were substantial; the 
removal of Arias Navarro would be seen as a personal decision on the part of 
Juan Carlos and interpreted as a unilateral action and subsequent threat to the 
establishment. This course of action was far too dangerous to adopt as there 
existed too many unknown variables, too many potential sources of conflict 
and no guaranteed positive outcome. 
2) The outcome of this decision represented by far the most prudent for Juan 
Carlos to adopt. The eventual removal of Arias Navarro would provide 
sufficient time to manipulate those variables currently out of the sphere of 
influence of the young monarch. The decision to wait until the situation was 
controllable constituted a mature and safe option. Given the volatility of the 
time and the relative power distribution, this would guarantee a much higher 
possibility of success. 
3) Should Arias Navarro be allowed to remain in otlicc unchallenged, this 
would not only be a personal affront to Juan Carlos, but also a damaging 
reality to the democratic transition. Arias Navarro's position had been made 
clear and his continued involvement in the political sphere was to have a 
negative impact of the transition process, and there existed the very real 
possibility that this negative impact would result in violence. 
2) Most prudcnt solution 
- 
allows for agcnda control 
3) Prcfcrrcd solution to one that could potcntially generate violcncc 




The reordering of preferences was a necessary clement of the decision process facing 
Juan Carlos and demonstrates the constraints that arc placed upon individuals at tines. 
The most desired outcome is not always that which can be achieved at once, the 
importance of balancing that which one wishes, with that which one can achieve is 
crucial for a the creation of a successful political strategy. 
Actions taken by Juan Carlos do not rcflcct the moral base of the decision 
process. Arias Navarro was not in favour of the transition, he was in fact hindering any 
real semblance of democratic reform. In addition to this, there existed friction and 
distrust between Juan Carlos and Arias Navarro and therefore the logical choice would 
have been to remove him from office and replace him with a more suitable candidate at 
the earliest possible opportunity. Rational analysis of the event prevents this from 
happening and introduces the clement of preventative decision making. 
If we assume a moral deliberation of events 210, the immediate removal of Arias 
Navarro and the nomination of a suitable candidate would have occurred, howcvcr the 
complexity of the situation prevented Juan Carlos from acting thus. The eventual 
decision taken was based upon an analysis of the existing rower structure and the 
potential for success expected in removing Arias Navarro from office. It is clear that an 
attempt to remove Arias Navarro without sufficient political sway would have resulted 
in potential disaster for the young monarch. The diagram below outlines the potential 
outcomes of the three preferences detailed above and clearly demonstrates the necessity 
for prudent action and cautious advancement. 
An historical institutionalist approach provides for the continuation of structures 
such as the office of prime minister, and given the constitutionally protected ability of 
140 
"An individual often evaluates a choice situation from many different perspectives, each of uºhich has 
associated with it a preference ordering of the options. My egoistic, altruistic. moral and social selves 
may rank the alternatives differently, so that the need arises for some aggregation mechanism. " (Steedman, 1. and U. Krause 1985,5). 
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the Bead of State to nominate according to his choice, there existed precedent for Juan 
Carlos to act according to his preferences. Unilateral action was not an option however; 
as an attack upon the person of Arias Navarro would have been seen as an attack upon 
the establishment, and this was not something that Juan Carlos could risk. The 
probability of political unrest and military backlash were far too real a threat to be taken 
lightly. It became rapidly evident that any action taken to remove Arias Navarro had to 
be undertaken with extreme care, minute preparation and the ability to support and 
substantiate the decision from both a political and an authoritarian perspective. 
The diagram below outlines the possible outcomes for the decision to remove 
Arias Navarro. The two available options arc highlighted in boxes on the left hand side 
of the diagram. The first box highlights the potential outcome were Arias Navarro to be 
removed eventually and in a much more structured and controlled manner than 
represented in the first diagram. This alternative represents by far the most adroit and 
sensitive approach to the problem at hand and one that stood a much greater chance of 
resulting in a potentially peaceful transition process. The second box demonstrates not 
only the inherent difficulties in removing the premier immediately but also the potential 
that it would also serve to dc-stabilise the country and provoke possible violence and 
civil unrest. Here we arc able to see the reality of power distribution and the extent to 
which external factors played into the decision making process. Juan Carlos was not 
free to act indiscriminately; his actions were constrained despite a moral and practical 



































The diagram above provides a visual outline of the potential outcomes of 
preferences 2 and 3, as outlined in Fig 4.1 above. The reordering of preferences was a 
necessary constraint that governed the actions of Juan Carlos. The removal of Arias 
Navarro and the subsequent nomination and confirmation of Adolfo Suärez can be 
viewed as the first real battle of the transition in Spain. Arias Navarro represented the 
`system' and as such, for any semblance of reform to take place, his replacement was 
critical. In a rational analysis, morality plays a minor role and at times, must be 
overruled in favour of a more practical and coherent strategy. As has been outlined 
above, there can be little doubt as to the course of action that would best suit the needs 
of this time. 
A more linear and historical institutional approach would suggest that the 
removal of Arias Navarro would be protected by convention. Simply put, the office of 
prime minister had existed prior to Arias Navarro and would continue to exist after he 
had vacated the position. The construction of institutions serves to protect and ensure 
the continuation of the system. The set of rules that govern a political democratic 
system, are designed to prevent abuse of power and any disregard for the established 
governing principals. ' Simply possessing the ability to engender change does not 
automatically provide the owner with the right exert this power. What is evident from a 
linear approach is that the removal of Arias Navarro, if done at the correct time and in 
the correct manner, would not have provoked a backlash of opinion, residing, as it 
would have, within the confines of a structural framework. 
It is essential in matters with a complex and sensitive ordering of variables that 
all efforts are made to create the semblance of legality. This naturally becomes an issue 
1 
"Institutions become second nature. Provided they continue to generate acceptable outcomes, there Is 
no perceived need to think about, let alone incur the costs of trying to implement, Institutional innovation. " (Ilausner. 1995,53). 
of greater importance, when those initiating the changes operate within the confines of a 
democratic framework. The system provides constraints upon those within it, which arc 
not necessarily apparent to actors operating within an authoritarian system. 242 There arc 
rules to follow and actions that can not be taken once adherence to the structure of the 
game has been established. The immediate removal of Arias Navarro would have 
resulted in a reversal of the democratic process and would have been counter to the 
`spirit' of the transition itself. Actors operate within a set of parameters depending upon 
their relevant political position and this will affect the manner in which decisions are 
made, and even considered. To simply state that Juan Carlos acted according to 
personal preference is to miss the greater picture. The constraints placed upon him were 
to shape the transition and interestingly, the careful consideration and subsequent 
manipulation of these constraints provided the key to successful reform. 
Juan Carlos was far too weak politically in 1975 to attempt that which he would 
later achieve with the removal of Arias Navarro. The relative power distribution 
between the two men has been discussed above and Fig 4.3. below outlines the interplay 
between the two actors. The game is relatively simple at this point as there arc only two 
primary actors to be considered and therefore it is relatively straightforward to plot a 
coherent strategy from the point of view of the man in control at the time, namely, Arias 
Navarro. 
2" 
`The defence of the realm involves a act of activities that contribute to the satisfaction of the goal 
attainment functional requisite... The achievement of societal goals offen involves the preservation of 
certain relationships. " (I loll. 1967,93) 
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FIG 4.3: 
DOMINANT STRATEGY: ARIAS NAVARRO 1975 
In 1975 Arias Navarro occupied the position of strength. lie had the support of the 
military and the Bunker; he had been nominated by Franco and was seen by many as the 
rightful leader of the Francoist government. Juan Carlos by contrast, was relatively 
weak at this time; he was a political unknown without a real power base and could not 
afford to provoke the establishment at this early stage in his career. 
Arias Navarro is in possession of a dominant strategy at this point, irrespective of the 
actions taken by Juan Carlos, Navarro is best advised to remain in power and assert his 
position. For the diagram below this strategy will be represented by S2. St would 
represent the alternative of resigning his office. The numbers in the left-hand of each box correspond to Arias Navarro and those in the right-hand side to Juan Carlos. 
S1 Arias Navarro resigns his office as prime minister 
S2 Arias Navarro remains in office as prime minister 
PLAYER 2 
JUAN CARLOS 









-1 19 0 
The game above is plotted for two actors but if we introduce the Cartes into the game 
and take into account the desire of Juan Carlos to replace Arias Navarro with Adolfo Suarez we are presented with the reality that no action taken immediately would have 
elicited a positive result for Juan Carlos and that patience and increased manipulation of 
the variables could produce a more favourable outcome. 
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DEMONSTR ATION O F ABILITY OF JUAN CAR LOS TO CHALLENGE POWER 
BASE OF CO 
QAME PLOT 
RTES 
TED IN 1975 
Below is a diagram representing the situation in 1975 when Juan Carlos had recently 
come to power. There are three potential strategies visible below and they demonstrate 
the extent to which Juan Carlos was subordinate to the control of Cones. Given that 
this game is plotted for 1975, we must bear in mind the lack of reputation possessed by 
Adolfo Sudrez at this time. Cones held power, Juan Carlos was weak at this time and Suarcz was largely an unrealistic candidate. 
S1 Suärcz is proposed as Arias Navarro's immcdiatc rcplaccmcnt S2 Suärcz is proposed at a later date S3 Arias Navarro is confirmed as the Prime Minister 
PLAYER 2 
JUAN CARLOS 
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lt is apparent from the diagram above that given the structure of rower distribution; it 
was in the best interest of the Cortcs to retain Arias Navarro as the prime minister given 
that the payoff in Row S3 outweighs that of the other choices. 711c option that Suarcz be proposed at a later date would not constitute a loss for either player to any great 
extent, merely a delay in the process. For Juan Carlos, player 2, the best possible 
outcome to expect from the plotted game would be to wait for a later date to propose Suarez. As demonstrated in Column s2, the payoff is zero, neither a loss nor a win. We 
assume for this game that Suarcz was the choice for nomination, were he not, the issue 
would remain the same, the names would simply change. 
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Given the parameters expressed in the diagrams above243, the possibility of Juan 
Carlos achieving victory were nil. In order for success to be assured, the conditions of 
the game needed to be changed. This created the necessity to manipulate the variables 
present in the primary game so as to reorder the outcome. It was vital for the agenda to 
be set in favour of Juan Carlos and democratic reform. Given Arias Navarro's relative 
power in 1975 and the support which he enjoyed from both Cones and the military, this 
was a daunting task indeed. The fact that Juan Carlos did not act as he would have liked 
in 1975 does not constitute a betrayal of his ideals 2/4, nor can it be explained by his fear 
of Arias Navarro, although this certainly factored; rather it was a prudent and analytical 
approach to a situation that would have resulted in a negative outcome had the issue 
been forced under less than perfect conditions. 45 
The manner in which the agenda setting took place cannot be credited entirely to 
the designs and aims of Juan Carlos and Torcuato FcrnSndez-Miranda. Arias Navarro 
was ill-suited for the position of prime minister given the political climate of the time. 
In the immediate years following the death of Franco, Spain experienced an opening of 
the political forum and a rise in awareness that had hitherto been smothered by 
Franco 246 The character of Arias Navarro played a crucial role in the period leading up 
to his removal and in so doing, speaks against the notion that overriding importance can 
be given to the role of institutions as opposed to that of the individual occupying the 
243 
"The particular structure of the relationships among the authority roles will both reflect and condition 
the way in which power is distributed and used in the system. The rights and duties assigned to each role 
and the extent to which each limits or reinforces the power of the other helps to determine s ho has what 
authority and how it is used. " (Easton 1967,209). 244 
"Rational behaviour means choosing the best means to gain a predetermined set of ends. It is an 
evaluation of the consistency of choices and not of the thought process, of implementation of used goals 
and not of the morality of those goals. " (Morrow 1994,17). 2" 
"Rational Choice Theory appeals to three distinct elements in the choice situation. The first element is 
the feasible set, i. e., the set of all courses of action which satisfy various logical, physical and economic 
constraints. The second is the causal structure of the situation, which detennincs What courses of action 
will lead to what outcomes. The third is a subjective ranking of feasible alternatives. " (Clstcr 1986,4). 
=46 
"General Franco preferred political apathy to enthusiasm. Except in unusual circumstances, his regime 
made no attempt to elicit mass support, rather preferring passive acceptance of its decreer" (Coverdale 
1979,13). 
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actual position. If the role of the actual individual were unimportant, it would not have 
bccn necessary to replace Arias Navarro at all, nor for that matter, would the leadership 
or Franco or Juan Carlos have provoked different outcomes. 
Coupled with the machinations of Juan Carlos and Fcrnindcz-Miranda we are 
able to include the actions of Arias Navarro and the role he played in his eventual 
demise. Herein we see the importance of individual behaviour. Arias Navarro may 
well have occupied the position of strength in 1975 but failure to accurately assess the 
developments within Spain and therefore engender an appropriate response to them, 
caused irreparable damage to his position and consequently, to his support base. The 
actions of Arias Navarro could well have been plotted using a rational analysis of his 
past behaviour and his obvious allegiance to Francoist ideals but the reality is that much 
of what transpired was exploited at a later date, as opposed to posited and planned for in 
advance. 247 
The arrogance of Arias was polluting the political forum and adding to the lcvcl 
of distrust and ill feeling that existed amongst the various political parties. Arias 
Navarro's refusal to meet with members of the lcft2« and his attitude towards those who 
deviated from the 'teachings of Franco' made his government far from either inclusive, 
or successful 249 No longer simply a clash of personalities driven by a mutual lack of 
respect, the very existence of Arias Navarro was encroaching upon the transition to 
=41 
"The writer of an essay on identifiable approaches to the study of politics and government might be 
tempted to look for a chain of evolution in the subject, whether molecular or holistic, but he soon finds 
that there is no evolution, no continuum. I le also rinds that there is not even an ostensible sequence of 
developments; some are consecutive, some concurrent, and most are apparently fortuitous. " (Charlesworth 1967,1). 
2"0 
"On 3 May, when Alfonso Osorio asked Arias Navarro if he would meet representatives of the 
opposition, he refused categorically. Osorio pressed on, 'Not even with those who are closest to us? ' to 
which Arias snapped, 'Would Franco receive Jose Maria Gil Robles? No he wouldn't. Neither will t. "' 
JPreston 2004,348), (Osorio 1980,123). 
"'The politics of the government of Arias Navarro between November 1975 and July 1976 was a 
disaster, both as an initiative to reform as well as an attempt to control the change. " (Maravall 1981,24). (Translated from original by author). 
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democracy. 250 This reality created the legitimacy needed to begin the process of 
replacement. The structural framework of political institutions enabled the replacement 
of a candidate and the ineffectual and damaging behaviour of Arias Navarro brought 
this concept to the forefront of political debate. 
It has been highlighted above that in 1975 Juan Carlos was simply unable to act 
according to preference but to assume that all was then left to chance is simplistic and 
naive. While we may not agree with the notion that Juan Carlos had minutely planned 
the transition from the beginning, we must presume that if he were willing to remove 
Arias Navarro, a replacement candidate must have been considered. If we consider that 
there existed three groups within Spanish political life in the aftermath of Franco's 
death it enables us to demonstrate the task that faced the reformers. 
It was necessary for the `reformers' to appease the traditional establishment 
while attempting not to alienate those factors who had hitherto largely been ignored 
under Franco, and were therefore expectant of change under a democratic system. This 
was to constitute a finely tuned balancing act and one that would be dependent upon 
careful planning and time management for its eventual success. As can be seen in Fig 
4.5 below, Fernandez-Miranda was to act as the bridge between the three groups. Any 
development that took place had to come from within and therefore appear as internal 
reform. Unilateral action was not possible, and the necessity for legal and accepted 
reform was paramount. While Juan Carlos did not possess great power at this time, his 
influence was on the increase as Arias Navarro's declined; this aflbrdcd a measure of 
control but not sufficient to provoke widespread change. 
2$O 
"There existed an impossible accord between Carlos Arias and the King. The King wanted political 
reform, Carlos Arias accepted political reform. The King wanted democracy; Carlos Arias preferred a 
Spanish version. The King spoke sincerely of being the King of all Spaniards, Carlos Arise, perhaps 
without realising it, saw him as King of a few Spaniards. The King thought of his son, Don Felipe, 
becoming King, Carlos Arias could not forget the immediate past. " (Osorio 1980,102.3). (Translated 
from original by author). 
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EXISTING POWER GROUPS IN SPANISH SOCIETY 
TORCUATO FERNANDEZ-MIRANDA 
BUNKER 
MILITARY TIIE PUBLIC JUAN CARLOS 
ARIAS 




lt became apparent that a measure of control was needed in order to maintain a balance 
between the establishment and the desire to reform. With the relative influence of Arias 
Navarro waning, came the necessity for Juan Carlos to demonstrate that, while acting 
within the framework of the system, he was able to engender change when it was 
needed. 23' Manipulation of existing variables was required and at the same time, an 
awareness and recognition of those additional variables that created new potential 
outcomes to the game. 
The manner in which Arias Navarro was removed from office represents a 
sublime use of rational analysis coupled with an in-depth knowledge of the system 
at 
«Juan Carlos knew that the transition to democracy would falter if it were not quickly placed in the 
hands of someone able to handle both bunker and opposition. Aware that dissatisfaction with Arias was 
also rife among senior Army officers, the King had to act before the military ministers formally requested 
that he dismiss the Prime Minister. In such an event, the preservation of his own authority would oblige him to keep on Arias if only to avoid a more reactionary figure. " (Preston 2004,351). 
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itself. 252 It would appear from Fig 4.5 that Fernandez-Miranda's influence and ability 
made him an ideal choice for the candidacy of prime minister but his refusal to accept 
the positionu3 despite the desires of Juan Carlos in this matter"' was to prove most 
fortuitous to the democratic process. If we analyse this refusal we arc able to see once 
again evidence of an aggregation mechanism at work. The role of prime minister would 
have represented a substantial promotion for Fernandez-Miranda and yet he declined in 
order that he might be of more use to the democratic process in his eventual position as 
President of the Cortes. 
In contrast to Juan Carlos' decision to delay action in 1975, Fernandez-Miranda 
was acting from a moral standpoint when he rejected the offer of the prime minister. 
This selfless act allowed for the eventual replacement of Arias Navarro, as without the 
knowledge and expertise of Fernandez-Miranda the process would have been largely 
impossible. 255 The role of individuals is highlighted in particular by the involvement of 
Fernandez-Miranda in the transition. Rational analysis without the sufficient means to 
subsequently enforce the actions taken does not guarantee success. In his role as 
President of the Cortes, Fernandez-Miranda was able to manipulate the situation from 
within and provoke internal reform. Much of what was happening within the 
government was taking place behind closed doors in the Cones and was therefore 
hidden from public view. Juan Carlos took a close interest in the proceedings of the 
: ". 
'Path-dependency suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of current 
possibilities and or options in institutional innovation... The path-shaping approach implies that social 
forces can intervene in current conjectures and actively re-articulate them so that new trajectories become 
ossible. " (I lausncr et al. 1995,6). fý'Torcuato 
rejected the offer of the Presidency with a gesture: that is better attributed to clairvoyance 
than to modesty. Ile responded to the King: 'I would be of better service to the Crown presiding over the Cortes and the Royal Council. " (Morin 1979,15). (Translated from original by author). 234 The king suggested to Torcuato that he should preside over the Conscfn de Alinlstros. If it was 
necessary to withdraw Carlos Arias, there was no one as suited to take command of the situation as he. 
JMorbn 1979,14). 
s$ 
.. The nomination of Suarez as President of the Government would never have been possible wit out 
the capable intervention of Fernandez-Miranda. " (Powell 2001,160). (Translated from original by 
author). 
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Cortes but it became increasingly clear that he would need someone intimately involved 
in the process in order to sustain internal control and direction. 236. This was to take 
precedence over replacing Arias Navarro and while it earned Juan Carlos criticism for 
being indecisive and weak, it was to benefit Spain in the long run. It became necessary 
to compromise on the issue of Arias Navarro in favour of being able to remove 
Alejandro Rodriguez Valcärccl as President of the Cones and install FernAndez- 
Miranda in his stead. This is a further example of preference rc-ordcring. in light of 
potential success, calculated against the ordering of existing variables. 
Arias Navarro saw Fernandez-Miranda s a potential rival for the position of 
prime minister and therefore the appointment of Fcrn3ndcz-Miranda as President of the 
Comes created a smoke screen behind which the attempt at true reform could take place. 
This is a perfect example of variable manipulation and serves to demonstrate the 
manner in which Juan Carlos and Femändcz-Miranda used the insecurities and 
arrogance of Arias Navarro against himself. Assuming that it was not possible to 
remove Arias Navarro at this point and that setting up FcrnAndcz-Miranda, as the 
President of the Cortcs was the best possible pay-off that could be achieved, this did not 
constitute an end to the game at hand. With every action taken, a new set of variables is 
introduced and this in turn, allows for a new set of decisions to be contemplated. Juan 
Carlos had initiated change with the introduction of his mentor into a position of 
genuine power and authority but further development was needed in order to fully 
establish control over the mechanism of government. 
The manipulation of variables continued and in effect was designed to erode 
Arias Navarro's power base to such a degree whereby refonn would be unchallenged. 
The issue of a direct confrontation with Arias Navarro was rejected at this point in 
216 For further information refer to footnote 46 
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favour of a much more subtle manner of political action. Whcthcr this was as a result of 
Juan Carlos' continued fear of Arias Navarro or a more shrewd analysis of the events is 
unclear. 257 What is apparent, despite what conjecture or hindsight may tell is that the 
structure of the system was amended by Juan Carlos in order to realign the power base 
and thus create the ability to challenge the political stranglehold of the premier. When 
Arias Navarro announced his new cabinet on 10 December 1975, Juan Carlos had been 
able to make certain specific additions and moderate the nature of it somewhat, although 
the bulk of the cabinet remained comprised of traditional hardliners. Chief among the 
appointments, achieved by Juan Carlos, were those of Jose Maria dc Arcilza as Foreign 
Minister, Manuel Fraga as Minister of the Interior and Antonio Garrigucs y Diaz 
Cafiabate as Minister of Justiee. 258 
Preston259 claims that Juan Carlos had insisted on these three nominations as his 
price for Arias Navarro to remain as prime minister. If this is true then it represents a 
very astute strategy and evidence that rational analysis cnablcd agenda setting to 
override the structural framework that had previously constrained the actions of Juan 
Carlos. All three of these men carried enough weight and influence to make their voices 
heard against the premier. These appointments were not sufficient to completely 
overrule Arias Navarro, nor did they constitute the end of the struggle for Juan Carlos, 
but they represented a decisive and strong move on the part of the monarch. 2'0 Juan 
257 
"I just don't know how to deal with Arias. I've tried to establish some connection but I haven't 
managed it. lie doesn't want, or doesn't know how, to listen and I have the impression that he doesn't feel the need to tell me anything.... I think that at times he thinks he is stronger that nu and that deep down he just doesn't accept me as King. lie doesn't keep nie informed, he talks and talks but the only 
thing he says is that, thanks to him, things are stable and that without him there would be chaos. " 
1Femindez"Miranda 1995,176-80), (Preston 2004,346). 
" For further information on these appointments. (Preston 2004,332), (Cowell 2001,146), (Osorio 
1980,46-7). 
2S9 (Preston 2004,332) 
260 
"The cabinet created after the King's proclamation should be deemed the first government of the 
Monarchy and the second government of Carlos Arias Navarro but in reality it was neither one nor the 
other. It was not the first because Juan Carlos would rather have had from the start a President in %hom 
he had confidence. " (Powell 2001,146). (Translated from original by author). 
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Carlos was maneuvering into a position of political security whereby he could 
legitimately provoke change and force the replacement of Arias Navarro to take place. 
Juan Carlos was in a position of rclativc strcngth in 1975, albcit tcmpcrcd by the 
knowledge that the fragile stability was predicated upon the cooperation and 
understanding of the groups outlined in Fig 4.5.261 The cabinet had been amended to 
better suit the aims and objectives of Juan Carlos and FcrnAndcz-Miranda, Arias 
Navarro had continued to alienate not only the left but also members of the bunker and 
the military and the legal ramifications of reform had been carefully analysed by 
Femindez-Miranda in a manner that left nothing to chance. The first true battle of the 
transition had been well planned and constructed in advance and its execution delayed 
until such a time as the conditions would ensure success. In the diagram below we can 
sec a complete reversal in the power structure between Juan Carlos and Arias Navarro 
from that present in 1975 and a realisation that the premier was firmly subordinate to 
the monarch. 
261 The Monarchy could still be swept away in a catastrophic clash between the irresistible force of the lcll and the immovable object of the right. If that was to be avoided. it was essential that Juan Carlos do 
everything possible to facilitate more rapid progress towards the introduction of democracy, yet do so in 
such a way as to meet with the approval of the Armed Forces and the bulk of the rrancoist old guard. (Preston 2004,354). 
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DOMINANT STRATEGY: JUAN CARLOS 1976 
In 1976 Juan Carlos occupied the position of strength; he had increased his power base 
and enjoyed more support than in 1975. Democratic reform had the backing of the 
people due to Arias Navarro's failures as prime minister and Juan Carlos had both 
legality and legitimacy supporting his actions, as assured by the involvement of 
Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda. Arias Navarro on the other hand had experienced a 
definite reduction in his own power base and was largely subject to the actions of Juan Carlos. 
Juan Carlos possesses a dominant strategy at this point, irrespective of the actions taken by Arias Navarro. Juan Carlos is able to assert authority and remove Arias Navarro 
from office. For the diagram below this strategy will be represented by S2. SI would 
represent the alternative of allowing Arias Navarro to remain in power and thus hinder 
the democratic process further. The numbers in the left hand side of each box 
correspond to Juan Carlos and those in the right hand side of each box to Arias Navarro. 
















Given the reversal in the power structure, Juan Carlos was in possession of the 
dominant strategy in 1976 and by the time he asked Arias Navarro to tender his 
resignation on 1 July 1976 there was little doubt that it would be received. Arias 
Navarro had never respected the position or the authority of Juan Carlos and therefore 
was likely not expecting the request for his resignation. The ability to manipulate and 
control the agenda from behind the scenes to such a point whereby victory in the game 
was secured, enabled the removal of a man who believed himself untouchable. The 
scene was set for a replacement to be nominated and elected. This in itself would not be 
a process without difficulty, despite the preparation and care taken by Fcrn3ndcz. 
Miranda. From a logical and rational analysis; the candidate chosen would have been 
one that would have elicited the least animosity in the election process. Should Juan 
Carlos' nominee fail to be ratified, it would have rendered the past year of preparation 
moot and dramatically undercut the emergent power base of the monarch and that of 
democratic reform. 
The choice of Adolfo Suarez may in hindsight seem a natural one, he had good 
credentials, was roughly the same age as the King and was charismatic enough to gain 
the support of the Bunkcr262 and the military and had proved himself during the period 
leading up to his eventual nomination, but at the time he was considered far from the 
ideal candidate, if he was considered at all 
. 
263 The two most likely candidates to replace 
Arias were perhaps embodied by the persons of Jose Maria dc Arcilza and Manuel 
Fraga. Arcilza was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sixty-six years of age and with a 
strong Francoist past, and Fraga was the second Vicc-President of the Government and 
20= in 1976 Suarez was a relatively unknown politician outside of the official circles of Madrid. 
Although he had associated almost exclusively with the Movement, in his youth he had scrod! in 
'Catholic Action' and had never belonged to the youth organizations of the sole party. " (Powell 2001, 
160). (Translated from original by author). 261 in truth, Adolfo Suarez was little known at the national level, he had barely made statements 
declaring his political position... combined with this it is evident that his age was not the most calming of 
factors for the veteran politicians. " (Osorio 1980,130). (Translated fromm original by author). 
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head of FEDISA264 and GODSA265 and was far too belligerent a character to be 
considered. Both men were far too dominant in their personalities and it is suggested by 
Preston (1986) that Juan Carlos needed someone younger, someone of his own 
generation who would share his own motivation and drive for progress. 
In essence, one can view the preparation of Adolfo Suarez in a similar vein to 
the grooming that Juan Carlos underwent at the hands of Franco. While the process was 
less pronounced and certainly less obviously made public, there is evidence to suggest 
that Suarez had long been the choice to replace Arias Navarro. 266 The decision to select 
Suarcz was the right one for Juan Carlos and for Fernandez-Miranda267 and yet it would 
not be a popular decision with all parties. Preston (1986) tells us that Juan Carlos was 
aware that the Ultras would attempt to block the transition and therefore, he matched 
Suircz's appointment with that of General Guticrr&z Mellado as Chief of the General 
Staff. This action goes some way to demonstrating that Juan Carlos' fundamental 
understanding of politics exceeded what many believed. While there were those who 
opposed Suarez, mainly for his connections to the Francoist past, this did not represent 
an immense hurdle and would eventually work in his favour. Juan Carlos had been 
wise in his choice of a youthful running mate as this was to impact upon the manner in 
which those both within Spain and without viewed the transition. 268 lie was clearly the 
King's choice269 and would, in time, become accepted by the population at large too. 70 
2" Federation of Independent Studies 265 Cabinet of Orientation and Documentation 20 As detailed in footnote 48 
267 
"The Monarch and his mentor required somebody 'manageable' and 'available' w ho would be 'open 
to ideas', and the Secretary General Minister of the Movement had given numerous signs that he was the 
man for the job" (Powell 2001,158). (Translated from original by author). 
2" 
"Spaniards wanted change but not confrontation and this favoured Sudrcz... In Contrast, Carrillo and Fraga awakened memories of the conflicts of the past. " (Preston 1986,119). 20. Because he came from Francoism and because he would not create suspicion that he was attempting 
radical change that would be viewed as unacceptable by certain sectors of our sodcty... he was young, 
modern and sufficiently ambitious as to wish to be the man capable of confronting the times in which we 
lived. Adolfo Sutrez the francoist successfully convinced the antifrancoists that they should place their 
trust in him to set the wheels in motion. " (Vilallonga 1993,120). (Translated from original by author). 
125 
The manipulation of the agenda did not cease to be a priority until Su3rcz had 
been confirmed as prime minister. Once Arias Navarro had been relieved of his duties, 
it fell to the Council of the Realm to present the dead of State with a list of three 
candidates to choose from. The Chairman of the Council of the Realm was Fcmindez- 
Miranda and the list of three names, the terna, had been carefully prepared so as to 
assure the inclusion of Suarez. This was far from a straightforward task as the 
motivation behind the action had to be concealed from those involved. As has been 
mentioned above, Suarez was far from the ideal candidate at the time and the inclusion 
of his name was seen as a means to pacify the Bunker with whom he had connections, 
but ultimately a waste of an entry on the list. 271 Fernandez-Miranda was able to exploit 
the existing structure of the system to the advantage of Juan Carlos and himself It 
became possible through careful manipulation of the functional framework to create the 
basis whereby the desired outcome would be obtained, in a manner that was both legal 
and legitimate. 272 We sec a perfect example of latent control being displayed. The 
battle ground had been carefully selected, the sides had been clearly drawn and the 
'reformers' were supremely armed for the task ahead. 
27'For the bulk of non-politicized Spaniards, however, fearful of losing the material bcncfits of the 
previous 15 years, but receptive to political liberalization, the combination of Juan Carlos and Adolfo Su6rcz was an attractive option. It seemed to offer the chance of both protecting the economic and social 
advantages of recent times and of advancing peacefully and gradually towards democracy. " (Preston 
1986,94). 
271 
"Torcuato then proposed Suarez, because, in spite of having openly shown his reformist tendency on 
certain occasions, he had conic from a Falangist background, having been General Secretary and Minister 
of the Movement, the Francoist single party, and Chairman of the official association known as the Union 
of the Spanish People. For the majority of Councillors, he was hardly suspicious. On the other hand, 
Sutrcz was less well known than other former ministers, and so his name was not rumoured and neither 
did it appear in the lists of favourites put out by the press. Provoking fewer rebuffs, he could make his 
way more discreetly into a trio. " (Colomer 1995,42). 272 
"On the occasion we are referring to, the device used by the Chairman of the council of the Realm 
was the introduction of a new dimension for classifying and grouping the available altcnutives in 
different subsets to be voted separately. It is important to remember that the voting of the Councillors had 
to produce not one but three winners, from whom the King would later select one. By grouping the 
candidates in three subsets, the scope of the available alternatives to be chosen at every voting round was 
reduced. This obviously favoured certain candidates who might not have been winters in a combined 
voting among all candidates. " (Colomcr 1995,41). 
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The strategy worked flawlessly, Suarez was included in the terna and was duly 
chosen by Juan Carlos. In perhaps the only occasion during the transition process, we 
are able to see the pride taken by Fernandez-Miranda in his task and the degree to which 
the planning and agenda setting had resulted in success. On his way from the Council 
to Zarzuela to present Juan Carlos with the terna, Femindez-Miranda commented to the 
Press that he was in a position to "deliver the King, that which he had asked for. ""3 
This is a clear indication that forethought and planning had played an extensive role in 
the removal of Arias Navarro and the subsequent selection of Adolfo Suarez. 
The event outlined above is an example of rational analysis and gaming on a 
scale so complex and sublime to be seemingly invisible to those not involved in its 
creation. The shift in the power structure that occurred with the removal of Arias 
Navarro can not be entirely attributed to Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda and yet 
their role in the process can not be overlooked or marginaliscd either. Time was taken 
to properly prepare the groundwork, to accurately assess the risk involved in decision 
making and to secure success. The system was manipulated from within, the actors 
were arranged accordingly and the end result mapped and designed with precision. 
Within the structural framework of a Francoist government, Fcmindcz-Miranda had 
engineered democratic reform. The choice of a candidate suitable for the role was 
paramount given the volatility of the times and the dexterity with which Suarez was 
introduced into mainstream political life is a further example of agenda setting. From 
Operating the constraints of the old, a new ethos and allegiance had been cradled ýý1 
273 
"On the way to Zarzuela, Fernandez-Miranda commented to the press that he was in a position 'to 
offer the king, that which he was asked of me', in the only instance when his pride for a task achieved 
outweighed his proverbial discretion. " (Powell 2001.160). (Translated from original by author). 
=4 
"A belief in legitimacy may become an autonomous goal for the members of a system. Some students 
of modernizing nations have observed, in this respect, that the breakdown of a sense of obligation to the 
old authorities leaves attitudes of 'free floating obedience'. diese can readily be attached to an 
appropriate leader who is clever enough to recognize and take advantage of such loosened attitudes. The 
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within the system in fact allowed for a degree of freedom that is perhaps not 
immediately obvious. One would think that a structural framework would constrain and 
hinder the actions of those seeking to reform it but correct manipulation of variables and 
an in-depth knowledge of the system enabled these constraints to be turned against 
those seeking to protect the existing order and provided the perfect sleight of hand with 
which to engender change. 275 
new leaders fill the void created by the absence of objects to which these attitudes of obligation attach 
themselves. " (Kahin et. al. 1955,309). 27 
"Not only are institutions man-made, men are also institution made. In other words, people are 
socialized by the 'hidden curriculum' effect of institutions into accepting the values, norms and rules 
embodied in them; hence they know, expect and anticipate that institutions can be relied upon and 
reckoned with. " (I Iausncr et. al. 1995,52). 
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Chapter 5 
The reform of the Cortes: 
Knight to King Four 
The reform of Cortes represents the most complex and delicately executed 
political event of the transition analysed in this thesis. The enormity of what was being 
attempted should not be underestimated. The reformers, despite an increased sense of 
authority as demonstrated in the previous chapter, were far from occupying a position of 
strength as the Bunker was still powerful and perhaps more importantly, continued to 
represent a recognised institution both of Francoism and of the government itself. The 
successful replacement of Arias Navarro with Adolfo Su6rez, as detailed in the previous 
chapter, marked a definite shift in the power structure and enabled the reformers to 
operate from within the system as opposed to implementing change unilaterally from 
without. The existence of Suarez in the position of prime minister did not guarantee 
democratic reform but it did provide the opportunity to manipulate the system internally 
and initiate change in a manner previously impossible. 
The removal of Arias Navarro represented a comprehensive victory for the 
process of democratic reform and yet without control of the mechanism of government 
itself, namely the Cones, this change would have been without real merit. The events 
outlined in the previous two chapters represent the initial steps taken towards reform 
and demonstrate that a subtle power shift was being experienced in Spanish political 
life. For any real transition to democracy to take place, complete control of the political 
system was required. The tremendous scope of the undertaking is explained below and 
an attempt is made to demonstrate the highly skilled and sophisticated manner in which 
individuals successfully executed what amounts to one of the greatest political 
undertakings of Spanish history. 
The events outlined in the two chapters above differ considerably to the one 
discussed below. The nomination of Juan Carlos was a game played between two 
individuals based upon shared preferences and understood implications of actions; the 
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nomination of Adolfo Suärcz involved more than two men although was consistent with 
the first event in that it was very much constructed on individual preferences and 
capabilities. The role of individuals and the manner in which they interacted with each 
other dictated the adopted course of action. The reform of the Cones is of a different 
nature, while the role of individuals is still important, and will be detailed below; the 
existence of the institution of government with its structured environment produced 
regulated responses from its members and allowed a strategy to be constructed by the 
primary actors accordingly. Not simply dealing with the impulses and actions of single 
actors, the reform of the Cortes would force the primary actors to confront a system 
designed to withstand external pressure and one that had been firmly established and 
institutionalised during Franco's regime. The very nature of the `game' was therefore 
substantially altered from the previous two events. 
A tremendous amount of preparation was involved in the planning and execution 
of the reform discussed bclow. 276 The reform of Cortcs required tremendous attention 
to detail, and the reality of change in Spain was a result of careful planning, political 
stratcgising and a comprehensive manipulation of variables. The Comes was an 
institution in Spain, implemented and strengthened during Franco's regime to the point 
of acceptance by the people and the political forum. It is arguable that the Cones, in 
and of itself, was not a hugely powerful entity but its true influence lay in its cxistcnce 
and perpetual involvement in political life. 
The successful nomination of Adolfo Sudrex as prime minister and the 
appointment of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda as President of the Cortes were crucial 
276 
'I believe that the entire installation process of the Crown has been misunderstood. Almost as if it had 
taken place suddenly and by accident. As if by surprise, a sort of happy improvisation. That was not the 
case. The Crown, before setting itself up as the axle of the State and indeed, from the moment this had 
been achieved, had a minutely calculated plan. Improvisation was the last thing that took place. " (Alcocer, J. L. 1986,13). (Translated from original by author). 
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steps in the process of democratic development but the Cortcs itself lay at the very heart 
of Francoism and constituted a staunch obstacle to genuine reform. Given the nature 
and motivational essence of the transition, an open and accountable Cones was 
paramount. Reform was essential and yet the manner of its implementation depended 
largely upon various societal and institutional constraints that could not be ignored. 
These constraints, imposed by Franco during his rule were felt at both a personal and 
collective level and were to shape the construction and subsequent execution of any 
reform action that was taken. 
The decision process before Juan Carlos would have been very similar to that 
regarding the issue of Adolfo Suirez's nomination, given that the success of any action 
taken was directly dependent upon the timing and preparation implemented prior to the 
fact. One can assume that the preference ordering of Juan Carlos would have indicated 
a desire to remove the Cortcs and install a new one of his choosing in the same manner 
as had been executed the replacement of Arias Navarro. Initial analysis of the situation 
and any subsequent action to be taken, would have resulted in a determination of what 
Elinor Ostrom terms an 'action arcna'. 277 lt is perhaps useful to view the ordering of 
preferences and any resultant actions taken, from the traditional understanding put 
forward by RCT and analyse these preferences in terms of return maximisation. The 
process of deliberation that Juan Carlos and his advisors undertook, would have taken 
into account the outcomes of previous events such as the replacement of Arias Navarro 
and any subsequent course of action would have been determined accordingly. 27 
277 For further explanation of an action arena, plcnse refer to E. Ostrom's c uiptcr titled "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development 1'ramcaroriº" in I'. A. Sabatier's book, Theories of the Policy Process. (1999)- 278 
"Two varieties are reflected in the model. The first is the mapping of choices onto decision makers, 
Ole decision structure. The second is the mapping of problems onto choicer, the access structure. " (March and Olsen 1989,13). 
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It is important to highlight the constraints that were involved in regards to the 
decision to reform Cortcs. As mentioned above, these constraints existed on both a 
personal and collective level. Juan Carlos was directly affected by decisions taken by 
Franco and by the institutional framework that curtailed absolute freedom of movement. 
The very nature of the system under which Juan Carlos was operating served to dictate 
the potential avenues available and acted as a deterrent from unilateral action? " The 
institutional safeguards were designed to prevent abuse and direct and wholesale 
change, while providing for the continuation of the establishment. No decision is made 
without consideration of additional factors and awareness of the 'game-scenario' was 
integral to any progress that could be attempted. Chief among the constraints in place at 
this time were the Leyes Fundamentales. These had been implemented by Franco 
during his regime in an attempt to create a straightjacket against any future reform of 
the system that Juan Carlos may attempt to initiate. 280 When examining the role of Juan 
Carlos in the process of reforming the Cortcs, we become aware of the tenuous position 
in which he found himself, constrained on the one hand by his acceptance of Franco's 
nomination281 and yet desirous for change on the othcr. 212 The decision to reform the 
Cortcs could not be implemented based upon personal preference, but rather through a 
more detailed and analytical awareness of the variables. The delicacy of the situation 
demanded a sophisticated and subtle approach to the problem at hand, one that would 
2" in contrast to some (though not all) rational choice analyses, historical institutionalists taxt to ice 
political actors not so much as all-knowing, rational maximiscrs, but more as rule-following `satislcrs. '" (Simon 1985), (March and Olsen 1982). 
°° For an in-depth analysis of the Leyes Fundamentales we Preston (2004,129,1$8.191,200-203), 
Powell (2001), I lerndndcz Gil (1982), (rernlndez-Miranda 1995,22). 211 
"The conversation was most cordial and emotional. The Prince reiterated that Which he had said on 
the 15 January: namely that he was committed to serve Spain that he had committed to this %hen he had 
sworn on the flag. At the end of the interview. Franco embraced him. " (I, rpez-Rollo 1977,335), 
SI'reston 2004,235), (Vilallonga 1993,99). (Translated from original by author). 
t2 
"During the early months of his reign, Juan Carlos was obsessed with the need to convince the 
democratic opposition both of his democratic intentions and of the viability of a far-reaching 
transformation of the political system. " (Powell 1996,96). 
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cnsurc a greater degree of success than a personally motivated onslaught of an 
cstablishcd institution. 
A cost-benefit analysis of the events would have indicated a preference for 
patience over immediate action. While the Codes was perhaps not as powerful as once 
it had been, a direct attack upon the institution of parliament would still have 
represented a dangerous move indeed. Such an attempt would have been 
unconstitutional and would have provoked a dramatic backlash from the armed forces 
and the entrenched Bunker. Every effort had been made thus far to operate within the 
constraints of democratic principles and to ensure that all action taken was done so in a 
legal manner, correctly coordinated and executed. Despite the possible desires of the 
monarch, there is no reason to assume that action taken in this event would be the result 
of anything less than a careful assessment of available options. here exists evidence of 
personal preference being over-ruled by the reality of the situation at hand. It is not 
always possible for unilateral action to be taken, not even if it is feasible. Respect and 
awareness of the game itself must exist in order for a successful outcome to be 
assured. 213 This constitutes a reordering of preferences as dictated by the game, but also 
signifies an awareness of the game itself and an appreciation of the parameters that arc 
in place. The actor is connected to the game just as the game is ordered by the actions 
of the actor in play. The diagram below outlines the ordering and necessary reordering 
of preferences on the part of Juan Carlos in his decision to reform Comes. 
2*3 in short, people don't stop at every choice they make in their lives and think to themselves, "Now 
what will maximise my self-interest? " Instead, most of us, most of the time, follow societally defined 
rules, even when so doing may not be directly in our self-interest. " (Thclen and Stcinmo 1992, R). 
134 
1) Remove Cortes and install a democratically minded Parliament 
2) Procccd with lengthy process of internal reform 
The first option constituted a potentially dangerous course of action on the part of Juan 
Carlos. There were far too many unknown variables involved with this decision. Given 
the volatile nature of the situation, it was necessary for maximum control of the 
sequence of events to be attained before acting. Bearing in mind the potential for a 
backlash from the Armed Forces and the unrest that would emanate from the Bunker 
itself, the decision to unilaterally remove Cortcs would not only have been illegal, but 
also highly dangerous and ill-advised. 
If the Cortcs was allowed to remain in power but was subjected to internal reform, Juan 
Carlos would need to appease the factions of Spanish political life outside of the 
immediate political arena such as the fringe parties und the people themselves. Given 
the public opinion in favour of democratic reform, this could have proved potentially 
dangerous as well. The level of strikes within Spain at this time and the rise in violence 
from ETA was indication enough that change was required and even expected. 
Given the potential for unrest from both sides outlined above, it would appear that Juan 
Carlos was in a no-win situation. An analysis of the potential repercussions and the 
memory of Civil War would have indicated that the greater risk lay with the alienation 
of the Armed Forces. It would be an easier task to appease the people with 
demonstrations of political reform than it would to confront the established Francoist 
power base head on. 
2 Procccd with lengthy proccss of internal rcfonn 
I) Rcmovc Cortcs and install a democratically minded Parliament 
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A cost-benefit analysis of the situation would have therefore led Juan Carlos to 
determine that the safer course of action lay with a meticulously, albeit gradual process 
of reform, one that allowed for the manipulation of variables and therefore a reordering 
of preferences would have been constructed and this would have been at the heart of the 
decision to act henceforth. While the decision to reform gradually would not guarantee 
success, there existed greater scope for control and success than offered by a direct 
confrontation with Codes and the Constitution itself. 
The diagram below (Fig 5.2) outlines the potential outcomes for the two choices 
detailed above. It is evident that the most prudent option was to allow sufficient time to 
pass thus creating the opportunity to manipulate the existing variables. The decision 
options are presented in the boxes on the left hand side of the page and the potential 
responses and subsequent outcomes arc shown accordingly. Fig 5.3 represents the 
possible outcomes involved, as demonstrated by a game scenario, involved in the 
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The numbers in the left hand side of each box correspond to Juan Carlos and those in 
the right hand side of each box correspond to the Cortes. 
SI represents the choice to reform now. This would have involved the direct removal 
of an established institution. It would have been incredibly difficult to complete and 
would have met with extensive if not violent opposition from the Cones itself and the 
Anny. 
S2 represents the choice to refonn later and from an internal perspective. This provided 
sufficient time for the agenda to be set in favour of reform, for the various parties to be 
convinced of the merit of change and for the legality of the operation to be assured. 
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The diagrams above illustrate the decision process before Juan Carlos in 1976. 
The power base of the King had grown, as the internal strength of the Cones had waned 
and yet the monarch was still not capable of removing the Cones in what could only 
have been interpreted as a unilateral action. Public opinion aside, it would have 
constituted an illegal act and one that would have weakened the very fabric of the 
democratic process. 
As can be seen from the diagrams above, the desire to rcplacc the Cones and 
install an openly democratic parliament aligned to the transition process would have 
resulted in political suicide for Juan Carlos. The potential ramifications far outweighed 
the potential for success. Arguably more important was the clement of uncertainty and 
the inability to control the outcome. Previous events in the transition had been 
meticulously planned and flawlessly executed and to deviate from that formula at this 
point, despite personal desires would have been a mistake. Juan Carlos was not acting 
alone in this process and it was the advice and direction he received from Fcmdndcz- 
Miranda in particular that helped to form the course of action that would be adopted. 
Having taken the oath to serve Spain and the institution of the Monarchy, the 
parameters to the decisions before him were somewhat limited. It was not without 
considerable internal debate and the invaluable involvement of Fcrn3ndcz-Miranda that 
any such decision to progress was reached. 84 
In a conversation that took place between Juan Carlos and FcrnAndcx-Miranda 
on the 18 July 1969, the personal involvement of the primary actors is highlighted. 
Evidence such as this illustrates a real human connection to the process being 
undertaken and in turn, enables us to construct additional parameters that permit a 
2114 
"In any theory of deliberate choice, action depends on the decision maker's alucs. Since the 
consequences of interest are to be realized in the future, it is necessary to anticipate not only hat will happen but how the decision maker will feel about those outcomes when they are experienced. " (March 
and Olsen 1989,6). 
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certain degree of prediction. Juan Carlos was concerned about his responsibilities to his 
oath28s and Femdndez-Miranda went to great lengths to assure him that reform of the 
Leyes Fundamentales would not constitute a breach of ethics; on the contrary, it was a 
constitutionally protected avenue of action. 286 The legal acumen and expertise of 
Fernandez-Miranda was instrumental in the manipulation of the variables necessary to 
allow reform to become a reality. External reform was not possible given the nature of 
the system and the relative uncertainty of the outcome and therefore, internal reform 
became the most attractive option available. 
The necessity to set the agenda and control the parameters in which the game 
would take place was vital. The institutional framework that outwardly constrained 
actions could be inwardly subverted to produce the desired results 217 Internal rcfonn 
would not only have the semblance of legality but would also appear indigenous to the 
very institution it was attempting to alter. This would in turn serve to reduce the threat 
of repercussion from the armed forces. The task at hand therefore was a mammoth one 
that would require all the expertise of the actors involved and more than just a little 
luck. 288 As has been mentioned above, Juan Carlos was desirous of reform and we can 
assume from the level of involvement in the process, so were both Torcuato rctn3ndcz- 
215 
"His concern was clean, clear and noble, very deep and sincere. Ile wanted to have a clear conscience 
regarding what he did and of the commitments he would acquire. Ile had received from rranco a legitimacy that he accepted but the Monarchy had in addition its own legitimacy. " (17WuAndez-Miranda. 
P. 1995,53). (Translated from original by author). 2" 
"ßy swearing to the Fundamental Laws, you are swearing to them in their entirety, and therefore, you 
are swearing to Article 10 of the Law of Succession, that states that the laws can be reformed. Subsequently, you accept the possibility to initiate reform. " (rert0ndez-Miranda, P. 1993.54). (Translated from original by author). 287 
"While rules guide behaviour and make some actions more likely than others, they ordinarily do not 
determine political behaviour or policy outcomes precisely. Rules, laws, identities and institutions provide 
parameters for action rather than dictate a specific action, and sometimes actors show considerable ability 
to accommodate shifting circumstances by changing behaviour without changing core rules and 
structures. " (Olsen 2003). 
Zag The constituent Cortes set out to draft a charter to break the legal and political framcwotk that existed 
under Franco and resume the tradition interrupted by the Civil War in 1936. In addition, the constitution 
needed to be amenable to both conservative and progressive interpretations 
.... 
Only a powerful and 
dynamic state founded on the principles enunciated by the constituent Cones would make sense out of 
post-Franco Spain and set it on a new course. ([bpez-Dina, A. 1985,34). 
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Miranda289 and Adolfo Suarez but an additional clement that helped to lend impetus to 
the reform process was that of public opinion. While this was not a factor that Juan 
Carlos could engineer, it was possible to harness it to the greater good of the transition. 
Awareness of the external factors enables manipulation of internal structures to generate 
a desired outcome. 
Public opinion was manifcsted in various forms and created a Icvcl of 
uncertainty on the part of the Cortes. While the Francoist parliament had been 
considered untouchable during Franco's regime, cracks were beginning to show and the 
aura of invincibility was being gradually eroded by more direct and active participation, 
in the political arena, by the general public. The increased levels of interaction between 
the police and the general public and the resultant animosity this caused were an 
additional factor to consider. 290 The problems experienced at this time were not 
restricted solely to internal ones, the combination of increased strike activity291 and the 
indirect involvement of certain members of the international community, 292 contributed 
to the setting of the parameters within which the primary actors were permitted to 
operate. External factors play a decisive role and one cannot afford to overlook them in 
an analysis of political events. 
219 
"1 interviewed the King at six... he took me by the hands and spoke to me of his long and difficult luºpe 
of so many years... of the difficulties he had experienced to form the Government and of the resistance he had encountered, Ile eulogised the fidelity and flexibility of Torcuato in the twin position he occupied. " (Areilza 1977,20). (Translated from original by author). r10 For a more detailed account of the events of this period and the clashes between the Spanish police and 
the general public, refer to I listorical Chapter p 40-01 291 
"Meanwhile in 1975, the most conflict ridden year of Francoism, 3156 strikes had been declared, in 
only the first three months of 1976,17731 had been recorded. " (Powell 2001,152), (Maravall 1981,27). (Translated from original by author). 291 
"Kissinger asked me whether the King had as much power as Franco had had, and whether he would 
one day become a Constitutional King. Whether he could direct politics by overruling the Government? 
Whether the Army respected him? Whether he would rush reform or take his time? " 24/1176 (Areilza 1977,61). (Translated from original by author). 
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The ability to reform from within, was an institutionally protected right that was 
successfully exploited to engender change. 293 The regulated and formulaic existence of 
the parliamentary system both constrained and facilitated the actions taken 294 
Constitutional reform was protected by the Leyes Fundamentales and this provided the 
avenue for human intervention. Institutions arc protected by a governing set of talcs 
that not only dictate the behaviour of the entity but also protect its very existence and 
survival. Providing these rules are correctly adhered to, there exists the possibility for 
institutionally sanctioned reform. 293 Despite the backing of public support, the 
additional pressure of negative feeling towards the Codes, the ability of Fernandez- 
Miranda and the protective cloak of legality, the task was still a complicated and 
tenuous endeavour. While the power and influence of the Cones may have been 
weakened due to external factors, they were still very much intact and represented a 
powerbase against which Juan Carlos was forced to tread carefully. Juan Carlos was far 
from respected at this point by the Cortcs, his personal influence and reputation had 
indeed grown throughout Spain but his political persona was a mere shadow of that 
enjoyed by Franco during his lifetime. 296 
291 
"Most institutional actions result neither from extraordinary processes or forces, nor from heroic 
interventions, but from relatively stable, routine processes that relate institutions to their environments. The stable rules and meanings... produce a great variety of behaviour flexibly responsive to environmental 
changes. If the environment changes rapidly, so will the responses of stable institutions. Asa result, with 
respect to many aspects of their behaviour, political institutions change quickly in response to 
environmental signals. " (March and Olsen 1989,58). 2" 
"A central defining feature of 'institutionalization'... is die stable, recurring, rcpetitivv, patterned 
nature of the behaviour that occurs within institutions, and because of them. 'Institutionalism' has been 
characterizes as 'the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. '" (Goodin 1996,22). 395 
"An important part of the modern democratic creed is that impersonal, fairly stable, publicly known, 
and understandable rules that are neither contradictory nor retroactive, are suppoAcd to shield citizens from the arbitrary power of authorities and the unaccountable power of those with exchangeable 
resources. Self-given laws are assumed to be accepted as binding for citizens. A spirit of citizenship is 
seen to imply a willingness to think and act as members of the community as a whole, not solely as %clf- 
interested individual or as members of particular interest groups. " (Arblaster 1987,77). 2%, All Franco's powers were theoretically subject to limitation by the Cones and the Conscja del Rein but, in practice, both bodies acted as rubber stamps. They could not be expected to behave like that if faced with a reforming King. The task thus facing Juan Carlos and Fcrn. ndez"MiranJa - that of winning 
over the Procuradores to their project and of asserting the authority of the Cortes over the government 
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The mechanism involved in engineering the internal reform of the Cortes, was 
human based rather than institutional in the main, although the end result is a clear 
demonstration of agency driven institutional manipulation. Evidence exists to posit that 
the process was by no means a spontaneous one and that a great deal of planning and 
forethought had been employed. 297 Initial action had begun well in advance of the 
actual reform itself, 298 and can be attributed to the influence and interaction of elite 
actors, namely one man in particular, Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, whose fundamental 
understanding of the structural workings of the Cortes and comprehensive legal 
knowledge were put to great USC. 299 No attempts at institutional reform can be 
successful without detailed planning and forethought, and even then, success is far from 
guaranteed. The attack on the Cortes would be a many pronged offensive. Efforts had 
been made to increase the number of potential supporters within parliament itself and 
the very structure of the system itself would be subjected to the scrutiny and 
machinations of Fernandez-Miranda, so that when the time came to introduce a reform 
bill, the scene would be set and a greater chance of success permitted. 
Fernandez-Miranda's role in the preparation and construction of the reform bill 
was as significant for its success, as was his involvement in the subsequent debate over 
the bill itself. The bulk of this preparation lay with ensuring that the Cones and the 
Consejo del Reino were sufficiently prepared for the task at hand. I icrc is evidence of 
was awesome in its enormity. " (Preston 2004,329), (Fernlndez-Miranda, P. 1995,125$), (Preio 1995, 365-9). 
29' 
"lt would require an over-active imagination to comprehend that the political reform had been designed in detail from the moment of ascension to the throne. It is, without doubt, an historical reality 
that the backbone of the reform had indeed been designed, greatly debated and prepar d, at least since 
1969. " (PemQndez-Miranda, P. 1995,20). (Translated from original by author). 2" 
"As we have seen, between 1976 and 1971 many young attorneys, with a more open mentality tlwn the 
older members and the ability to view the governmental project favourably, had been incotporated into 
the Cortes" (Powell 2001,171). (Translated from original by author). 
r" O-One cannot overlook the importance of Fernandez-Miranda, not solely as President of Ow Coact but 
also as President of the Royal Council. The first of these charges enabled him to control the discussion 
process in the Cortes in order to avoid obstruction from the 'continuity sector', and in the Royal Council, he was able to control those items brought before the King. " (Soto 1998,26), (Fcrn. ndez-Miranda, P. 
1995), (Castellano, P. 2001). (Translated from original by author). 
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manipulation of the control-field. The necessity adequately to construct a suitable 
playing field could not be more pronounced than in this instance. The manner in which 
Femdndez-Miranda set about adapting the existing political structure to better suit the 
needs and aims of the transition is evidence of the importance of agenda-setting. 
Fernandez-Miranda did not act alone in this process although the responsibility for 
preparing the groundwork fell to him 300 While the King was in the background 
somewhat, albeit lending his support, the practical aspect was largely Ieit to the two 
men who, between them, held the crucially important positions of political power, 
Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda and Adolfo Sudrez. Having chosen to follow the option 
of internal reform, the primary actors were presented with the unenviable task of 
convincing the Cortes to voluntarily vote to self-destruct 3°' Given the inherent 
difficulties involved in this process, it was imperative that all pieces were correctly 
positioned. 302 Despite the fact that Fernandez-Miranda had been influential in the 
creation of the Ley Para la Reforma Politica1°3 (Reform Bill) it stood a greater chance 
were he not openly associated with it. 304 Having been instrumental in the removal of 
Arias Navarro, additional action of this nature could well have jcopardiscd the transition 
process itself. 
300 
"For him, the greatest part of political activity of the President of the Cones and of the Royal Council, during the stage of Arias' Government, was to prepare the two organisms via strategic planning to take 
over the institutions and the State's power resources. " (Fernandez-Miranda, P. 1995,22). (Translated from original by author). 301 it was not a law, dictated in foresight of possible reform, rather it incorporated the decision to reform 
with a potential that, according to Article 1. would result in the abandonment of the political system from 
which it emanated. " (I lerndndcz-Gil, A. 1982,129). (Translated from original by author). 302 
"The debate surrounding the plan of the Law to reform the Comes was prepared meticulously by the King, the Government and Fernandez-Miranda, in order to guarantee its ratification by at (east two thirds 
of the attorneys as required by the law. " (Powell 2001,167), (Preston 2004). (Translated fromm original 
by author). 
3 
"Fernandez-Miranda drew up the script for true political reform. from the restoration of the monarchy by the government, in accordance with the legislation of the regime, in order to preserve the system by 
counting on the ordered and selective response of those carefully Chosen to attend the party. " (Castellano 2001,178). (Translated from original by author). V`" 
"lie could not also be the protagonist, the executor. lie did not passest the audacity, self-conldence, 
youth, seduction, charisma or patience. lie had more enemies than friends, aroused more suspicion than 
confidence. " (Ibid. 178). (Translated from original by author). 
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A logical analysis of events and the possible consequences attached to them 
dictated that Fernandez-Miranda could not be directly associated with the reform in the 
manner he perhaps deserved to be. This bears evidence of a rational approach on the 
part of the actors involved and a subtle understanding and awareness of the parameters 
that they had in essence constructed for themselves. Despite the relative importance of 
individual actors in the Spanish Transition, what is strikingly evident is the importance 
placed upon the role of institutions and institutional sensibilities by the very men who 
sought to manipulate them. Actors are expected to behave in a certain way and follow a 
given set of accepted rules. These rules exist to protect both the actors themselves, the 
institutions under whose auspices the actors operate and those members of society who 
benefit from the protection and equilibrium afforded by these institutions. Wcrc 
Fernandez-Miranda to deviate in any way from the expected nouns of institutional play, 
the likelihood of a detrimental outcome to the process would have been greatly 
increased. 305 
The importance of Fernandez-Miranda, and thcrcforc that of individuals, cannot 
be overlooked in the transition in Spain. iie was instrumcntal in laying the groundwork 
for the reform bill and his personal attitude and approach to the process typifies the 
reason for the success of democratic reform in Spain, 306 namely the ability and 
willingness of the key actors to place the role of institutional integrity above personal 
motivation and to allow for subtle manipulation of both cvcnts and personnel. Having 
laid the foundation from a political point of view, Fcrn3ndcz-Miranda elicited the hclp 
3's 
"In short, actors are expected to behave according to distinct democratic norms and rules and the democratic quality of a polity depends on properties of its citizens and officials. If they are not law- 
abiding, enlightened, active, civic-minded and acting with self-restraint and a distance to individual 
interests, passions and drives, genuine democratic government is impossible. " (Mill 1962,30). 
"*"I 
must confess that I never enjoyed being a man of mystery, nor an enigma. If I did not explain my 
conduct on one occasion or other, it was simply because I was unable to do tug, an explanation at the 
wrong time destroys the efficiency of the efforts, my task was to fulfil my specific missions of decisive historic importance, not to show off, and even less to prejudice action by sheer vanity, thus making it impossible to explain whilst in the process of acting. " (Manuscripts front Torcuato Fcm. ndez. Miranda. 
quoted from FemSndez-Miranda, P. 1995,62). (Translated from original by author). 
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of Adolfo Suarez to continue the task. The two men would work in tandem for much of 
the process but it was Suarez, who represented the future of the regime and was 
sufficiently accepted by the entrenched Francoists, who would be the true face of 
reform. 307 This decision is a further example of resultant analytical deliberation; the 
chances of success were much greater with Suarez at the helm than they would have 
been had Fernandez-Miranda claimed ownership of his own reform bill. Suarez had 
been made prime minister for precisely this purpose, to ensure the support of the Bunker 
while presenting a youthful face to the democratic process. 
Despite the hypothesised increased chance for a successful return should Adolfo 
Suarez, at least publicly, assume control of the reform process, his involvcmcnt far from 
guaranteed anything more than a slightly more favourable reception. In addition to the, 
not insubstantial, complexities of the political process itself, the primary actors were 
also forced to deal with remnants of the Francoist regime. The continued existence of 
the institution, under attempted reform, was of course a decisive clement in both the 
preparation and the actual execution of the adopted strategy. The need to take into 
account the position and potential action of not just the Francoist government, but also 
the military was paramount. The simple existence of individuals is not sufficient to 
generate a positive outcome if they arc lacking in the recognition of their status by 
others. The involvement of Adolfo Suarez improved the prospect of success but did not 
guarantee it; much was the same for the role of Juan Carlos during this portion of the 
procedure. Juan Carlos was Chief of State in little but name only for much of the 
307 
"Moreover Fernandez-Miranda presented to Adolfo Suarez the possibility that he assume owiwrship of 
the text. 'Ilere, I give you this, that which has no father', said the author to the President of live 
Government. And precisely, the next day, 24 August, Adolfo Suarez presented without further &do the 
sparse papers that would open the door to political reform before the Council of Ministers. " (Prego 2000, 
43), (Fernandez-Miranda, P. 1995), (Powell 2001), (llernAndcz-Gil 1982). (Translated from original by 
author). 
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transition process, lacking the true backing and support of the military, and 
understandably so, reluctant to risk unilateral action without adequate reason. 
The transition in Spain is marked by careful planning and an in-depth 
consideration of the variables on the part of the primary actors. Rational analysis 
dictated that any course of action pursued without previously garnering the support of 
the military could potentially result in a return to violence and as such would run 
counter to the aims of establishing democratic stability. The subsequent actions taken 
highlight the importance of individuals in relation to the stability of institutions. Adolfo 
Suärcz was instrumental in the task of convincing the army as to the inherent 
applicability of the reform bill and this was achieved by personal interaction between 
the premier and high-ranking military officers. It was imperative that Suarez been seen 
to take the lead in this action as he had the tacit approval of the army308 due to his 
former involvement in the Movimiento, but his action was sanctioned and directed by 
Juan Carlos. 09 The inclusion of the military in this respect represented the result of a 
difficult choice on the part of the primary actors. The necessity to placate the military710 
was marred by the possible ramifications of involving them unduly in a political process 
in which they had little or no place. 3 1A preference ordering on the part of the primary 
actors would naturally dictate that the military remained distanced from politics but the 
harsh reality of the political climate prevented this from taking place. 
"" 
"During three and a half hours, Suarez offered a show of sympathy, imagination, talent and 
companionship. Ile appeared as one of them, putting forward his worries and being inflexible in his 
principles. Nobody doubted his loyalty or his affection for the old Regime. " (Moran 1979,310), (Powell 
2001), (Preston 2004). (Translated from original by author). 7°' 
"The idea had come from Fernandez-Miranda with the full blessing of the King. and Adolfo made it 
his own and lent it his style. " (Morin 1979,310). (Translated from original by author). 
"0 
"After consulting with the King, who under no circumstances wanted to convert the victors of the war into those defeated by democracy. " (Powell 2001,66). (Translated from original by author). 311 
"At the outset of the transition, Suarez and his collaborators thus confronted an awkward 
choice... Inclusion of elites in negotiations over democratic transitions can co-opt the participants In thence 
talks and help secure their loyalty to the new regime. But at the same time, inclusion of military elites in 
negotiations regarding the structure of a civilian democratic regime would imply that die military had a legitimate role to play in domestic politics. In short, such inclusion might have implicitly redefined the 
role of the military, increasing its involvement in domestic politics in the future and undoing the good 
deed that Franco had inadvertently performed on behalf of the new regime. " (Gunther 1992,734). 
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The meeting between Suarez and the military officials was designed to provide 
him the opportunity to explain the legality of the proposed reform bill and the manner in 
which it would need to be ratified by Cones. This in itself was an intelligent strategy as 
the bill would need a two-third majority to pass and the bulk of the Cortes were 
traditional Francoists. On the surface, this would have been welcome news to the 
military and demonstrates the continued relevance of institutions and the ability to 
predict actions based upon an individual's reliance and faith in the stability and 
predictability of said institutions. Given the information outlined above, a rational 
interpretation would have concluded that the Cortcs would, under no circumstances, 
vote for their own demise; and providing the reform bill was introduced in a legal 
manner, there was no real threat to the continued existence of the Francoist government. 
The ability and foresight on the part of the primary actors to construct a control- 
field of this nature represents a sublime manipulation of events and a fundamental 
understanding of human nature. To this the primary actors would also add the weight of 
public pressure. The awareness of external parameters enables them to be self. 
constructed and manipulated accordingly. In the aftermath of the meeting with the 
military officials, Suärcz took part in a televised broadcast that served a double purpose. 
The primary objective was to inform the public as to the status of the reform process 
and to ensure that democracy was conducted in an open fashion; the added result was 
the increase in public support and expectation. Coupled with the increased levels of 
public unrest and violence, this additional pressure would serve to further influence the 
actions of the members of Cortes 312 
312'The President intervened by television, explaining the reach of the Plan for Political Reform. At half 
past nine at night, in the face of the expectations of the entire country, the President confirmed that: 'We have begun to make reality that which I spoke of on another occasion: namely, to raise the level of 
politics to that which is considered normal in the streets; to remove drama and fiction from politics via the 
process of elections. " (Morin 1979,310), (Powell 2001), (liernandez-Gil 1982). (Translated from 
original by author). 
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The pieces were being correctly aligned, internal support was being assured and 
the media was providing the additional pressure of external expectations. Douglass 
North has discussed institutions as "the rules of the game for society or, more 
formally... humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions. " (1990,3). This 
is precisely what was being attempted, a form of institutionally protected constraint that 
would enable the actions of the Cortes to be accurately predicted and manipulated. 
Complete control of a situation is of course a near impossibility and yet the attempt to 
produce a favourable outcome based on the construction of preference reordering and 
variable manipulation was a prudent action and one based upon a rational analysis of 
potential alternatives. Situating the decision field as they did within the confines of a 
structured environment 313, the reformers were able to reduce the options available to the 
actors within the game. 314 The balance of power was removed from those who believed 
themselves to occupy an institutionally protected position of strength and it was placed 
in the hands of those seeking to provoke change. 
The central tenet behind manipulating the playing field to produce an optimal 
situation lay in the necessity to remove any existing alternatives until all that was Ich to 
the secondary actors of the game, was the pre-dcsigncd end game of the primary actors. 
Despite the relative strength and influence of the Cortcs, this did not correlate to their 
respective political ability and knowledge. The power base of the Cones lay in the 
traditional support they had shown to Franco and Francoism. During Franco's regime, 
the Codes had acted as little more than a rubber stamp for decisions taken by the 
313 
"1listoricall y, political science has emphasized the ways in which political behaviour was embedded in 
an institutional structure of rules, norms, expectations, and traditions that severely limited the free play of individual will and calculation. " (March and Olsen 1989,5), (Wolin 1960). 3" 
"Institutional routines are followed even when it is not obviously in the narrow self-interest of the 
person responsible to do so. Even in extreme situations like war, or in concentration camps, individuals 
seem to act on the basis of rules of appropriateness rather than rational consequential calculation. " (March and Olsen 1989,22). 
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Caudillo and as such, was no match for the politically motivated primary actors 
. 
315 The 
Cortes existed as an institution and was therefore constrained by the very manner in 
which it was able to operate. 316 In essence, it represented, not a free thinking individual 
able to respond to new and uncertain situations with free will, but rather an entity that 
would measure future action upon past performance and adhere to a strict set of 
governing rules. 317 The ability to restrict the possible avenues of action greatly 
increased the likelihood of success 318 The involvement of the primary actors in the 
process of reforming the Cortes was a demonstration of leadership and control and as 
Goodin argues, "governance is nothing less than the steering of society by officials in 
control of what are organizationally the `commanding heights' of socicty. "319 
The manner in which the debate within Cortes took place further compounded 
the ability of the primary actors to respond to the situation and construct a strategy 
accordingly. Delicate negotiations had convinced the Army that no reform would take 
place without the explicit approval of the Cortcs themselves and therefore the remaining 
315 
'The fact that institutions encode experience into standard operating procedures, professional rules, 
practical rules of thumb, and identities does not imply that the rules necessarily reflect intelligence. " (March and Olsen 1989,54), (Brehmer 1980), (March 1981). 3t6 
"A straightforward and almost automatic relation between rules and action is most likely in a polity 
with legitimate, stable, well defined and integrated institutions. Action is then governed by a dominant institution that provides clear prescriptions and adequate resources. I. e. prescribes doable action in an 
unambiguous way. The system consists of a multitude of institutions, each based on different principles. Yet, each institution has some degree of autonomy and controls a specified action-sphere. The (living) 
constitution prescribes when, how and why rules are to be acted upon. It gives clear principles of division 
of labour, maintains internal consistency among rules, prevents collisions between divergent institutional 
prescriptions and makes the political order a coherent whole with predictable outcomes. Together. a 
variety of rules give specific content in specific situations both to such heroic identities as statesman or 
patriot and to such everyday identities as those of an accountant, police officer, or citizen. " (March and Olsen 2005,7), (Kaufman 1960), (Van Maanen 1973). 317 
"A central defining feature of 'institutionalization'... is the stable, recurring, repetitive. patterned 
nature of the behaviour that occurs within institutions, and because of them. 'Institutionalism has been 
characterized as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. In an institutionalised setting, behaviour is more stable and predictable. " (Eisenstadt 1968,410). 318 
"The behavioralist focus usefully serves to fix attention upon agency, upon individuals and grouping 
of individuals whose behaviour it is. But those individuals are shaped by, and in their collective 
enterprises act through, structures and organizations and institutions. What people want to do, and U hat 
they can do, depends importantly upon what organizational technology is available or can be made 
readily available to them for giving effect to their individual and collective volitions. " (Goodin 1996,13). 319 (Goodin 1996,13). 
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task lay with convincing the Cortes that the notion of reform was one that would benefit 
themselves and was in fact a legitimate and adequate course of action s. o 
The legislation had been drawn up, the relevant institutions had been prepared 
for the day when the reform introduced, the external factors had been placated to the 
best of the ability of the primary actors, and all that remained was to convince a 
parliament that the most appropriate course of action was to vote to remove their own 
power base. 321 It would require all of the personal charisma and charm of Suarez to 
achieve this objective. 322 There were several weapons in the arsenal of the president in 
his task to ensure that the reform bill would pass when presented to Cortcs, some of 
which occupied a somewhat ethically grey area but were effective nonetheless. In many 
ways, Suarez played a game of chess with Cortes. There would be no single factor that 
could be used to influence every member of the Cortes and therefore it became 
necessary to attack the matter from a variety of fronts. The reform bill, although 
revolutionary in its eventual outcome, was far from being an inflammatory document. 
323 
The reluctance on the part of the ministers to accept was based on what it would mean 
for their own future. 
The process was not a smooth one and there were stages during the process 
when success was far from guaranteed. 324 Suarez and Fernandez-Miranda spent a great 
320 
"Sometimes action reflects in a straightforward way prescriptions embedded in the rules, habits of 
thought, "best practice" and standard operating procedures of a community, an institution. organization, 
profession or group. A socially valid rule creates an abstraction that applies to a number of concrete 
situations. Most actors, most of the time, then, take the rule as a "fact". There is no felt need to "go behind it" and explain or justify action and discuss its likely consequences. " (Stinchcombe 2001.2). 721 
"Make them see the lack of viability of a regressive position and that in the future they may take part 
without feeling marginalized. " (Powell 2001,168). (Translated from original by author). 
su 
"Knowing the eloquence and personal charm of this master politician I have no doubt that he could 
win over many to his side. But it is one thing to win over many and quite another thing to win over o 
majority. Apparently something more than eloquence and charm was needed here. " (Krasikov 1984, 108). (Powell 2001). 
323 
"The objective of the law was, simply put, a call from the Cortcs with constitutional powers, motivated by what has been characterized as a 'law-bridge'. " (Powell 2001,166). (Translated from original by 
author). 
324 
"In the Council of Ministers on the 10 August 1976 the perplexity and indecision, the confusion and inaction were the risks to be dealt with. They knew what was wanted but not how to achieve it and there 
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deal of time developing strategies based upon rational analysis in order to increase the 
likelihood of success. During the period between 17 and 20 August, they met to discuss 
the nature of the reform. 325 The bill was submitted before the Comfstdn dtirta 
Gobierno-Consejo Nacional (National Government-Advisory Mixed Commission) for 
their consideration. This was necessary; as to spring a bill upon the parliament, without 
forewarning, would have potentially resulted in its outright rejection. The precautions 
were well founded as by and large, the bulk of the text was accepted and remained true 
to the spirit in which it was conceived. This is further evidence of using the system 
against itself; it is much easier to convince someone of an idea, if they believe they have 
played a role in its conception 326 
The decision to introduce the bill for the consideration of the commission prior 
to an actual vote was very astute. The changes that were made were largely cosmetic 
and yet went a long way to placating the ministers who were sceptical of the bill. While 
it could be viewed as a courtesy to the commission, the introduction of the bill in this 
manner was a direct response to the need to gain the support of even one additional 
minister. The actual nature of the bill itself was not held in question, nor was the 
legality of the action327 and yet time and of ort had to be spent on securing the passage 
of the reform through the political waters that would ratify and accept it. 
are numerous witnesses to attest to this. On the 15 August Su3rcz called Fernandez-Miranda in Asturias 
and admitted to the President of the Cortes that he could not sec a way out. " (Fcnandez-hfiranda. P. 199$, 223). (Translated from original by author). 325 
"Between the 17 and the 20, Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda and Adolfo Suarez held long comctxations, 
the last of which lasted for more than four hours, it came out in the press the following day that: 'The 
presidents of Government and Cortes study the strategy of the reform. " (Fernandez-Miranda, I'. 1995, 
225), (Europa Press, Informaciones 21/8/76), (EI Pais, 21/8/76). (Translated from original by author). 326 
"The improvements to the plan were indubitable... and despite the fact that they were improvements, 
they were received with recognition and appreciation. " (Fernandez-Miranda. P. 199$, 229). (Tran la(ed from original by author). 127 
"Article 10 of the Law of Succession established that various factors were required in order to modify 
any rule of the Fundamental Laws: the knowledge and pre-empting report, although not binding in nature, 
of the National Council; the agreement of the Parliament and a favourable vote by the people by process 
of a popular referendum. The proper nature in which was grounded its permanent and inalterable 
character was that of a constitutional nature and not that of a false nature of absolute truth based upon a 
rational, historical, philosophical or moral character. Neither the State, the supreme duties of the people, 
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Any approval, tacit or otherwise, of the bill by members of the Cones would not 
be sufficient to return the required two-thirds majority323 and so it became necessary for 
additional tactics to be introduced. 329 True to the nature of previous involvement by the 
primary actors, complete variable manipulation is conspicuously apparent. Evidence 
exists that all alternatives were explored, where negotiation and debate proved 
unsuccessful, less honourable methods were employed. Activity such as this is 
condoned in the literature and represents an integral clement of much political 
activity. 330 Ministers were offered future governmental positions or threatened with 
financial repercussions should they not act accordingly. 331 The combination of reward 
and punishment proved successful and is a further demonstration of the understanding 
of human nature displayed by the primary actors. 32 
While the actions may have been less than sanitary, the underlying motivation 
was driven by a common objective; namely that of generating a suitable game-arena in 
which to introduce the reform bill 333 When control of the players within the game 
nor any constituent power can lend more value to a political enunciation than the constitutional and historical. " (Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda quoted in Gentleman, July 1974). (Translated from original bauthor). 
37, The creation of an instrument 
- 
that of a democratic Parliament - that permitted discussion with the 
nation, needed approval by a two thirds majority from with the Parliament itself and from a subsequent 
referendum. " (Powell 2001,165). (Translated from original by author). 329`°The task facing the government regarding the lawyers has been both long and intense: the ministers have divided the attorneys into groups and using personal interviews, they have attempted to convince 
them one by one of the merit of the plan to reform and of the future possibilities that would await the 
attorneys in a Parliament elected by universal suffrage. " (Prego, 2000,45). (Translated from original by 
author). 
330 The rational choice approach to institutions also reminds us that creating institutions Is not a cost-free 
activity. The creation of an institution requires the investment of time and talent, and may require the use 
of other more tangible resources if a design effort is to be successful. (Peters 1999,39). 331 One should also not forget the vast capacity of the Government to place the attorneys % ho supported 
them in the numerous Administrative posts available and in public companies. " (Soto 1998,41). 
I ranslated from original by author). 
"If I had not had senate seats to offer the lawyers, how would I have been able to advance the Political Reform? " (Adolfo Suarez quoted in Soto 1998,41). (Translated from original by author). 333 
"Very few details of the vote were left in the hands of fate. " (Ysart 1984,45). (Translated from 
original by author). 
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became impossible, they were simply removed from the game altogcthcr. 334 As has 
been mentioned above, action of this sort is condoned when viewed from the 
perspective of the overall transition and underpinned by a desire for democracy. It 
would appear, from the evidence, that the manner in which the members of Cones were 
manipulated was legal, if morally questionable, and is proof of the commitment to detail 
and dedication of purpose of the primary actors. The denial of the right to vote for 
certain hard-line members of the Cortes should be interpreted as a political maneuver 
rather than a betrayal of the democratic principles that the transition was attempting to 
instill. The result of the transition was far too delicately balanced to subject to anything 
less than perfect conditions 335 
Attention to detail was observed throughout the process of introducing the bill, 
right up to, and including the manner in which it was presented to the Cones. As has 
been mentioned above, Fernandez-Miranda could not claim outright ownership of the 
reform bill and so this was awarded to Suarez but when it came time to defend the 
reform bill during the debate in Cortes on the 16 November, the primary actors turned 
to a figure intimately connected to the Francoist regime, namely Miguel Primo de 
Rivera. While his arguments did not convince the more staunch hardliners, chief among 
them Bias Pinar336, his involvement and the subsequent implications of this, were to 
have a pronounced effect on the process. 337 Awareness of the situation in which the 
334 
"Half of the 34 attorneys were absent, evidently those whose vote was doubted, embarked on a 
boat 
voyage a week earlier to Panama and Cuba. " (Soto 1998,41), (Preston 2004), (Moran 1979). (Translated from original by author). 335 
"Fernandez-Miranda had made it clear that, should the resultant plan to reform not be to the liking of 
the government, they could withdraw the plan from Parliament in connection with the King and suspend 
the deferment thus far enjoyed by the organic chamber. " (Powell 2001,171). (Translated from original bb author). 
"Ile accused the plan of breaking with legality and using arguments of a moral nature, to remind the 
attorneys and the King of their decision regarding the Fundamental Principles of the Movement: that by 
their essence were immutable. " (Soto 1998,40), (1terndndez-Gil 1982), (Morrin 1979). (Translated from 
original by author). 337 
"Perhaps the most important aspect of the strategy was enlistment as speakers in favour of the reform law of prominent figures in the Cortes (such as Miguel Primo de Rivera, whose late brother had rounded 
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game had been constructed and a fundamental understanding of the opposition allowed 
for a strategy to be constructed in this manner. Decisions are not made in vacuums and 
the likely reaction to any action taken must be considered and plotted carefully in order 
to limit the chance of failure. 
The final step in the process was the vote itself before Codes. This vote would 
be the linchpin for true reform in Spain338, if the bill were to fail to pass, all the carcful 
groundwork and planning done by Juan Carlos, Fernandez-Miranda and Suarcz would 
have been for nought. The voting style was changed in order to create the appcarance 
of an open and democratic procedure. 339 The way in which the vote was conducted is a 
clever demonstration of the system being manipulated against itself; the clement of 
privacy was removed and with it, so was the ability to avoid the pressure of expectation. 
While this may have been the overt justification, the subtle undertone of this decision 
made it immediately obvious who had voted both in favour of, and against the reform 
bill. The relevance of this may not be immediately obvious but members of the Cones 
were no longer protected by the shroud of invincibility that had existed during Franco's 
regime. The assassination of Carrero Blanco340 and the shift in public opinion created 
an undercurrent of fear amongst the procuradores, and this undercurrent was exploited 
by Fernandez-Miranda. The `control-field' was constructed in such a manner as to 
dictate the actions of those involved in the playing of the game. The actors were left 
the Falange espanola, which later became the Movimiento nacional) who were regarded by many as s-cry influential and who had extensive clientelistic networks within that body. " (Gunther 1992,49). 378 
"The object of the Law, although not exclusively, was to create a new procedure for constitutional 
reform that would be immediately applicable. " (Ilernandez-Gil 1982,128). (Translated from original by 
author). 
339 
"Preventing them from voting upon the amendments, one by one and in order they complied perhaps, 
and I doubt it, with the rules but they performed a weak service for the country, in light of the necessary 
clarity for the law and for the government. " (Jose Maria Ruiz Gallard6n. Recordatorio, ABC 17/11/76). (Translated from original by author). Information on the assassination of Carrero Blanco and the repercussions for Spain can be found in (Preston 2004), (Preston 1986), (Morin 1979), (Vilallonga 1993), (Powell 2001). 
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with no room to manoeuvre and in essence, the end-game was in place before the game 
itself even began. 
Where the attempts at bribery or blackmail had failed, the anticipation and fcar 
of external repercussions had perhaps succeeded. While this is a difficult area to 
quantify, the likelihood of it having played a part is high. The vote was cnginccrcd in 
such a way as to force those voting to reassess their actions in the glare of public 
opinion. 341 The vote was passed on 18 November and returned the desired result for the 
primary actors. What is remarkable is less that the detailed preparation at the hands of 
Adolfo Suarez and Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda played its part, 342 but more that the 
members of the Cortes played theirs. This was evident to the extent that not only was a 
two-third majority reached, it was surpassed 343 Despite absence of a precedent the 
result was a resounding success. 344 There is even a degree to which the secondary 
actors involved failed to understand exactly how the events had transpired in the manner 
in which they had345. The successful manipulation of variables had allowed for internal 
reform to take place at the expense of the institution charged with the responsibility of 
341 
"Torcuato had demanded a nominal vote, alleging that in this manner, the people would know the 
actions of their representatives. " (Moran 1979,315), (Fernhndez-Miranda, P. 1995). "The object of the 
Law, although not exclusively, was to create a new procedure for constitutional reform that would be immediately applicable. " (Iiernandez-Gil1982,128). (Translated from original by author). 341 
"The fundamental pitfall had been evaded with a degree of success that surprised the authors. One 
magazine termed Suarez ` Suarez-Man'. " (Moran 1979,316). (Translated from original by author). 313 
"The manoeuvres of the Torcuato-Suarez duo to obtain a majority percentage bore fruit: 425 voted in favour, 59 against and there were 13 abstentions. The tasks of the duo were principally directed at breaking the syndicate block... Various negotiations proved successful and the law to Political Reform. 
obligatory trampoline in the political transition, was approved. Franco's Parliament had committed 
suicide by a decisive majority. " (Moran 1979,314). 34"The 
attorneys rose to their feet and impetuously applauded the demise of their position u hire Adolfo Suarez clapped his hands whilst looking at the front row of scats. " (Moran 1979,313). ""Ihe object of the 
Law, although not exclusively, was to create a new procedure for constitutional refortn that would be immediately applicable. " (IIernandez-Gil 1982,128). (Translated from original by author). 345 
"We assisted in an unusual spectacle: the most hard-line political sectors of Francoism were resigned 
to their sacrifice and the institutions of the regime permitted the emergence of the reformist sector, made 
up of the youngest and least involved members of the bureaucracy of the system. " (Soto1993,42). 
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ratifying the decision. The members of Cortes had been forced to act against their 
personal interest due to the overriding rules of the institutional framework 
. 
346 
The reform of the Cortes was a truly magnificent feat, one that comprised 
delicate political manoeuvring with external pressure. The sublime use of institutional 
constraints to endogenously shape reform left those within the institution with little 
choice but to react in the manner which institutionally constructed response allowed. 347 
The support of external factors was felt posthumously with the ratification of the reform 
via referendum held on the 15 December 1976.348 The re-ordering of preferences and 
the ability to formulate strategy based upon an awareness of the parameters of the game 
provided for a successful course of action. The coupling of a fundamental 
understanding of the issues, with a respect and consciousness of the institutional 
framework was sufficient to manipulate the existing order and superimpose from below 
a new democraticaly and open parliament upon an institution confined and secure in its 
own inherent power structure. 
346 
"And others believed without a doubt that the regime that they had served was best suited to pass into history facilitating a pacific solution than spearheading one final instance of numantine resistance. " (Powell 2001,171). 
3471n logic of appropriateness.. 
. 
behaviours (beliefs as well as actions) are intentional but not wilful. 't'hey 
involve fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation, and so of trying to determine the imperatives of holding a position. Action stems from a conception of necessity, rather than preference. Within a logic 
of appropriateness, a sane person is one who is 'in touch with identity' in the sense of maintaining 
consistency between behaviour and a conception of self in a social role. Ambiguity or conflict in rules is 
typically resolved not by shifting to a logic of consequentiality and rational calculation, but by trying to 
clarify the rules, make distinctions, determine what the situation is and what definition 'fits'. (March and Olsen 1989,160-1). 
348 
"The result of the referendum for the political reform surprised the government once again ... die favourable votes accounted for 94 per cent, as during the old days of Francoism, and the negative votes 
only 2.5 per cent. Abstentions and annulled votes made up a discreet 3 per cent. " (Moran 1979,316), (Fernandez-Miranda, P. 1995), (Maravall 1984). "The object of the Law, although not exclusively, was 
to create a new procedure for constitutional reform that would be immediately applicable. " (1 iernandcz- Gi11982,128). (Translated from original by author). 
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Chapter 6 
The attempted military coup: 
Democracy held hostage 
The final event chosen for examination in this thesis is a crucial one that di(Tcrs 
in many ways from those previously selected. 23 February (23-F) narked the 
culmination of the struggle for democratic reform and saw the Francoist establishment 
mounting an offensive to reclaim lost territory. Previous events had served to test the 
ingenuity and capabilities of the primary actors, but 23-F would also test their resolve. 
To claim that 23-F was a unique event in the Spanish transition, and one that occurred 
spontaneously is naive and dramatically underestimates the underlying opposition to 
democracy and democratic reform that existed in Spain at this time. 23-F has been 
chosen for analysis due to the latent violence it demonstrated and the subsequent 
struggle for power this came to represent. The aftermath of 23-F will not be dealt with 
in this chapter, that is not to say that the manner in which the perpetrators were dealt 
with has no bearing on the democratic nature of the transition, simply that the motives 
and machinations that contributed to the event itself, and the manner in which they in 
turn were confronted and dealt with by the King is better suited for the overall analysis 
of this thesis. Previous events highlighted for examination have been from the 
perspective of the primary actors, namely Juan Carlos, Torcuato Fcrnindez-Miranda 
and Adolfo Suarez, but this event requires a different approach to be employed. While 
the primary actors were still very much involved, the focus of analysis must shill to 
encompass those actors intrinsically linked with the attack on parliament itself: Iivrat if 
they cannot all be named, it is possible to hypothesise Potential outcomes bawd upon 
their factual cxistence. 349 
The nomination of Juan Carlos, the appointment of AMA) Suiw. and tile 
reform of the Cortes had all been the result of structured, offensive action on the part of 
349, Rational choice involves two guesses, a guess about uncertain future con uencet and a gueeýr ebo ut 
uncertain future preferences. " (March 1986,142). 
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the primary actors. 350 Strategies had been constructed based upon rational analysis of 
the existing parameters and action had been taken to initiate change accordingly. In the 
case of 23-F the primary actors were reacting to circumstances and events as they arose 
rather than constructing strategy before the fact. This aspect of the event naturally 
affects the manner in which it is possible to construct an analysis field, but it does not 
prevent the determination of parameters to aid understanding, as has been done ror the 
previous three events. 351 There is much regarding the event of 23-F that is still 
unknown and yet it is possible, through analysis of the scenario, to better understand the 
motivations and actions taken by the primary actors in response to the threat. )$' 
The transitional process thus far had been far from smooth)", thcrc had boat 
points of doubt and uncertainty where the future seemed far from assured and )ct, 
throughout, the impetus resided firmly with the primary actors. Whilc the cxistcncc of a 
minutely constructed plan is perhaps somewhat far fetched, the sublime manipulation of 
events displayed by the elite actors is sufficient to indicate a measured 1c%, cl of authority 
and control. Natural energy levels within transitions alter depending upon the exact 
point in the process and are responsive to the general mood of the population. 23"F 
came at such a time when the exuberant levels of energy associated with the initial 
350 
'he key variable within political science would be 'power'. The capacity for one person or grtwp 10 
control the actions and choices of others 
- 
or, better yet, to secure its desired outcomes without regard to 
anyone else's actions or choices 
- 
is what politics is all about. " (Goodin 1996,13-6). 331 
"The apparent contradiction in rational choice institutionalism is resolved in practice. If for no other 
reason than that individuals realize that institutional rules also constrain their competitors In wh. ateºTr 
r'_me of maximization those competitors may believe themselves to be involved in. " (I'etcts 1999.45). 
"But how do we know what an actor's goals are? In general We deduce actors' "It (reset olkcrt-ing 
their prior behaviour.. 
. 
we then assume that actors will continue to pursue the coals we have deduced they 
pursued in the past. We fix actors' preferences and allow the information they have and the s tuaiion they face to change, creating variation in their actions. " (Morrow 1994,17). rst 
"By the autumn of 1980, an anxious Juan Carlos saw Su3rcz isolated from his cabinet. his party and 
the press. The working agreement with the PSOE had collapsed. Felipe (Jonzälcz declared that the Trine Minister no longer had a meaningful contribution to make. Unemployment had rircn to one and a half 
million. The government's policy on regional autonomies was bogged down. Ill feeling In Andalusia 
remained intense after the referendum fiasco. The slowness of täte transfer of powers to the ne i ly elected Basque and Catalan regional governments was both an embarrassment and a provocation. ' (Teeirin 2004,444). 
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period of the transition had begun to wane. 354 The replacement of Arias Navarro with 
Adolfo Suarez and the reform of the Cortes had been achieved with little response from 
the Bunker despite both actions constituting a direct attack upon Francoist ideology. 
Perhaps therefore, it was simply a matter of time before those under attack, retaliated in 
an attempt to wrest control from the reformists and place it back in the hands of 
Franco's most ardent supporters. 355 
A basic analysis of the events at the time of 23-F allows for the construction of a 
control field. It is possible to demonstrate that the secondary actors in previously 
analysed events were becoming the leading actors in this situation. While it is indeed 
true that the reformists had experienced a surge in both popularity and power, the 
continued existence of both the military and Francoist sympathisers within and without 
the Armed Forces was a persistent threat to the fragile stability of democracy at this 
juncture. The country was newly democratised, lacked a comprchcnsivc democratic 
political sphere, faced threats from regions demanding autonomy and was under siege 
by the ever-increasing spread of domestic terrorism. "' Thcrc was no single 
contributing factor357 that led to the coup taking place in 1981, rather a collection of 
events and circumstances that came to a head on 23-F. Much is still unknown of the 
334 
"After the logical expenditure of popular energy in favour of the re-establishment of dcnuxtacy (1976-1977), came the absurd squandering of those same energies (1978.1981), bnwgbt alwut by 
assassinations, by the military who were heading for old times, and also by politicians alThcicd 
by divrrse 
types of immature practical-ideology, by the process of learning, by frivolity ask! by ecutfuh wt, " (Nilar 
1986,88). (Translated from original by author). rss 
"A regime change is precisely a change of the rules of the game and. logically, the gain file changing 
rules cannot entirely be shaped by the incentives structured by the rules being clhanged. Some interactions among actors in a process of political change are therefore less eonatrained than 11106e of 
actors in a stable political situation, whether this be a dictatorship or a coniktitutio sal. ctmiºlidaied democracy. " (Colomer 1995,6). 
76 For a more comprehensive list of problems facing Spain at this time we PreMon (2004,444). 357 
"There was no single cause; there was in fact a confluence of causes, an intricate web of cauncs, 
although there was the tendency to group them under the common denominator of %iolcnce. " (Nilar 1986,89). (Translated from original by author). 
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circumstances under which the attempted coup took place and it is not the aim of this 
chapter to provide the answers to these questions, rather, to more accurately locate the 
events within a framework of analysis that will aid our understanding of the transition 
itself. 
The relative strength of democratic reform had been rcduccd by certain events in 
the build up to the attempted coup. The resignation of Adolfo Suircz and the 
subsequent failure of the nomination of Leopoldo Calvo Sotclo's to be ratified on the 
first attempt highlighted the cracks in the facade that had thus far protected reformist 
action. This in essence supports the claim of the importance of individual actors in the 
transition process. Adolfo Sudrez had become intimately connected with democratic 
reform, he had been at the forefront of actions taken to implement change and his 
inability to successfully manage and hold together the UCD part? " and construct a 
balanced and functioning government, was viewed as a tangible failure of the reform 
process. The very man chosen for the position by the King and ratified by the people of 
Spain had failed in his task. Suarez had played his role and played it well but his 
influence was waning, and with it, so was his relevance. No longer simply a personal 
matter, it became apparent that there were many who wanted Su3rrcz removal from 
of ice359 and a restructuring of the government to take place. 
The reluctance of the system to accept Sußrcz and his inability to maintain the 
authority he had gained at the start of the transitional process led to the inevitable 
downfall of the man, and in turn, the general weakening of the political position of the 
isil 
'ne UCD was truly the party of the transition. Once the Constitution of 1978 had come intkk 
faro 
and the first Cones had been elected in 1979, the centripetal force that had kept the pieces or the UC I) 
to ether had dissolved. " (Ramon Arango 1985,167). 33 
"Surez remained public enemy number one, as much in the eyes of the parties of r{+poiiihrn at f'w his own party members. The press reflected these points of view. In addition. the campaigns oq aninnl by the journalists against the President of the Government were certainly a determining factor-in the 
tarnishing of the image and loss of credibility that affected the principal politician of the trancitson" (Vilar 1986,90). (Translated from original by author). 
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government. It was exactly this weakening that Juan Carlos and the proponents of 
democratic reform could not allow. A delicate balance existed between the continuance 
of democracy and overt military involvement in political affairs. It became imperative 
for the establishment to construct a strategy that would enable them to maintain control. 
The confines of a control field dictate that all angles must be considered and 
manipulated in order to prevent undue pressure and influence from outside factors. The 
necessity to defend the newly-constructed, and by definition, delicate power base was 
paramount. The primary actors were constrained by the realisation that should the 
government be without a strong leader, or be seen as outwardly weak and stagnant, as 
had been the case under Arias Navarro, the possibility for its removal by force would 
exist. Previous chapters have highlighted the success that the reformist faction enjoyed 
in removing both a prime minister and a government from office when they lacken the 
ability to adequately defend themselves. A rational analysis of the events would have 
provided the impetus to prevent this initiative from being turned against the democratic 
faction and thus benefiting the Bunker. 
23-F is a useful event to analyse as it provides us with evidence that the 
reformists were capable of constructing a pre-emptive defensive strategy as well as an 
offensive one. The existence of the military was a very real problem which dentandcd 
attention. Despite the fact that the democratic process had experienced little in the way 
of actual opposition from the Armed Forces, the political climate of the time made this 
an increasingly viable reality. There exists evidence to suggest that the notion of a 
military conspiracy was a reality from 1980360 and that the establishment were fully 
360 
`The military discontent had reached dangerous levels where anything was possibl&' (C lvti Sütelo 1990,21), (Translated from original by author). 
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aware of this threat. 361 If this is indeed true then it is logical to assume that tage 
necessary steps were being taken to avoid such an eventuality. The possibility that the 
primary actors had foreknowledge of a potential coup is an entirely feasible possibility. 
Given the nature of agenda setting and manipulation of variables that had constituted 
the underpinnings of the reformist strategy, it is logical to assume that the potential 
repercussions attached to actions analysed in previous chapters would also have been 
taken into account. What marks 23-F as different, compared to previous wafts 
examined, is the reality that the primary actors were not in control in the lead up to the 
event itself and were forced to regain control through action taken during the process. 
Previous events had been constructed in such a way as to allow the outcome to be 
predicted with a certain degree of accuracy, this would not be the case here. 23-F 
constitutes a very real need to defend the democratic regime and to further strengthen 
the power base in so doing. 
The necessity to replace Adolfo Suarcz cannot be wholly attributcd to a desire to 
prevent the involvement of the military in political affairs but instead must also be 
viewed as a reality of political life. Institutional rules provides for the ncsity that a 
government possess a leader and provisions exist to ensure an ineffectual leader can be 
replaced. This in itself need not be interpreted solely as a response to an external threat, 
but rather as a logical progression of political development. 71'c true drnbcr inhci nt in 
23-F, existed in allowing the opponents of democracy to establish a tbothold in the 
process. Complete control had to be maintained, or at the Vcry least, the illusion of 
control. Given the apparent shortcomings of Suarez, his removal became more and 
more of a necessity for the political survival of the regime. His response to the 
761 in November 1980, the information services of the state created a document entitled 'Pa oramic of 
operations underway', that consisted of a superficial description of the Vast quantity of existing inipatives 
to bring about the fall of Adolfo Suarez as President of the Government. 11u e of tbcwcorn. riracies -Arge 
military and a fourth was mixed in nature, part political, and part military. " (Prclo. 1. & lta, bctia. l. l. 
1991,101). (Translated from original by author). 
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changing political climate and his inability to maintain the respect of those in the 
political arena coupled with his general inability to govern effectively led to a feeling of 
desgobierno, a complete lack of guidance and governance. This turn of events Vcry 
much mirrored the position of Arias Navarro prior to his resignation and indicates a 
continuity of sorts. The removal of Adolfo Suarez became both a political necessity and 
a survival tactic aimed at ensuring the continuation of the democratic rcbime. 
The relevance of the involvement of individuals is highlighted by the increased 
interaction between Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez during this period. Speculation 
exists as to the exact nature of their discussions but a rational analysis of events dictates 
that the prospect of a military coup and the available alternatives to counter this, must 
have featured on the agenda. Chief among these alternatives would have been the 
possible formation of a coalition government. 362 From the standpoint of a rational 
response to the potential threat of military involvement, this idea was not without merit 
and indeed, as subsequent events would show, would constitute the stalwart of the 
strategy in opposition to the existing government. Pre-empfing violence with a 
moderated version would have created a potential solution, albeit not an ideal one. 
What is clear from subsequent events is that the issue of Su: Ircz's own position 
within the government must also have been discussed. One can hypothesisc ui to the 
exact nature of the debates surrounding this issue but given Su3rcz's reduction in fix. wer 
and influence, his removal was something of a foregone conclusion. Later everts, 
including statements made by Suarez himself, lead us to believe that his resignation was 
voluntary. If this is indeed true then it demonstrates the intrinsic imp<nttancc of 
individuals within a transition process, crucial to which is the nature of these individuals 
"6_ 
"With democracy trapped in the inexorable pincer movement political nears urrr Mretchcd to breaking point. The idea of a strong all-party coalition to replace Surfrex had been in the sir iiinc¬ the 
summer of 1980. " (Preston 2004,447). 
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and their commitment to a common goal; if the resignation is forced then it provides 
evidence of the relevance of institutional continuation. The integrity of the Office of 
prime minister was in need of protection, not the person of Adolfo Sui cz. In either 
respect, the resignation of Suarez was necessary for the survival of the transition 
process. The official announcement of the resignation was to come in a television 
broadcast on 29 January and it marked the start of the next stage of the transition. News 
of Suärez's resignation was interpreted in varying manners; the army believed the King 
had forced the issue and took the decision as a positive factor for their future prnjcets, 343 
while those outside the military viewed his resignation as a response to the threat of 
military action and saw it as a necessary action to stall direct action by the army. In 
either respect, it highlights the importance that external factors play on the decision 
making of individuals. Interpretation of events, although naturally subjective, is crucial 
for our understanding of subsequent actions taken. The position and, to a certain extent 
nature, of the individuals involved must be taken into account as this will enable us to 
order a set of preferences based upon a rational analysis of predicted responses. 
To attribute the resignation of Sudrez solely as a direct response to the threat of 
military action is to miss the greater picture. Fundamental weaknesses had appeared in 
the UCD party and with Sudrez's leadership and the continuation of the democratic 
regime took precedence over the desires of a single individual. Here we arc able to sec 
the importance of institutional structure in perpetuating the system. The ollicc of prime 
minister and the stability of the government were more important to the transition 
process than was the person of Adolfo Suärcz, despite his role thus far and his relevant 
importance to the transition as a whole. 
3"3 For further information: (El Pals, 30 January 1981), (El 41ciL-ar, 30 January 1981). (Dt'a, *, 16,30 
January 1981), (Onto 1981,113,119,152), (Melia 1981,74-5), (Calvo Sotelo 1990,24-32), (Preto 2000, 
105-10), (Navarro 1995,366-9). 
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The failure of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to be ratified as the new prime minister 
was seen as an obvious weakness and failure of the democratic system by the 
opposition. A rational analysis of the situation would have led to the creation of a 
strategy to undermine the existing system and replace it with one more conducive to the 
ideology of the Bunker. This in itself was a tried and tested mechanism in the Spanish 
transition, having been successfully employed by the primary actors in previous events. 
Given the relative instability at the time and the lack of a comprehensively grounded 
democratic system, there was indeed scope for revisions to be introduced. The 
resignation of Suarez was the last pro-active decision by the primary actors as 
successive actions taken were reactive in nature and in response to the strategy 
employed by the opposition. 
The military constructed their strategy based upon a prcfcrcncc ordering related 
to their position and status"' and an analysis of the existing structure but failed to 
accurately predict the outcome due to the inability to control all the variables. The 
strategy employed was not without merit however, it was a two-pronged offensive 
incorporating both political negotiation365 and a demonstration of military force. It is 
possible that the patterns of behaviour, learned under three decades of rrancoist rule, 
affected the manner in which the military constructed their strategy. The arrogance of 
364 
"The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human action as driven by ruler of arprcriate 
or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are wett as natural, 
rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an Identity. a 
membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectatimu of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a 
ecifc type of situation. " (March and Olsen 2005,1). s 
"Armada also had meetings with Leopoldo Calvo Sotclo, Rodolfo Martin Villa, lordi I'ujol, i. u. p Tarradellas, NO Cabanillas and others. Ile enjoyed particularly cordial relations with Tammdcllaa, v+IKI described himself as a friend of the general. On 23 December, Manuel Fraga Wrote in his diary. I have 
received solid information that General Armada has said that he would be prepared to head a enahtron 
government'" (Preston 2004,447), (Fraga 1987,226), (Pardo Zancada 1998.105-6), (Rend 1992.. 450 
3). 
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assumed authority366 prevented a fundamental understanding of existing parameters 
from taking place. 367 This reality is of vast importance for the transition as a process in 
Spain. The institutional constraints that existed, whether recognized by the actors at the 
time or not, were sufficient to dictate the outcome of events. The choices made by those 
involved in the attempted coup provide us with great insight into the nature of 
transitions. Given the decisions taken and the courses of action followed, it is plausible 
to claim an underlying coherency of design to the strategy; this is only apparent 
however, when not viewed in light of alternative actors. If we base our analysis ofthe 
coup solely as a reflection of the preferences of those involved then there is little with 
which to find fault. The climate for action was ripe, the situation called for a solution 
and they were in possession of the necessary tools to initiate change; the resultant 
failure becomes apparent when we introduce additional actors, namely those against 
whom the conspirators were acting. The inability to predict or even to consider the 
potential outcomes and actions of the reformists prevented a comprehensive strategy 
from being constructed. 
When taken from the perspective of the opposition, the choice to attack the 
system, in an attempt to return Spain to a Francoist understanding of rule, was a viable 
strategy. The increase in domestic violence368 and more importantly, the inability of the 
government to adequately deal with this369 generated public support in favour of 
change. Coupled with a natural desire on the part of the opposition to control 
3" b 
"The defence of the realm involves a set of activities that contribute to the satisfaction of 
d v, - goal - 
attainment functional requisite... The achievement of societal goals also involves the prcicr ation of 
certain relationships. " (Holt 1967,93). 367 
"Path dependency suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of cumctlt 
possibilities and or options in institutional innovation. " (I lausner 1995,6). 
"ETA-M began a campaign of grenade attacks on Civil Guard posts and aºtemptcd to murder the c 
Iitor 
of the Diario de Navarra. " (Preston 2004,444), El Pais, 22 June; Cwnbio 16,13,20 July, 24 Augu i t4 7 
September 1980, (Rinc6n 1985,63). 30 
"In the Basque Country, the government's delegate, Jose Saenz da Santanuaria, complained that 
by 
dragging its feet, the government was generating support for ETA. " (Preston 2004,444). 
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proceedings and remove the dissident elements from Spanish politics, the prescncc of 
domestic violence was as a call to arms. The underlying reason behind the failure of the 
opposition in its attempted coup lay with the inability to foresee the repercussions of an 
overtly military response. Given the subsequent actions by the military and the 
conspirators, it appears that a favourable response was expected with the culmination of 
the attempted coup resulting in the clamouring of public support. There is very much 
the sense that the entire enterprise was not plotted to the point of endgame. The 
concept was far from redundant, especially when in light of the events at the time and 
the potential for active involvement on the part of the military and yet the manner in 
which it was executed leaves doubts as to the coherency of the design structure. 
The collective memory of Spain370 and the fear of ovcrt military involvement in 
the political sphere, coupled with the newly found liberty of the Spanish people in the 
aftermath of Franco's death constituted a very powerful parameter to the game that was 
not taken into account by the conspirators. While their strategy made sense from a 
certain perspective, it was far from developed and was therefore fundamentally flawed 
in its construction. The steps taken by the conspirators were in line with a rational 
analysis of what was required but inattention to detail created a strategy lacking in the 
necessary tools to deal with any arising factors that would contravene the goal as laid 
out by their game. 371 
370 
"Memories of previous, costly conflicts thus seems to have been important 
in convincing deci'ion 
making elites that the creation of a stable democracy was vastly more important that revenge or the 
narrow pursuit of partisan interests. " (Gunther 1992,77). 371 
"A proper understanding of successful efforts to achieve elite consensus cannot 
ignore the basic 
values, historical memories, and behavioural styles of individual members of the political elite. 
Even 
though we must take care to avoid tautological arguments regarding these kind of variables, We can ray 
in 
general that negotiations involving pragmatic leaders, whose historical memories lead them to Poweive 
potential threats to stability and who place great value on achieving stable democracy, are more 
likely to 
lead to an elite settlement that will negotiations among dogmatic individuals. Mho are unaware of te fragility of the system or who have no over-riding desire to establish a stable democracy. " (Gunther 1992,76). 
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A potential scenario for the restoration of a Francoist govcrnmcnt indicates that 
Paramount, would be the garnering of support for any action taken, both at the public 
level, and more importantly, at the highest levels of political existence. The resignation 
of Adolfo Suarez, and his obvious weakness in the preceding period created the 
optimum time for action. The foundations of the government were shaken and for a 
brief period, it was without a substantial leader, and therefore, without any real 
semblance of direction or guidance. The time was rife for a potential hostile 
takeover. 372 The manner in which the strategy manifested itself was initially very subtle 
in nature. Delicate pressure was placed upon Juan Carlos to consider a coalition 
government headed by a member of the military. General Armada enjoyed a personal 
relationship with the King and it was this that enabled rumours to become potent 
weapons in the hands of the conspirators. The suggestion of a coalition govcn mcnt 
was not a revolutionary one in nature and indeed constituted a viable option for Spain at 
this point. 
To guarantee success to any degree, manipulation of the agenda setting was 
paramount for the conspirators. The government was weak and without a strong 
figurehead, public opinion was being swayed by increased domestic violence'73 and the 
foundation of reform appeared shaken. Despite all these factors, which were not 
insubstantial, the necessity to construct the actual place and time of action remained 
crucial. General Armada was ideally placed to develop relationships and set the scene 
for any eventual action that could subsequently occur. A rational analysis would dictate 
372 
"In the summer, Armada gave the King a report, drawn up by an unnamed constitutional law)ý', 
examining legal ways of resolving the situation with a coalition possibly headed by a soldier. The hint 
was unmistakable. " (Preston 2004,447). 373 
"The year to the end of October 1980 had seen 114 deaths as a result of terrorism. an mrrage of one 
victim every three days, including 57 civilians and 27 Civil Guards, 11 Army Ollicers and nine 
policemen. " (Preston 2004,449), (Benegas 1984,110-1), (MuAoz Alonso 1982.229.31), Cambia 16,10, 
17,24 November; El Pais, 11 November 1980. 
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that the support of additional Generals374 and internal political figures would constitutc 
the most prudent course of action. Given the nature of a two-pronged attack and based 
upon an understanding of the manner in which reform had been executed thus far, 
internal plus external support was needed. It is unclear to what extent the conspirators 
would have examined the manner in which the reform of the Cones was achieved but 
the nature of the task before them dictated that a balanced support system would need to 
be in place. Herein exists a crucial failing on the part of the conspirators. While the 
primary actors had ensured in past events that they were well placed to call upon 
support from within an institution, 23-F was a demonstration of the inability to consider 
all the potential outcomes and to map out the entire game scenario. An integral part of 
the plan to overthrow the government lay with the tacit support of the King. This was 
never given and yet was wrongly assumed to have been and exploited as such. Perhaps 
the reason for failure lay with the expectance of success and this clouded the necessity 
to consider alternative outcomes as possibilities and to plan accordingly. Previous 
events of the transition had had a far less conclusive outcome and yet had triumphed. 
The inability on the part of the conspirators to communicate created great 
difficulties and ultimately prevented a more successful outcome from being reached. It 
is true however, that Armada met with Captain-General Milans dcl Bosch on several 
Occasions375 and elicited support through insinuation and rumour as opposed to concrete 
374 Captain-General Milans del Bosch, Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero, Licutcnant-Colonel Pedro M. ss Oli%, ef, 
General Carlos Iniesta Cano, General Manuel Cabeza Calahorra and General Luis Torres Rojas Ware 
among the more prominent members. als 
"On 17 November, Armada visited the Captain-General of the Valencia Military Region. 
Jaime t"lilans 
del Bosch. Fervent monarchists, they had been friends since both serving on the Russian 
finnt with the 
Divisidn Azul. In the course of the discussion, Armada managed to insinuate that 
he was acting on the 
King's behalf. According to Milans, Armada told him that: 'The King is worried about the situation in Spain. Things are going badly. Terrorism is shedding the blood of the Armen! 
Forces and the 
autonomous regions are destroying our national unity'.... When he asked what could 
be done. Armada 
allegedly replied, 'Plenty, General, we can do plenty. I have been with I lis Majesty the last few times he has been in Baqueira Beret. Violent actions are feared and we must point them in another directidtt. Ilk Majesty has discreetly confided his worries to me. "' (Preston 2004,431), (Santiago & Merino 1983,33- 6), (Pardo Zancada 1998,174-5). 
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evidence and factual grounding. This was sufficient to create impetus for action, but 
proved detrimental in the extreme for a desired outcome. Armada perpetuated the 
image that he had the car of the King by cultivating a personal relationship with Juan 
Carlos and visiting him on several occasions, including on 18 December to discuss the 
forthcoming Christmas broadcast and on 3 January at Baqucira Beret to visit the royal 
family during their Christmas holidays. Armada's actions can be viewed as a subtle 
manipulation of actors within the game, one that remained successful as long as there 
was no communication between men such as Milans del Bosch and Juan Carlos. In an 
attempt to orchestrate a control-field, Armada relied on his ability to persuade and 
dictate the terms of the situation. Subsequent meetings between Armada and Milans del 
Bosch were designed to further cement the belief that the King had lent his support and 
that all was proceeding according to plan. 376 Given the nature of the final outcome, a 
rational analysis dictates that Armada was forcing the situation in order to limit the 
potential actions available to Juan Carlos. From a game theoretic approach, this was an 
intelligent manoeuvre and one that had been employed in previous events in the 
transition. If the control-field has been set to the extent whereby alternative courses of 
action are beyond comprehension and consideration, then the desired end-gante will be 
achieved. 
Armada's strategy did not rely simply upon his supposed influence on Juan 
Carlos, but instead demonstrated his ability to address various angles in Succession. 
Su3rez's resignation caused a temporary vacuum in the political arena and one that, 
s76 
"On 10 January 1981, Armada again visited General Milans del Bosch. NN ass dtcir w nd mcd ng in 
two months... Armada was able to announce that he came with a message from the King,. llo*"Vf 
it 
would appear that he went far beyond anything that the King had said. -Armada told Milans that he was 
about to take up a senior position in Madrid at the General Staff from which point he womid Java the 
process, insinuating that the King approved. Thus, aware of Milans's inclination towards a %iolent coup. 
Armada was sounding him out, even subtly encouraging him to make the coup a hich he would c 'entually be in a position 'to redirect' to his own benefit. " (Preston 2004,453-1), (Segura & Merino 1913. $7.9, 
77-8), (Urbano 1982,58-61), (Pardo Zancada 1998,175), (Reinlcin 2002,272.3). 
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increasingly as time passed, appeared would be filled with a coalition government. This 
represented not just the ideal solution for Armada but also a very real altennative for 
Juan Carlos and the democratic establishment. The demise of Su3rcz had greatly 
weakened both the power base and the integrity of the government and steps were 
needed to assure its authority was preserved. Various methods were used by Armada to 
generate support for his objective, including the solicitation of factions of the modia. 
An article, written by Emilio Romero, appeared in the Conservative piper, WIC 
forwarding the idea of a coalition government, headed by General Armada, as opposed 
to another politician. 377 There existed an established connection between Armada and 
Romero and the article must be viewed with this in mind. Much in the same way as 
Suarez had used the media to manipulate public opinion, in the period leading to the 
introduction of the reform bill, Armada was doing likewise. Armada's strategy aimed at 
gaining the support of Juan Carlos incorporated a mixture of personal negotiation and 
external populist pressure, 378 to this he would now add strength, The tactics 
demonstrated by Armada are very similar in nature to those of the primary actors, 
analysed in previous chapters. The strategy demonstrates evidence of fore planning and 
realisation of the importance of manipulation of variables and setting of the control- 
field. 
r'r Story told in greater detail in (Preston 2004,458), ('Las tertu/fas de Aladrh! ', ABC, 31 January 1981). 371 
"In addition to the article published by ABC, ElA1cci: ar, an extreme right-wing publicaation. l+ubinhcJ 
three such articles from mid-December 1980 to February 1981 that represented all but open appeal* (r a 
military coup. The first article referred to a 'divorce between the government and the ranks or the 
military' and of 'the urgent need for a corrective solution to permit the regeneration of the spani"h 
situation. ' ('Analisis politico del momento militar', EIA/ed: ar, 17 December I980). Vic aioJ cedar d 
that 'the democratic experiment has failed' and 'the constitution as it stands does not woti' and tugser''ed 
that the incapacity of the government meant it was time to turn to other institutions, namely dw King and 
the Armed Forces, in order for progress to be made. ('La hora de las otras inxtituciones', Li Ak 1 ar, 22 January 1981). The third article was the most outspoken of all, published the day after Komcn 'r article. 
and stated that 'we are at the critical point, the countdown has begun. Political inriq%losibslsty hat 
culminated in a sad process in which the crown is inescapably obliged to interncne... the etuwn fitxla itself with the historical opportunity to initiate a substantial change of direction, the oil-mentioned tc+uth 
on the rudder would permit the formation of a government of national mCcneration, rti)o)1n9 all d )C 
authority needed in the exceptional circumstances in which we live. '" ('L, a decir Sn del Man. k) Supremo', El Alcäzar, 1 February 1981). 
173 
Herein lies another difference to the events analysed in previous clapters; the 
publishing of `suggestions' placed a certain element of the parameters of the game into 
the public arena and provided not only the reformists, but also those unconnected with 
the process itself namely the Spanish people, with an insight into that which could 
occur. If this was done to engender support for the initiative then it was a bold and ill- 
considered move, the reality of making public such suggestions as those released by 
ABC, enabled a counter-strategy to be established based upon a logical outcome 
prediction. The parameters were, in many ways, ideally suited for a coup and yet the 
attempt failed. The arrogance of the men involved, born of traditional understanding of 
their role in Spanish life379, coupled with the mistake of underestimating the resolve of 
Juan Carlos resulted in disaster for the conspirators. 380 
The actual details of the attempted coup are of less relevance for this chapter 
than the material discussed above. The plan was to storm the Cozies and seize control 
of the political structure and wait for the appropriate authority to arrive and take charge. 
This initiative would be supported by the activation of the military factions in Spain and 
the implementation of Marshall Law until such time as full control was obtained. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero381 was responsible for the storming of the Comes and even as 
this took place, Armada was still negotiating with Juan Carlos for political legitimacy. 
Armada, denied the opportunity to be present at La Zarzucla by Juan Carlos, lobbied for 
the opportunity to go to Cortes to negotiate with Tcjcro. The failure of the military 
379 
"To explain why military regimes are more susceptible to internal disintegration, I Gvw here on 
rivalries and relationships within the ruling entity of an authoritarian government: the officer anus. ºinyte 
tarty, clique surrounding the ruler, or some amalgam of two or more of these tlure. " (GcdJer 199'). 122). 
"0 "Where empirical observation to some extent contradicts Armada's apparent appraisal of the rituation is regarding the order of preference of King Juan Carlos. The King's former tutor sees in him a sintrte 
wish for constitutionalism, from which one might deduce that his first preference is that neither he nor his 
captain-generals stage a coup at all. However, Armada imagines that Juan Carlos wwIuld prefer to agree 
with his generals than risk confrontation with them, even to the extent of unwillingly supporting it coup 
which was not of his own making. Such an order of preference on the part of the ling is conceisabte if 
one considers the fear he might understandably be experiencing of having the throne anºtc 1 from hint by the military. " (Colomer 1995,111). 311 Refer to footnote 125 for additional information on this. 
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opposition lay in the lack of cohesion amongst its members. It became evident as 
events of 23-F developed, that Armada's strategy had been constructed without the 
direct approval of Juan Carlos382 and that his agenda did not necessarily correspond to 
that of the initial concept behind the coup. Lack of integrity and adherence to a 
coherent structure prevented any real success. 
The inability, on the part of the conspirators to cooperate and communicate 
prevented their strategy from fully reaching its potential. Arguably, 23-F could well 
have succeeded had those involved mounted a unified front, one based upon mutual 
understanding and common objectives. A rational analysis would grant the upper hand 
to the conspirators and yet the democratic system achieved a comprehensive victory in 
the fact of overwhelming odds. There are many factors that when examined from a 
rational perspective, would lead one to posit a positive outcome for the conspirators. 
They were in possession of some powerful weapons, high-ranking military officials, the 
ability to allude to the friendship and support of Juan Carlos in certain areas, the 
increasing deterioration of the political system, the increasing levels of violence, public 
desire for change and the historical tradition of military rule in the country. How then 
did they fail? Armada's design was not for a military take over so much as he was 
concerned with assuming power himself. The diagrams below outline the fundamental 
error made by Armada in regards to preference ordering and demonstrate the necessity 
to fully calculate the potential outcomes from all perspectives. 
Armada constructed his strategy based upon a misinf n ncd calculation or the 
preferences of Juan Carlos. As has been mentioned above, the nccc sity tu address 311 
elements of the equation, and not simply those over which One has full control, is 
1 82 
"Juan Carlos had been informed of the probable involvement of General Armada in n conkf uaty. reu 
when the latter now asked permission to visit him in the Zarzucla Palace. he was rctuxej po'nt-blanL Later it transpired that Armada's failure to gain admittance to the palace had been a decisi c 613 "'r in clue 
collapse of the coup. " (Gibson 1992,61). 
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critical. The institutional nature of those involved in the Bunker, prevented full analysis 
from taking place and ultimately cost success. In previous chapters, it has been clearly 
demonstrated that the reformists took into account the preferences and potential actions 
of the establishment and constructed a strategy that would guarantee results when, 
applied to the formal ordering of institutional boundaries that constrained their 
opponents. Such analysis was not present here as the true resolve of Juan Carlos was 
either not believed, or not given true credibility. Those involved in the attempted coup 
failed to take into account the change in the young monarch and viewed him as they had 
at the time of his nomination, an inexperienced and easily manipulated puppet. The 
reality would prove their downfall and highlight the importance of individual actors in 
transitional processes. 
Fig. 6.1 demonstrates the game played from Armada's perspective and Clearly 
demonstrates the relevance that must be attached to the identity of the person 
constructing the game. Decisions are made based upon a rational interpretation of 
events but the issue of `rational' is naturally subjective to the individual's interpretation 
of events and outcomes and is determined, in turn, by their understanding of their own 
position and that of others in the game. There is no single definition of 'rational' if we 
are able to conclude that the actions of individuals, is simply that, individual, and While 
there will exist similarities and patterns of common action, the nature of the particular 
actor involved, dictates the constructs and parameters of the game. Taken (mm this 
perspective, the misinformed game, as perpetrated by Armada, is only misinformed 
from our perspective and must be regarded as a rational, if ill-advised, strategy on his 
part. 
Fig 6.2 demonstrates the game according to Juan Carlos, and in reality, 
according to what hindsight would determine as a rational perspective. In this game we 
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are able to see the de facto power distribution and given our understanding of Juan 
Carlos' position, it is possible to accurately plot the outcome of a same that was 
doomed to fail from the outset, as a result of the inability of Armada to consider the 






For the purpose of this game, we assume that Armada is in control and that he acts 
accordingly. He believes himself able to overrule both the Captain-Gcncrals and Juan Carlos. The game is being played under misinformed conditions as not all players arc fully aware of the parameters of the game and are not privy to all the available information. 
Armada is in possession of a dominant strategy, namely that of pursuing the coup as this 
will give him access to the power structure. We assume for this game that Armada believes Juan Carlos to be weak and that he will therefore adhere to the parameters of 
the game, as constructed and produce the desired end game. 
Si represents the successful attempt of the coup S2 represents the failed attempt of the coup 
The numbers shown in the left-hand side of the boxes corresponds to Armada and the 








-1,0 -1,0 2 
We can see from the game above that Armada wins when he chooses to pursue u coup. 
as shown in the first row but he loses when the ultimate decision is to avoid a enup. Juan Carlos cannot be considered a winner under any circumstances of the game as the best that he can hope for is to neither gain nor lose from an outcome and he remains 
either equal to, or below Armada in all four occasions. 
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IG 6.2" 
JUAN CARLOS' GAME 
In this game we see Juan Carlos occupying a position of relative strength in that he is 
able to dictate the outcome and is confidant in his ability to produce the desired end 
game. He is in a position to force the decision one way or the other and therefore 
represents the dominant player. 
Si represents the decision to attempt a coup S2 represents the decision to avoid a coup 
The numbers shown in the left-hand side of the boxes correspond to the Army and thosc in the right-hand side of the boxes correspond to Juan Carlos. 
JUAN 
CARLOS 







As we can see from the game above, Juan Carlos possess a dominant strategy if lie opts 
against a coup, as demonstrated in the first row and the second column. Irrcspcctivc of 
the decision taken by the Army, if Juan Carlos votes against a coup, he will adiicve his 
aim and the Army will lose. 
The interesting thing to note, from Fig. 20, is that if both players oppose the Coup, a balance is reached; Juan Carlos remains in control and the Army prescn'cs their 
position. There is also a balance achieved should both players opt to support the Coup. United, Juan Carlos and the Army would have stood a very real chance of success and 
yet this would have come at the expense of democracy and so interestingly, 
Juan Carlos 
would have both won and lost. Given the lessons learnt from Alfonso 
XII1 and 
Constantine of Greece, it is realistic to assume that Juan Carlos would not 
have risked 
an uncertain future based on an uneasy alliance with the Arnicd Forces. 
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A strategy that encompassed a greater military backing and therefore possessing 
a far greater capacity to generate results may well have been more successful. A central 
problem to the strategy of Armada383 was that he failed to take into account Juan 
Carlos's commitment to the democratic process and more importantly, drastically 
underestimated the obedience and loyalty the King commanded from the Armed forces. 
Juan Carlos was instrumental in thwarting the attempted coup, able as he was to gain 
control of the situation quickly and effectively, rally his supporters, reassure the 
population at large and prevent a military coup almost by force of will alone. 
The paradox of the Spanish case rests upon the position of Juan Carlos and the 
office which he had come to represent. The transition period had seen him successfully 
come to embody the power and authority of Franco in more than name only. lie had 
achieved recognition and was recognized as the ruler of Spain. The allegiance 
expressed towards him by the Armed Forces was not a result of his democratic stance, 
but rather due to his position as Commander-in-Chief. Juan Carlos was able to avert the 
coup because of military control and position rather than in the name of democracy 
itself. This was evident by his very appearance on the night in question. Juan Carlos 
did not appear as a defender of democracy or even as a man, but rather as the office of 
Commander-in-Chief. The simple act of appearing wearing his military uniform was 
sufficient to reassert his position as leader of the military3". From this mint on. 
783 
"Behind Armada's behaviour was a strange mixture of hubris and paternalism which 
led him to 
believe that he could both interpret the unspoken wishes of Juan Carlos and then present 
himself to hit 
brother officers as the King's spokesman. " (Martinez Ingles, A. 2001,191.7), (Preston 2004,479). 394 
"The military obeyed me, not only because I was one of them, but also, and above all, 
b«au%c I was 
the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces. Who would have taken me seriously if I had not been able to 
put on the uniform of Captain-General and address them in front of the television cameras? " (Vilallon9a 1993,200). (Translated from original by author). 
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subsequent demonstrations of obedience on the part of the military were to the office 
itself as opposed to the individual wearing the uniform. 385 
The ultimate collapse of the attempted coup was resultant from the failure to 
understand the relevance of institutional constraints. Despite the reforms that had bccn 
implemented, the political system in Spain remained just that. Mechanisms existed to 
prevent abuse and to ensure the survival of the system. The removal of Adolfo Su3rcx 
was a necessary and constitutionally protected course of action, just as had been the 
removal of Arias Navarro. The weakening of support for the government in light of 
domestic violence and inaction was perhaps an inevitable result of the underlying 
problems within Spain, problems that had been present before the reform process truly 
began. Those who sought to overthrow the existing system and implement one of old, 
did not take into account the inherent strength of the system as an institution and 
attempted to exogenously implement change without crucial endogenous support. In 
addition, the failure to accurately assess their own position within the system and 
recognise the constraints that this position created, prevented an exact determination of 
their relative power distribution; and this in turn ultimately resulted in their dcfeat at 
their own hands. 386 
The coup was brought about by adherence to the ideology of Franco and in that 
sense, was undertaken in his name and yet it was he who had appointed Juan Carlos to 
3eS 
"The experience of mass societies confirms that at least large aggregates of members 
do nt usually 
respond to ideas and ideologies in and of themselves. To collect and focus the support of 
large numbers 
of members and to link their feelings to other objects requires some way of eoncrrtiring their 
attachments. Typically, this has been achieved in part by the emergence of vigorous and trustej leadm 
who, the members and followers are led to believe, in some way embody the 
ideals and stand for the 
promise of fulfilment. They are the personal bridges acting as ties to the new norms and structures of 
authority. " (Easton 1967,305). 3,6 
"At no point during the transition was the military permitted to enter into real ncgotiaticmf nrgarding the course of important political developments. At most, they were merely 'informed' by Sulres of 
his 
intentions, and much of the time found themselves reacting to fails accomplis. 71utwgh his own behaviour and that of Vice-President General Guti6rrez-Mellado, this restricted the role fier the military 
was institutionalised. " (Gunther 1992,74). 
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the position of Commander-in-Chief. 387 The conspirators were attempting to 
deconstruct a system that they had helped to build, and one that was firmly grounded in 
Francoist ideological constructs itself. 388 The existence of a strong leader was a familiar 
concept and one that was clearly too potent to overthrow. 389 Attempts to override 
institutions are largely met with opposition as the institution recognises the attack and 
relies upon the governing rules and protective structure to prevent such an action. 
`"Thus, political institutions define the framework within which politics takes placc. s390 
The necessity for rational analysis on the part of individuals is essential but it 
must be reinforced with the ability of an individual to physically initiate the process of 
change, as clearly demonstrated by previous events in the transition process. The 
ideological 
must be connected to the actual in order for progress to be made, but this by 
itself will not guarantee a successful outcome. The ultimate need to adhcrc to the 
institutionally protected framework of existing constraints391 and shape change from 
within an organization prevented a successful outcome to the attempted coup of 23-F. 
397 All are loyal, above all else, to the supreme head of the Armed Forces, King Juan Carlos. Like so 
many other high-ranking military officers, a great number of captain-generals we Juan Carlos as 
'successor to the Caudillo', regard his training at the military academies positively, and consider 
obedience to him above and beyond observance of the Constitution. " (Colomer 1995.110). 798'The institutional variants of the approach focus attention on the importance of institutions as 
mechanisms for channelling and constraining individual behaviour. The basic argument of the rational 
choice approaches is that utility maximization can and will remain the primary motivation of individuals, but those individuals may realize that their goals can be achieved most effectively through institutional 
action, and find that their behaviour is shaped by the institutions. Thus, in this view, individuals 
rationally choose to be to some extent constrained by their membership in institutions. W 
hcther that 
9embership is voluntary or not. " (Peters 1999,44). If Political leaders, for various reasons, are understood to be the founders of democracy, then they 
also often function, after that initial breakthrough, as its sustainers or its underminers. Thus, 
for example, 
they design political institutions (which affect the quality and, perhaps, the very survival of democracy); they decide to be more or less constrained by the rules of the democratic game (which affects quality and 
sustainability); and in periods of political and/or economic difficulties, they can use their poarr to either V9rotect democracy or destroy it. " (Bunce 2000,709). 
3° 
(March & Olsen 1989,18). 
Without denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of 
individual 
actors, therefore, institutional analysis posits a more independent role for political 
institutions. The state 
is not only affected by society but also affects it.. 
. 
Political democracy depends not only on economic and 
social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. Bureaucratic agencies, 
legislative 
committees, and appellate courts are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of 
standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, normt, 
interests, identities, 
and beliefs. " (March & Olsen 1989,17). 
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The role of individuals is important as highlighted by the involvement of Armada and 
ultimately by Juan Carlos and yet, without the institutional backing of his position as 
Commander-in-Chief, Juan Carlos would have been unable to halt the coup in the 
manner in which he did, and potentially, would have failed altogether from preventing a 
dramatic increase in domestic violence and civil unrest. In this respect, the role of 
individuals is important, but only becomes critically significant when supported by the 
fundamental recognition of a structured institutional framework. 
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Conclusion 
The prevalent thought regarding the role of individuals within political proccsscs 
is perhaps best outlined thus, "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly 
that events have controlled me. 1092 There is very little room for manoeuvre as the 
system will override individual preference and perpetuate action according to 
established traditions and norms. It can be argued that those who operate from within 
the political sphere do so for personal gain and that little will be done to initiate change 
as it is neither easy to achieve nor beneficial to try. The conception that political inertia 
will triumph over personal involvement is plausible and therefore, to a certain cxtcft 
true. What this thesis has attempted to demonstrate is the capabilities afforded to 
motivated and dedicated individuals and the relative power and influence they are able 
to exert in given situations. 
I set out, in this thesis, to prove that single actors were capable of influencing 
political processes and that the course of a transition to democracy was directly linked 
to those involved in the shaping of it. While I do not wish to argue that single actors are 
responsible for the entirety of political action and that they remain untouched by 
external pressure or influence, this thesis was designed to highlight the relative 
importance and latent potential of individuals in relation to those constraints that 
inexorably direct the course of history. The notion that actors are completely 
subordinate to institutions and can play no part in shaping the structure of politics is one 
that contradicts the issue of free will and rational choice to a certain extent. 
If 
individuals are powerless to act, then all political processes would be shaped according 
to the given parameters and a simple analysis of the data would provide us with an 
392The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln edited by Roy P. Basler, Volume VII, "LMtcr to 
Albeit 0. 
Hodges" (April 4,1864), p. 281. 
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accurate predictive capability. 393 Reality is much more complex and any sophisticated 
investigation of political processes must, at the very least, take into account the role 
played by single actors. 
The focus of this thesis, while centred on that of individuals does not rest there 
alone. The content of this work was designed to not simply illustrate the role played by 
specific individuals, in this case a group of three specific men, but to contcxtualisc this 
role by situating it within the wider sphere of institutional constraints. I have attempted 
to provide a link between the behaviour of individuals and the structure within which 
this behaviour is permitted to operate. No decisions are made in a vacuum and the 
motivations behind, and the implications of these decisions, must be taken into account. 
Analysis of specific decisions must be grounded by the awareness of the parameters 
governing action. Attention must be paid to the nature of the system and the historical 
and cultural constraints that exist 394 For this purpose, I included an historical account 
of Spain up to and including the period under investigation. It is important to 
understand the shape of that under analysis in order to accurately interpret actions taken. 
I chosc Spain for scvcral rcasons. The transition to democracy cxpcricnccd in 
this country is remarkable and providcs grcat insight into the general proccss of 
transitions. Within the incrcdibly short pcriod of 7 ycars from 1975 to 1982, Spain was 
transfonncd from the dictatorship of Franco to the socialist democratic government of 
393 
"For some scholars, democracy is understood to be a by-product of elite actions, which are understood 
in turn to be a by-product of larger social forces. From this perspective, elites are seen as summariaers of 
long-term developments and as well-positioned representatives of larger forces. For other analysts, elite 
action in the here and now 
- 
and deliberate action in highly contingent circumstances at that - is what is 
understood to matter in the rise of democracy. " (dunce 2000,703). 
'w 
"The peculiar historical contribution to institutionalism, old or new, lies in history's fixation upon the 
past. If in social scientific terms each discipline 'owns' one particular variable, time is history's. Insofar 
as it has social scientific aspirations, history is just the study of the way in which the past shapes the 
present and the future. Or, in less Whiggish mode, we might say that historyjust amounts to the telling to 
stories about the past which we internalize as our own and which, in the telling and retelling. shape us and 
our future actions. " (Goodin 1996,3). 
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Felipe Gonzalez. This transition was no accident and nor can it be attributed to a 
natural progression of events as dictated by structural parameters. Countries such as 
Greece and Portugal experienced similar contributing factors such as military 
dictatorships and a shared cultural and ethnic background and yet failed to achieve the 
same level of success enjoyed by Spain. 395 This thesis has demonstrated that the 
initiative and capabilities of the individuals involved in the transition in Spain were 
fundamental in engineering change and without their direct involvement, the end result 
would have been greatly different. 396 
The role of institutions is one that is equally important and was to play a decisive 
role in the Spanish case. This thesis has included analysis of the structure of 
institutions, the role they played within the process and the constraints that they placed 
upon the autonomy of individuals. Unlike previous analysis of the Spanish case, the 
connection between the two elements; actors and institutions, has been established. I 
have demonstrated the manner in which the two are connected and the possibilities that 
still existed for unilateral action to be adopted, providing the rules were adhered to. In 
order for this to happen, it is of course necessary for the actors to be fully conscious of 
the system within which they arc operating and to conform, to a certain extent, to the 
parameters that exist. What makes the Spanish case interesting is that the actors 
"s 
"Spain and Brazil were the prototypical cases of change from above, and the Spanish case in particular 
became the model for subsequent democratization in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In 1988 and 
1989, for instance, Hungarian leaders consulted extensively with Spanish leaders on how to introduce 
democracy and in April 1989 a Spanish delegation went to Budapest to otTcr advice. " (Iluntington 
1991/2,593). 
396 
"A different series of events would have transpired if the ultraconservative prime minister (and close 
friend of Franco) Luis Carrero Blanco had not been assassinated in 1973; if the term of the president of 
the Cones and of the Council of the Realm had not expired at the time of Franco's death (enabling Juan 
Carlos to appoint to those key posts his former tutor and close collaborator, Torcuato Fertt5ndez" 
Miranda); if Adolfo Suarez had not replaced as prime minister the less flexible Carlos Arias Navarro... if 
it had been Juan Carlos who had been accidentally shot and killed by his brother, rather than the other 
way around; of if King Juan Carlos had bchavcd like his grandfather, Alfonso XIII. Implicit in this 
analysis is the observation that elite settlements are highly contingent events, requiring the right 
circumstances and the right people in the right place at the right time. This is to say that settlements are 
eminently political events. " (Gunter 1992,78). 
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involved, not only conformed to the rules but also subverted them to suit their needs and 
aims. This subversion was made possible thanks to a fundamental understanding and 
appreciation of their own limits coupled with an awareness of the nature of the 
structural limitations of the system itself. The four events that were chosen for this 
thesis were done so to highlight not only key elements of the transition itself, but also to 
provide the opportunity to analyse the data from different perspectives thus providing a 
more comprehensive understanding of the transition as a whole. 
The Nomination of Juan Carlos 
The nomination of Juan Carlos at the hands of Francisco Franco is instrumental 
in illustrating the direct influence of individuals. Decisions taken by the Caudillo were 
largely his and his alone. Advice was received from counsellors but for the most part, 
Franco acted in a unilateral manner. One could argue that the transition to democracy in 
Spain would not have taken place without the direct involvement of Juan Carlos, and 
indeed hindsight would support this claim. Juan Carlos has been called the `pilot', or 
`motor' of the transition and is largely understood as having been directly responsible 
for the successful establishment of democracy in Spain. This understanding extends to 
claims that he was in possession of a master-plan for the transition prior to the death of 
Franco. This is a difficult assertion to prove and while I do not believe that Juan Carlos 
foresaw every possibility and angle from the outset, I do believe that there existed an 
idea of the direction in which he wanted Spain to move. This is evident from speeches 
and interviews, detailed in the chapter above, he, gave during the last few years of 
Franco's death where he asserted his desire for reform and democratic progress. 
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While the evidence does not support the existence of a master plan, I do not 
believe that Juan Carlos was as ill-prepared as many thought at the time. The moniker 
`Juan Carlos the brief was wrong and the assumption that he was a political 
incompetent was gravely misplaced. The actions analysed in the first event chapter 
illustrate his inexperience and his naivety but do not support claims that he was 
politically incapable or the mere puppet many expected him to become. The 
relationship Juan Carlos enjoyed with Franco was far from straightforward and evidence 
exists demonstrating the young prince's awareness of his role as a pawn in the game 
Franco was playing with Don Juan. The decision by Juan Carlos to accept the 
nomination demonstrates an awareness of the parameters set in place by Franco, the 
institution at the time. There was no other way for Juan Carlos to gain power, no other 
method for him to begin the process of change, but to align himself with the existing 
order, manifested in the person of Franco. This represented a rational decision by the 
young prince and one that we can safely claim was in his' best interest. If power was the 
only goal, that would be obtained with the title of monarch; and if change was the 
objective, that could also only be achieved thus. Demonstrating an appreciation of the 
structure of power and the limitations present in his own position, Juan Carlos opted to 
succumb to the criticism and alienation at the hand of his father, the jokes surrounding 
his political acumen and the whims of Franco in order to progress to the next stage of 
the process. 
The nomination of Juan Carlos represents a relatively straightforward event to 
analyse as it largely deals with the motivations and actions of two actors, in relation to 
each other. The level of communication was an important factor as Juan Carlos was not 
directly privy to the thoughts of Franco. This realisation determined the need to analyse 
events and determine the best course of action accordingly. The issue of 
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communication and dialogue between actors is one that this thesis has attempted to 
bring to the fore. When complete communication does not exist, what remains to the 
actors is rational decision making based upon a hypothesised preference ordering of 
themselves and the other party, or parties, involved in the game. In the case of the 
nomination of Juan Carlos, incomplete information did not prevent a successful 
outcome for Juan Carlos, rather, it taught him some valuable lessons about the nature of 
constraints, the mindset of the Francoist Bunker and ultimately, the tremendous 
importance attached to power and its distribution. 
The connection between that of individual capacity and institutional structural 
governance is one that is prevalent throughout and evident in this event, despite the 
restricted number of individuals involved. Franco represented the institution and Juan 
Carlos the individual. Franco acted as predicted; he chose a successor based upon an 
analysis of what was needed to perpetuate the regime. Juan Carlos had been groomed 
for the role and Franco clearly believed that he would continue in the vein intended. 
The institutional structure was very much in existence, as represented by both the 
Fundamental Laws and the Cortes. Juan Carlos acted in the only way possible, by 
adhering to the nature of the institution. In hindsight, this represented both, the only 
possible option available to him, and the one most closely suited to his goals. 
The Nomination of Adolfo Suarez 
The nomination of Adolfo Suarez represents the first proactivc decision on the 
part of Juan Carlos and is an event that overwhelmingly highlights the rclcvancc of 
individuals to political proccsscs. Were actors completely subordinate to institutional 
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constraints, there would have been no need to remove Arias Navarro from office and 
replace him with someone more suited to the goals of democratic reform. Arias 
Navarro was every inch a Francoist, was firmly entrenched in the ways of the old 
regime and he resented Juan Carlos as an upstart beneath his contempt. The very fact 
that he was removed demonstrates the importance of the involvement of the `right 
people at the right time', and the manner in which he was removed is an ideal 
representation of the connection between the actions of individuals and the structure of 
the institution. 
The evidence shows that Juan Carlos did not associate Arias Navarro with 
democratic progress and, as detailed in the chapter above, the continued existence of 
Arias Navarro as prime minister, not only stalled the transition but also had a negative 
effect through the alienation of certain political groups. The inability of Arias Navarro 
to adapt to the changing political arena and his intimate connection to the Bunker 
signified his downfall. The importance of individuals rests with the manner in which 
they arc viewed by others. A great deal of politics is perception and given the task 
before Juan Carlos, the continued presence of Arias Navarro as premier was counter 
productive. The decision to remove Arias Navarro was perhaps an obvious one and yet 
given the nature of power distribution at this point in the transition, Juan Carlos was not 
permitted to act unilaterally, nor even appear to be doing so. 
While Juan Carlos had inherited his position from Franco he did not at this point 
in the transition possess the Caudillo's force of will and individual capability. Given 
that Juan Carlos was attempting to construct a democratic state from the existing 
foundations of a dictatorship, he was subordinate to structural parameters that had not 
existed for Franco. The reality of a democratic transition is that of an evolving 
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organism. Rules that existed and constrained previous regimes play a certain role, but 
with every decision made and every action taken, the rules are rewritten and a new set 
of constraints are introduced and placed upon the actors. Juan Carlos was not pcrmittcd 
to act in the same manner as had Franco, given the very different nature of his end goal. 
The necessity to base democracy upon the rule of law and open and accountable 
government creates institutional parameters that must be addressed and adhered to. The 
nomination of Adolfo Suarez represents one such occasion. 
The selection of Adolfo Suarcz was met with disbelief at the time and yet 
hindsight demonstrates his suitability for the role and is bolstered by his portrayal as the 
face of Spain's democratic transition. The importance of individuals is clearly 
demonstrated by the involvement of Adolfo Suärcz as he was a very visible figure who 
initiated change, sometimes through political connections, and sometimes through force 
of will and charisma alone. The manner in which Arias Navarro was removed shows a 
strict adherence to the institutional mechanisms in place. As detailed in the chapter 
above, the method employed by Juan Carlos and Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda was legal 
and open. The ability to subvert and change the existing system was made possible by 
an in depth knowledge of the workings of the process of selection and the crucial 
placement of key personnel, namely Fernandez-Miranda, to ensure that the correct 
course of action was executed. At no point did this represent an abuse of power, merely 
compliance to institutional structure and forni. 
The nomination of Adolfo Su; rcz differs from the nomination of Juan Carlos as 
more than two actors were directly involved. Any rational analysis, at the time, had to 
take into account the actions of more than one opponent. Tlic strategy constructed by 
Juan Carlos and Fernandez-Miranda was based upon the legal requirements set in place 
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for the replacement of a premier. The inclusion of Adolfo Sudrez's name on the list of 
possible candidates was seen as a waste of an entry, not as a subversion of the process; 
and the actual selection of Adolfo Suarez by Juan Carlos was permitted and protected 
by law. The absolute necessity for individual actors to operate within institutional 
constraints is clearly shown with this example, as is the importance of motivated and 
dedicated individuals. The connection between these two elements, institutional 
constraints and motivated individuals, was critical for the successful conclusion of 
Spain's transition to democracy. 
The Reform of the Cortes 
The reform of the Cortcs was chosen for inclusion in this thcsis for several 
reasons; it represents the turning point in the transition after which the remnants of 
Francoism were seen to truly have lost their power base, and it constitutes an ideal 
example of the connection between individuals and institutions. The sheer enormity of 
reforming any system of government is significant and the task of producing this change 
with the wholehearted agreement of the institution itself is difficult to fathom. As has 
been mentioned above, the parameters that constrained the actions of the elite actors had 
not existed to constrain Franco. Unilateral action was not possible and would have been 
viewed by all involved, those in favour of democracy included, as a break from the 
spirit of the transition. The successful nomination and election of Adolfo Suarez as 
prime minister had clearly demonstrated the possibilities for change to be executed, 
providing the existing system of rules was strictly adhered to. Internal development 
could be achieved providing certain factors could be controlled and key personnel 
employed where needed. Herein lies an important clement of the Spanish transition; 
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namely the ability of the elite actors to learn from prior events and to be sufficiently 
aware of the parameters as to make correct decisions at the correct times. 
The Cones represented a traditional institution in Spanish political life, not 
simply as a souvenir of Francoism but as the foundation of government and law. To 
initiate external reform would have resulted in disaster and prevented further progress. 
Rational analysis and an acute awareness and knowledge of the inner workings of the 
political system were crucial for the reform process. The established members of the 
Cortcs, for the most part Francoist ministers conditioned to a limited amount of personal 
freedom in decision making under Franco, were no match for the intricate and highly 
sophisticated machinations of Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda and Adolfo Suarez. 
Bearing this in mind, the absolute necessity of a fundamental understanding of the 
situation at hand, based upon expert knowledge and preparation transition becomes 
apparent. When one is capable of implementing change through force alone, it will 
largely be due to the nature of the system as well as the relative power one can be said 
to possess. The system must support change of this nature and be conditioned to 
operate within these parameters. The elite actors involved in the democratic transition 
did not enjoy this luxury and therefore substituted outright power and force for attention 
to detail and action based on rational analysis. 
The manner in which reform was achieved is a demonstration of the 
communication that existed between various actors and the ability to determine the 
responses of others. A key clement of the Spanish transition was the aptitude displayed 
by men such as Juan Carlos, Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda and Adolfo Sum to 
manipulate the existing variables and ensure a successful outcome. Very little was lcft 
to chance in the actions taken by the elite actors. An awareness of the parameters 
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enabled them to construct a strategy based upon a rational ordering of the preferences of 
others. With the existence of institutions comes a set of established responses and 
expectations and this allows for the possibility of reform. Internal reform is a natural 
part of the institutional structure and providing any action taken remains within this 
structure, there is very little that can be done to prevent it. In many ways, the traditional 
members of the Cortes, those sufficiently aware that is, would have been able to see the 
reform before it actually took place and yet there was nothing that could be done to 
prevent it. The beauty of the transition process in Spain was the deconstruction and 
reform of the system by its own hand. 
The internal manipulation of the Cortes was a result of extensive planning and 
preparation, an intrinsic understanding of what would be necessary for reform to take 
place, the ability to develop a rational analysis into a successful course of action and the 
relative power and influence to engineer all of the above. The existence of institutions 
alone would not have provoked such a change; the involvement of individuals was 
required to produce the end result. The existence of individuals alone however, would 
not have resulted in the desired change as a greater degree of external force would have 
been necessary and the resultant effect would have been interpreted as a unilateral 
attack upon the government of a country as opposed to a demonstration of required and 
necessary internal reform. 
The Attempted Military Coup 
The attempted military coup d'etat represents the end of the period analysed in 
this thesis and as with the previous events, its selection was based on several factors. 
The attempted coup is significant because of the manner in which it was executed, the 
ease with which it was defused and the implications of these two actions. Prior events, 
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outlined above, were the result of proactive decisions on the part of the elite actors 
whereas the events of 23-F constituted the first real defence of democracy. This in itself 
is relevant as it indicates that by 1981 there existed something to defend, something that 
members of the traditionally Francoist establishment perceived as a real threat. 23-F 
demonstrates that there had been a definite redistribution of power in the political arena 
and one that had been felt by all. No longer were men like Juan Carlos merely puppets 
or young pretenders to be ignored; no longer was democracy a fad to be ignored, the 
establishment had firmly lost its stranglehold on Spanish politics. 
The elite actors, outlined in the previous chapters above, were forced to react 
during the attempted coup as opposed to acting on their own initiative. Those involved 
in the attempted coup failed largely due to lack of communication and incomplete 
information. There was no cohesion to the actions of the conspirators as had existed in 
the previous events examined. The necessity for information to be shared and used 
accordingly had been essential thus far and its absence in this case resulted in failure. 
The conspirators had failed to learn from past experiences and reform from within, but 
had instead attempted to halt change by the threat of force alone. This in itself 
represents an expected response from an institutional perspective. Those involved in 
the attempted coup were heavily attached to the establishment and the Francoist regime; 
with this came a learned and shared understanding of the manner in which action could 
be taken. 397 Viewed from the perspective of the elite reformists, the action of the 
conspirators was both predictable and expected. Micro the conspirators failed was in 
'°r 
"There is a tendency for large, powerful actors to be able to specify their environments, thus forcing 
other actors to adapt to them. Dominant groups create environments to which others must respond, 
without themselves attending to the others... The ability to ignore others can lead to long-term failure. 
Powerful institutions and individuals in them find it less important to monitor and team from experience 
and thus become less competent at doing so. Such an apparent disability may not hurt, but there is some 
chance that a powerful institution will become dependent on its capability to enact its own environment 
and consequently be unable to cope with a world in which it does not have arbitrary control. " (March and 
Olsen 1989,47). 
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their inability to manipulate variables and in their fundamental misunderstanding of the 
preferences and motivations of the other actors involved in the game. Communication 
is paramount o a successful completion of an activity of this nature. 
23-F highlights not only the absolute relevance of individuals, but also the 
necessity of a structural framework to guide and order possible actions. What is 
interesting about this event in particular is the manner in which it effortlessly connects 
the two. The human face of institutions is important; Juan Carlos had inherited his title 
and power from Franco and yet it was not until this point in the transition that he truly 
embodied them. Juan Carlos was successful in preventing the attempted coup precisely 
because he represented the establishment that the conspirators and the military respected 
and belonged to. The coup was presumably conceived as an attempt to halt change and 
return power to the hands of the military, but it resulted in an external attack upon the 
very system it was attempting to rescue. Juan Carlos' ability to represent the institution 
of authority provided him with the necessary support and influence to halt the events of 
23-F. In previous events, elite actors had manipulated the system from within and had 
shied away from direct and external action; this then was a fundamental flaw in the 
strategy adopted by the conspirators. 
What is relevant is the shape that institutions take as a result of the connection 
between structural constraints and human free will. Juan Carlos had become the 
institution and in so doing, had shaped it in his own image. The respect and obedience 
he enjoyed was due to his title, not to his persona and yet this was manipulated 
accordingly. Through the internal development of the system and the subtle increase in 
Juan Carlos' relative power base, he became both the face of democracy and the 
successor of Franco. The connection between institution and individual is undeniable, 
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the transformation sublime. During the transition period, the elite actors were forced to 
deal with parameters that had existed during Franco's regime and yet by 23-F, they 
were dealing with parameters of their own creation. The system had evolved under the 
careful manipulation of individuals dedicated and prepared to initiate change. 
Summary 
One can not fail to recognize the importance of individuals within the Spanish 
transition to democracy. This thesis has attempted to highlight the role played by men 
such as Juan Carlos, Adolfo Suarez and Torcuato Fcmindcz"Miranda in order to 
demonstrate "that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can change the world. 
Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has 
. 
098 The essence of this thesis is in the reality 
that actions of motivated and dedicated individuals must be situated within the confines 
of institutional and structural constraints. The very nature of an institutional framework 
provides the setting within which action can be initiated and change engineered. 
Awareness of the parameters that exist, analysis of the possible outcomes and a 
comprehensive manipulation of the variables are all elements of the process of 
transition. The framework that overrides individual activity does not do so to curtail 
liberty but rather exists to provide order and control to a potentially volatile situation. 
Understanding of this enables actors to reform and develop the system using rational 
analysis and the confines of the structure itself. The Spanish transition to democracy is 
a perfect example of the undeniable connection between individual freedom to act, and 
institutional constraint to shape these actions. 
3" (Margaret Mead). 
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